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Preface 
Once again it is a pleasure to acknowledge the financial support of Touche 
Ross Foundation that has made it possible to continue this series of biennial 
auditing symposia at the University of Kansas. The 1980 symposium was the 
fifth of the series, with some fifty invited practitioners and educators coming 
together for two days to consider the eight papers that were presented. 
As co-chairmen of the symposium and editors of these Proceedings, we 
assume full responsibility for the selection of topics for both the invited papers and 
those selected from the papers submitted in response to the call for papers for the 
symposium—a call which we reissue at this time for the sixth offering of the sym-
posium which we hope to present in May 1982. Papers or proposals for papers 
should be submitted to either of us by September 1, 1981. 
With the exception of the paper on the history of government auditing and the 
General Accounting Office, which continues the historical coverage of auditing 
that has opened each of the symposia, the papers reflect no unifying theme or pur-
pose, other than that the topics addressed or the research reported hold promise of 
being of interest to the invited participants from both practice and academe. A l l 
papers, except for the traditional evening address on a more general topic, were 
distributed in advance, making it possible for the preparer to limit comments to 
summary remarks or observations about the paper so that more than an hour was 
available for the prepared response of a selected discussant and the ensuing open 
discussion. Although these discussions invariably have been one of the highlights 
of the symposia, unfortunately it has not been feasible to attempt to capture and 
report these discussions for the benefit of the wider readership of the proceedings. 
For those who might like an opportunity to participate in the discussions at a 
future symposium, however, we would be pleased to receive an indication of your 
interest. 
The proceedings of each of the five symposia are in print and may be pur-
chased from: 
K A N S A S U N I O N B O O K S T O R E 
UNIVERSITY OF K A N S A S 
L A W R E N C E , K A N S A S 66045 
The titles and prepaid price of each of the volumes are as follows: 
1972 A U D I T I N G L O O K S A H E A D $5.00 
1974 C O N T E M P O R A R Y A U D I T I N G PROBLEMS $5.00 
1976 A U D I T I N G SYMPOSIUM III $5.00 
1978 A U D I T I N G SYMPOSIUM IV $6.00 
1980 A U D I T I N G SYMPOSIUM V $7.00 
In conclusion, we should like to acknowledge the encouragement, advice, 
and personal support of the symposia so generously proferred by Jerry Jackson, 
partner in charge of the Kansas City office of Touche Ross & Co. 
Donald R. Nichols 
Howard F. Stettler 
October, 1980 
University of Kansas 
Lawrence 
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A n Historical Perspective of Government 
Auditing—With Special Reference to the U.S. 
General Accounting Office 
Leo Herbert 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
Introduction 
Looking back on what has happened to auditing in the government by one 
who was there may give a somewhat warped perspective. Nevertheless, I am go-
ing to interject some of my own impressions of what happened in government ac-
counting and auditing during the past forty or fifty years that I have participated in 
these activities—in education, in state and local auditing, and in the Federal 
Government. 
Looking back into history only a short distance, a short enough distance to ob-
tain a vision of the environment that is causing auditing changes, we sometimes 
might not like what we foresee. Foreseeing changes oftentimes can be very 
disconcerting, because we can possibly see that the changes can extend into our 
own future in such a way that they will dramatically affect us and our future pro-
fessional lives. Most of us do not like rapid changes of any kind and especially 
those that directly affect us. Yet, you can see that changes in government auditing 
may be reflected in private auditing, and likewise, changes in private auditing can 
affect government auditing. 
First, let me give you an overview of what has happened in government 
auditing from the time that the United States started as an independent nation un-
til recently. Then I will give you a more detailed look at government auditing with 
special reference to auditing in the U.S. General Accounting Office during the 
past thirty years. By then, you should be ready to take a peek into the future to see 
some of the conditions in government auditing that may affect you in your profes-
sional activities, whether they be in education, public accounting, internal 
auditing, private accounting, or in governmental accounting. 
A Look at Audit ing During the Various Periods of United States History 
During my early years in the G A O , I became very interested in the history of 
auditing because what we in the G A O regarded as auditing seemed somewhat dif-
ferent from what the rest of the profession was calling auditing; furthermore, the 
impression I received from some of my friends in the public accounting profession 
was that they thought what we were doing was not auditing. I had many of them, 
including some members of state boards of accountancy and professors of account-
ing, tell me that only the examination of financial statements was auditing—and 
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nothing eke. Yet, I knew that what they were then doing in the way of making 
financial statement examinations was not what I was taught to do in my first col-
legiate course in auditing, about 25 years earlier. Obviously, in only a few years, 
quite a few changes had taken place in the meaning and practice of auditing, and 
these changes, as far as I was concerned, were still taking place. Furthermore, I 
felt, additional changes would continue to take place in the future. 
So, at that time I wrote a paper concerning some of those historical changes in 
auditing. I am going to paraphrase some of the statements I made at that time, 
because the points I made then are still relevant today. Let me start with what hap-
pened in auditing during the early history of our country, from the 1770's to the 
1870's. 
From the 1770's to the 1870's—100 Years of History 
I have always considered auditing as the professional part of accounting. If you 
consider auditing to encompass more than financial statement examinations, then 
you must think of accounting as being something much broader than merely 
financial record keeping. Accounting from this broader standpoint, moreover, 
would be more closely related to accountability than to accounts. With this in-
troduction, and with some minor changes, this is what I said concerning this early 
period of the history and what happened in accounting and auditing. 
The conditions under which accounting operated in the United States 
prior to the middle of the 19th century, both in government and business, 
can be stated very simply. The environment primarily was agricultural. 
Most businesses—agricultural, commercial, and industrial— were small. 
State and local governments were the dominant public bodies and most 
citizens believed the less government the better. There was little govern-
mental influence in any business activity. Any auditing was for the pur-
pose of checking the accuracy of vouchers, determining the legality of 
transactions, and finding fraud in the records. The concept of an indepen-
dent accountant could not be supported at that time in the United States.1 
If you will check into this period of early United States history you will find 
that most auditing done in this country at that time was performed by the United 
States government. This type of auditing was the review of vouchers to determine 
compliance with applicable laws or regulations and to determine whether any 
fraud had been committed. 
Notice, that in this type of auditing no financial statements were involved. 
Auditing included only a review of individual vouchers. "Voucher Auditing" 
continued long after newer types of auditing, such as balance sheet audits, finan-
cial statement examinations, and performance audits were discovered. The fact of 
the matter is, I saw a lot of voucher auditing in both the State of Louisiana and the 
G A O when I was there, but it was gradually being phased out. In addition, in 
early years, a great deal of State and local auditing was concerned with pre-
auditing, i.e., auditing before payment, as well as post auditing, i.e., auditing after 
payment of the voucher. But, this type of auditing changed very rapidly during 
the next 50 years. 
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From the 1870's to the 1920's— 50 Years of History 
Concerning change during this next fifty years, I said: 
Be that as it may, the environment changed so radically, immediately 
before and after the Civil War, that it influenced the functions of the ac-
countant (and auditor) and the knowledge he needed just as radically. In-
dustry, commerce, transportation, and finance were becoming 
preponderant, and they provided the major stimuli for accounting and 
auditing changes. The Federal Government, taking over from the States 
and municipalities, was becoming the dominant public body. 
Absentee owners of industrial, commercial, financial, and transporta-
tion businesses, rather than expecting accounting to be mainly an asset 
recording tool, were now beginning to require it to be an income measur-
ing tool—a tool for measuring the profit performance of those who carried 
out the activities for investors. 
Thus the auditor began to act as a representative of absentee owners 
rather than for the managers of business. In his audits, he represented the 
equity suppliers, and thus was independent of management. Now the en-
vironment began to support the concept of an independent accountant, 
and independent financial auditing became a part of the common body of 
knowledge of the accountant.2 
But independent financial auditing during the latter part of the 19th century 
was quite different from what it is today. Kohler and Pettingill, in a book pub-
lished in 1925 say: 
The American public accountant 40 years ago was frequently called 
an expert bookkeeper and his labors were confined largely to matters of 
locating errors and irregularities.3  
Thus, the auditor's approach during the 1870's and 1880's was largely the 
same as what the government auditor had been doing for 100 years; i.e., auditing 
vouchers for locating errors and irregularities. But, later on it changed to the audit 
of balance sheet accounts. In the same book, Kohler and Pettingill say: 
A number of years ago the Federal Trade Commission found that 
verified statements could be divided into the following two classes: 
1. Those in which the certificate is based on an examination of the books 
without independent appraisal of all assets with the aid of technical ap-
praisers. 
2. Statements verified with the personal supervision of inventories and the 
independent appraisal of all assets. 
Most balance sheet audits fall under the first category, and rightfully 
so. The accounting records of any business of ordinary size should be 
capable of satisfactory review in a few weeks' time by independent auditors 
without a physical inspection and appraisal of its assets. Occasional 
physical appraisals of properties by competent engineers, are, of course, 
necessary, not alone for testing the sufficiency of insurance carried, but 
also for the purpose of ascertaining the existence and estimating the future 
usefulness of properties appearing on the books. In most cases, it is safe to 
say, the auditor's technical abilities are best confined to extensive checks 
and comparison and a study of the general financial situation in which any 
business may find itself.4 
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You may notice that the term "balance-sheet" audit was the rightful title of 
audits at that time. The balance sheet was the primary statement, with the income 
statement just coming into prominence. The audit had moved from checking only 
individual transactions through voucher auditing to an examination of a summary 
of the vouchers in the accounts. The examination of accounts usually only in-
cluded balance sheet accounts; thus, the balance sheet audit. The auditor seldom 
went outside of the records during his examination, but he was beginning to be in-
dependent of the organization that was being audited. 
Government had lagged way behind the public accounting profession during 
this period. Government auditors were still auditing vouchers. Most of the 
auditors were a part of the branch of the government they audited, the executive 
branch, with only limited independence. In 1921, at the end of this period, the 
Federal Government adopted the idea of independent auditors, by setting up the 
United States General Accounting Office and transferring to it the functions and 
the auditors from the Treasury Department. 
From the 1920's to the M i d 1950's—35 Years of History 
From the 1920's to the mid 1950's the accounting profession grew very 
rapidly. During this period, I saw auditing move from the balance sheet audit to 
the examination of financial statements; from no standards for auditing to 
numerous generally accepted auditing standards; and from only a hint of generally 
accepted accounting principles, G A A P became the password of the day. I heard 
accountants say that the profession would never become proficient in observing 
inventory taking or expert in determining the validity of accounts receivable 
through account confirmations. 
I saw during this period: (1) government attempt to develop better ways of 
managing its expanded activities as a result of trying to overcome the worst 
depression that the nation has ever had, and (2) government spend more in one 
year than they had spent before in 100 years as a result of the effects of two world 
wars. And, as a result of the wars, the depression, and bigger central government, 
I saw the expansion of the income tax base so that practically all businesses, not 
only big businesses, and almost every individual, not only the extremely wealthy, 
paid income taxes. I saw the need for adequate payroll accounting because of the 
Social Security and withholding tax systems, and I saw the need for adequate 
audits in order to sell registered securities as a result of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission Acts stemming from the great depression. The fact is that 
during this period of rapid expansion of the accounting profession one of my 
graduate professors made a statement that all of us should consider. He said: 
"Each of us accountants should arise each morning and bow three times to 
Washington, because they have made the accounting profession what it is today.'' 
Of course, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue 
Service, and audit organizations, such as the G A O and the D C A A have all had a 
major impact on the private auditing profession. But when it came to auditing 
public organizations, is was not until the passage of the Government Corporations 
Control Act in 1945, that audits in government began to be comparable to those 
in the private sector. 
This Act required the G A O to audit government corporations in accordance 
with the principles and standards of the accounting profession. Thus, the G A O 
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then became the independent public accountant for all Federal Government cor-
porations. G A O ' s Corporation Audits Division reviewed the financial statements 
of some of the largest corporations in the United States—The Tennessee Valley 
Authority and The Columbia River Power System, for example. Their audits 
were made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and their 
audit reports expressed an opinion as to whether the statements were fairly 
presented in accordance with G A A P . But this part of G A O ' s responsibility was 
limited to the audit of financial statements of government corporations and did not 
include auditing the financial statements of all activities of government. 
Many states, likewise, were requiring their auditors to follow generally ac-
cepted auditing standards in making audits of state and local agencies. The major 
problems I found in our audits in Louisiana, at that time, were not related to 
following generally accepted auditing standards, but to finding accounting prin-
ciples that we could use as a basis for expressing an opinion on the statements. To 
a certain extent, it became necessary for the auditor to develop his own generally 
accepted accounting principles and any legal principles that were needed. Thus, 
the auditor in government was somewhat both a legal expert and an accountant. 
But all auditing activities of government changed as dramatically as in the public 
accounting profession. 
In the early 1950's, Congress passed an Act that said that G A O should be the 
public accountant for all agencies and departments, and not only for the corpora-
tions of the Federal Government. It was also given the responsibility for stating ac-
counting principles and standards for Federal organizations. In other words, the 
auditor in the G A O , instead of having the vouchers sent in to him, was going to 
the site of the audit, as an independent auditor, to make his review. And, instead 
of auditing only vouchers and preparing statements of government agencies, he 
would audit all of the activities of the Federal Government, including the ex-
amination of financial statements, as well as the audit of any funds that went to 
private sources for government procurement of goods and services. 
You can easily visualize what a change this would make in the activities of the 
G A O . Instead of having voucher checkers as auditors, they would need profes-
sional accountants. Instead of sitting behind a desk reviewing and stamping 
vouchers, they would go to the site of the audit to professionally examine the ac-
tivities of the departments, agencies, and corporations of the government. In addi-
tion they would audit any funds that went to private sources for government pro-
curement of goods and services. 
From the M i d 1950's to 1970—15 Years of History 
Most of you have lived during this period and can attest to what has happened 
to auditing as it applies to education, public accounting, internal auditing, and 
government. Auditing standards have expanded, principles of accounting have 
grown dramatically, lawsuits in the public accounting field have run rampant, and 
the supply of professionally trained accountants has not been sufficient to meet the 
demand. Many factors have increased this demand for personnel for accounting 
and auditing services: 
—the expanded requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and of the Internal Revenue Service; 
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—the effect of two wars on our economy; 
—the expansion of technology, such as, television; the space program, in-
cluding a landing on the moon, a look at other planets, and the possibil-
ity of space travel; 
—nuclear energy, including the possibility of a nuclear war; 
—the almost universal adoption of contracting with private corporations 
to fulfill the military, space, and atomic needs; 
—the shifting from the government's taking care of social problems to let-
ting private enterprise and local government organizations take care of 
them through the use of federal funds. 
In addition to creating shortages in auditing personnel, these factors have also 
brought about the intermeshing of private auditing with public auditing, and na-
tional auditing with international auditing. The expansion of demand for account-
ing and auditing services also created other problems: not only obtaining new per-
sonnel but also developing current personnel to meet the demands of the changing 
practice. 
In April 1956, I went to the U.S. General Accounting Office as a consultant 
and stayed on as the Director of the Office of Staff Management with the responsi-
bility for developing its professional staff. You will remember that until the late 
forties and early fifties the mandate of the Office was to examine vouchers, but this 
was slowly changing. I made a study for the Comptroller General soon after I went 
with G A O and found that of the approximately 5,000 employees, only 1,226 
could be classified as "accountants and auditors." Of those 1,226 we could find 
only 226 we could identify as professional accountants and auditors. Most of 
those classified as professional auditors had been contract auditors during the 
World War II, with most of them coming from large national public accounting 
firms. They decided after the war to stay in the government rather than go back to 
their private employment. Others had come in after the war in the Corporations 
Audit Division, the division set up by the Comptroller General to audit govern-
ment corporations. A few of the voucher auditors had demonstrated their capabil-
ity as professionals and had been converted to auditors; a few of the professionals 
were accounting systems experts, with limited auditing background. 
With this nucleus of professional accountants and auditors, with the auditors 
being required to audit in accordance with the principles and standards of the 
public accounting profession, and with the auditors being on the site of the audit, 
most of them found that it was almost impossible to audit the financial statements 
of the departments and agencies of the Federal government. It would be almost 
impossible for them to state that in their opinion the statements were fairly 
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Although 
the G A O had set forth accounting principles for the Federal Government, most of 
the agencies and departments of government did not have an accounting system 
that would provide information that could in any way be said to be accordance 
with G A A P . Consequently, the auditors began to expand their audits into areas 
that led to determining the efficiency and economy of the operations of the 
organization. G A O found that the Congress, to whom the reports were sent, was 
more interested in the accountability of the management of the departments and 
agencies than they were in accounts and financial reports. As a result, G A O 
developed what, in the early stages, they called a ''Comprehensive Audit . " This 
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audit included not only a partial review of the financial records but also an audit 
for efficiency and economy of particular operations of the organization. Efficient 
operations include: (1) holding the costs constant while increasing the benefits, (2) 
holding benefits constant while decreasing the costs, (3) increasing costs at a 
slower rate than benefits, and (4) decreasing costs at a faster rate than benefits. 
Economical operations involves the elimination or reduction of needless costs. 
Thus, economy and efficiency, as they both pertain to reduction or elimination of 
costs, are equivalent in meaning. Only when costs remain constant or increase in 
relation to increasing benefits are the meanings different. 
The reception of Congress to the efficiency and economy audits was very 
favorable, and except for the corporation audits, where principles and standards of 
accounting were important, financial statement audits for all intents and purposes 
were eventually eliminated. Efficiency and economy audits were the only ones 
given to the Congress, the agency, and the public. During this period that saw the 
movement to economy and efficiency audits, we found in the G A O that through 
developing and using a conceptual framework for training, auditors who had been 
educated or trained in auditing financial statements found it very easy to shift to 
auditing management's performance for efficient and economical operations. We 
also found that the basic approach to auditing was the same, whether it be for 
financial or management auditing. Since each audit for efficiency and economy 
was, in almost all cases, separate and distinct from every other audit, unlike finan-
cial statement audits, one or two additional steps were needed to specifically iden-
tify the particular activity that needed auditing. But these new steps could be 
learned very easily if the auditor knew the procedures of auditing and the specific 
elements of any audit. The conceptual framework for training we developed for 
these types of audits identified those elements as: criteria, causes, and effects. 
From there on, all the auditor had to learn was a little more about evidence. 
Since all auditors were at that time required to gather evidence by observing 
inventories, by confirming receivables, as well as by reviewing records, they 
sometimes did not have insight into gathering evidence from sources other than 
records, and past habits are hard to change. I can remember a discussion I had 
with our policy staff concerning the use of interview evidence. They said that in-
terview evidence could not be used alone as evidence—it had to be supported by 
records evidence. I suggested to the policy staff that they might want to look into 
the reasoning behind why judges and lawyers wanted information from knowledg-
able individuals, rather than from records, to prove their legal issue. This legal 
view of interview evidence seemed to me to be exactly opposite of what the policy 
staff had told me about the value of that type of evidence as compared to records 
evidence. This distinction between relative values of types of evidence took several 
years and a good understanding of audit evidence by all of the staff members con-
cerned before the question was satisfactorily resolved. 
Adding on one or two additional steps to find out just exactly what activity 
needed to be audited for efficiency and economy; learning that management con-
trol for purchasing, marketing, and other management activities is no different 
from internal control for accounting; understanding the meaning of evidence as it 
applies to both financial and management audits; and learning the techniques of 
writing a report instead of copying a standard report; the auditors soon became 
very proficient in making audits for efficiency and economy. But one of the 
pecularities of their becoming proficient in measuring the efficiency and economy 
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of operations of others is that the G A O auditors found out how others were 
measuring them. The employees in the various divisions of G A O , so it seems, had 
found that they were being measured by the number of reports that they issued. 
T o increase their performance potential, they learned how to make additional 
reports out of one report. They called these reports "drip-type" reports. To do 
this, they determined the minimum amount of effects the office would accept in 
each report. The magic amount was $100,000. For example, instead of consider-
ing whether a corporation was efficiently or economically carrying out the con-
tracts it had with the government on an overall contract basis, possibly $500 or 
$800 million worth, they considered each contract separately and "drip-type 
reported" any deficiency as long as the amount was at least $100,000. The cor-
poration may have been doing an excellent job overall, but on this one particular 
contract, they may have overstated costs to the government of at least $100,000. 
Thus, a report would be issued on that one contract without considering what was 
taking place with all of the other contracts. For example, the contractor may have 
understated costs by $100,000 on another contract. This often made the corpora-
tion look as if it were cheating the government, as if it were inefficient or 
uneconomical, or if it were doing a very poor job, even when they were doing an 
excellent job on an overall basis. 
Another illustration of drip-type reporting is that found in leasing versus buy-
ing of electronic data processing equipment. Instead of making one report on the 
cost to the government for leasing instead of purchasing all data processing equip-
ment, one report was issued for each contract, as long as the report had in it a defi-
ciency of at least $ 100,000. 
If there is one thing that I learned about auditing for deficiencies in manage-
ment during this period, it is this one point—if you want to improve the opera-
tions of management, rather than to make a headline, place your deficiencies in 
proper perspective. Isolating immaterial deficiencies for headline purposes is often 
used to destroy people rather than to improve operations. For instance, a general 
built a fancy doghouse for his beloved puppy out of appropriated funds. Even 
though he was doing an excellent job overall, this simple, but very limited, defi-
ciency in his management gave him a very hard time, especially from the press. 
Isolating deficiencies in order to gain headlines in newspaper stories has seemed to 
me to be a very poor way to improve managerial operations. It seems to me that 
reporting isolated deficiencies, if reported often enough, gives the impression that 
everything is bad, and there is no good at all in management's operations. Which 
is not true. 
While these isolated deficiency reports often impressed news makers, you can 
imagine how many congressmen and their staff, most agency heads, and many 
corporation executives felt about them. Overall, most of the managers were doing 
a fairly good job, needing a balanced perspective as to what deficiencies they had in 
their operations, in order to improve them. So, in the middle 1960's, Congress 
held hearings on this type of work. From these hearings, this single, isolated, drip 
type report, except for exceptional circumstances, became a past issue. The Con-
gress said they wanted to know whether the overall operations were being con-
ducted efficiently and economically, and suggested that G A O might look into 
whether the programs of government were being operated effectively. This leads 
us to the next period. 
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From the 1970's to 1980 — T e n Years of History 
Frederick C. Mosher, summarizing this last ten year period of G A O ' s ac-
tivities says they have ranged: 
—from frugality in expenditures towards effectiveness; 
—from audits for legal compliance toward reviews of management; 
—from suspicion of and hostility to the executive branch towards coopera-
tion and collaboration; 
—from individual transactions toward systems and problems; 
—from a punitive approach toward a corrective approach; 
—from nearly total independence toward interdependence with Congress; 
—from concerns about the past toward concerns about the future; 
—from concerns of auditing in itself toward devolution to executive agen-
cies; 
—from strictly financial matters toward costs and results of programs.5 
By the end of the 1960's, G A O had practically divested itself of that punitive 
approach to auditing—reviews for legal compliance, for errors in individual 
vouchers, and for efficiency and economy of individual actions—and had started 
the improvement (corrective) approach: reviews of the overall activity of manage-
ment for efficiency and economy and of management's programs for effectiveness. 
Programs were considered effective when management achieved the goals or ex-
pected results desired by third parties and management agreed on and accepted 
those goals. 
This trend toward reviews for effectiveness automatically brought about more 
concern for the future than for what had happened in the past. In addition, G A O 
began to be concerned with auditing for what the Congress, the major user of the 
reports, wanted and needed as well as for what G A O wanted. With the expansion 
of governmental activity at all levels, G A O became concerned with the decen-
tralization of the audit function by determining what best could be done by agency 
auditors, CPA's , and state and local auditors instead of the G A O doing it all 
themselves. 
Let me give you an illustration showing the differences between efficiency and 
economy audits and effectiveness audits. This illustration concerns the readiness 
of a particular military unit. This unit was supposed to be ready to fight anywhere 
in the world on 24 hours notice. We reported that the guns wouldn't shoot, the 
airplanes wouldn't fly, the tanks wouldn't run, the trucks weren't available, and 
the men couldn't be found. This is quite a bit more responsive than a report that 
says that a particular tank could be produced for less if the department used com-
parable parts from the previously used tanks. 
Furthermore, let me show you how the reports on efficiency and economy 
changed and how much broader they are today by considering the overall manage-
ment activity rather than by considering a single isolated action. This illustration 
is concerned with management using a particular type of spark plug (a platinum 
tipped spark plug) in place of a regular spark plug for use in military aircraft. This 
new plug costs four times as much as the regular plug, but users were obtaining 
only the same amount of service life. It was shown that the service life that should 
have been obtained from the new plug was six to 10 times that being obtained. If 
the users obtained the full service life from the plug, they could have saved hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars. Compare that to a recent report (February 7, 1980, 
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LCD-80-30) concerning the system of ground support for military aircraft. That 
report says that hundreds of millions of dollars could be saved each year if the 
military standardized ground support for all military aircraft—ground support 
such as tow-bars, boarding ladders, maintenance stands, electrical connectors, 
automatic test equipment, and the like, instead of developing particular support 
for each type of aircraft. Contrast this with earlier G A O reports that would have 
taken each individual part of the ground support for each particular type of aircraft 
and made a report out of it. 
This move towards effectiveness reviews and broader based economy and effi-
ciency audits was not an easy challenge. Many of the staff members had become 
extremely capable in making these single, drip-type, deficiency audits, and were 
especially afraid to move to effectiveness reviews. Since we had found that by us-
ing a conceptual framework, we could very rapidly train a staff member to make 
deficiency type audits, we decided that we should develop a conceptual structure 
for training in auditing for the effectiveness of a management system or program. 
One person I had review my paper suggested to me that I give an illustration of 
how these concepts can be used. So, for this purpose, I have included an illustra-
tion in the appendix. 
I mentioned earlier the military readiness review as an early start in the direc-
tion toward effectiveness reviews, but the audit effort in social areas often is more 
complex and difficult than that in military areas for the reason that often there is 
no consensus on the criteria that should be used as a basis for measuring results. 
Whenever the goals are already accepted and standards for accomplishing them 
are available, such as when the Bureau of Indian Affairs has the goal of bringing 
the level of education of Indian students to that of the average American within 
ten years, then an auditor can complete the audit without too much outside help. 
But when a program has no accepted goals and has no standards for measurement 
to determine whether the goals are being accomplished, some help from experts in 
the particular field of that program is needed. Take for example a program that has 
as its goal to make new buildings in each state more energy efficient. Obviously, if 
the program manager, such as a particular state agency, has not developed any 
standards for improving the energy efficiency of new buildings erected in the 
State, the program has little chance of accomplishing its goal or of being effective. 
But suppose the program manager had developed some standards that were being 
required in all new buildings. How would you be able to measure this unless you 
had some help from experts in that field to determine whether those energy effi-
ciency standards were the right ones? G A O has found that help in many of the 
newer program areas is needed in order to evaluate some of the programs, and 
consequently many of the newer staff members coming into the G A O are from 
engineering, atomic energy, mathematics, actuarial science, economics, and other 
fields as well as from the accounting field. 
But where are all of these improved approaches to auditing going to lead 
government auditing, and how will they affect us? To find out let us take a peek at 
the future of governmental auditing. 
A Peek at the Future of Governmental Audit ing 
Some directions that I believe governmental auditing will take in the future 
are: 
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1. A l l governmental units—state and local as well as Federal—will require 
the same type of auditing now found in the G A O — that is, less em-
phasis will be placed on financial statement examinations and more will 
be placed on auditing for efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. 
2. Public accountants will become more and more involved in 
governmental auditing and hence more and more involved in auditing 
for efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. 
3.Once public accountants learn that there is very little difference in the 
practice of auditing in one area of management performance, i.e, finan-
cial statement examinations, as compared to the review of the activities 
of an organization for efficiency and economy and a program for effec-
tiveness, they will be ready to move into the same type audits in private 
corporations. 
Types of Audits in A l l Governmental Organizations 
The Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Ac-
tivities, and Functions states: 
This concept of accountability is woven into the basic premises supporting 
these standards. These standards provide for a scope of audit that includes 
not only financial and compliance auditing but also auditing for economy, 
efficiency, and achievement of desired results. Provision for such a scope of 
audit is not intended to imply that all audits are presently being conducted 
this way or that such an extensive scope is always desirable. However, an 
audit that would include provision of the interests of all potential users of 
government audits would ordinarily include provision for auditing all the 
above elements of the accountability of the responsible officials.7 
These elements include: (1) financial and compliance auditing, (2) economy 
and efficiency auditing, and (3) program results auditing. Program results auditing 
is what I am calling effectiveness auditing. 
With the formation of intergovernmental audit forums, with at least one book 
and many articles on auditing management performance, and with the various 
departments and agencies of the Federal Government requiring better accounta-
bility in state and local management's use of Federal funds, I can see that it will 
not be very long until auditing in each of these areas becomes common place 
throughout all levels of government. It appears to me that the emphasis in the 
future in governmental auditing will be on compliance, efficiency, and effec-
tiveness auditing, rather than on financial statement examinations. 
I also believe that any increased emphasis in government on financial state-
ment examinations for third party users will be on the audit of the overall govern-
mental unit as an entity rather than on the fund as an entity. I believe this will 
come about: (1) because of the increasing use by third parties of government 
bonds as an investment and the need of those parties for information that they can 
rely on concerning the security behind those investments, and (2) because of the 
Federal Government's interest in the activities of State and local government— 
they provide at least one third of their financing. I doubt that you can obtain the 
information needed today by these parties from audited financial statements of 
governmental units on the fund basis, even though the statements for all funds are 
shown on a combined basis. 
11 
Of even less value than combined statements of municipalities are those in-
dividual statements of agencies and departments of states and the Federal govern-
ment. For instance, I have very little confidence that the information from the 
statements of the G A O would help me to determine whether the Federal govern-
ment has sufficient resources to back its bonds. The same lack of confidence ap-
plies to state agency financial statements. What value would the statements from 
the highway department be in convincing me that the state could pay its debts or 
provide matching funds for Federal grants? Maybe highway revenue bonds that 
did not have state backing would be considered by investors and the Federal 
government, but then you are into the area of income determination, using 
generally accepted accounting principles for this purpose, rather than generally ac-
cepted accounting principles for governmental agencies. 
If this trend in government continues towards the need by third parties for 
total government information through desire for consolidated financial statements 
on the full accrual basis, it means that there will need to be a major change in 
what is now considered principles of accounting for governmental agencies. I 
believe that change will take place very rapidly. 
From the above discussion you can understand why the Congress lost all in-
terest in financial statement audits for agencies and became more interested in 
audits of efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of their operation. The user of the 
audit report has a great deal to say about what is audited and how it is reported, 
and the audit report should at least attempt to meet some of his needs. 
It seems to me that one need by third parties in reports on efficiency and effec-
tiveness is that audits should be more timely reported. To meet this need for more 
timely reports, auditors are going to have to learn a lot more about planning for, 
obtaining, and evaluating audit evidence, and about the way evidence determines 
our conclusion on an audit objective. This field of audit evidence, then, appears to 
me to be a very important area of research that universities and other research in-
stitutions should spend a great deal more time on in the future. This is so if 
auditors are to learn how to plan for, obtain, and evaluate sufficient evidence on 
the audit objective in order to have a timely report without the inherent risk that 
goes with insufficient evidence. 
Another problem that I can see coming as a result of audits of management 
performance, one that may create a clash between the user and the auditor but one 
that I do not know how to give you a proper answer on, is that concerning in-
dependence. When auditors evaluate policy, policy makers want them to make the 
policy. Sometimes this seems the obvious way to go. Yet, if they make policy, 
they lose their independence and thus their capability as auditors. I have always 
made a distinction between program auditors and program analysts or program 
evaluators. The auditor must be independent in order to render an independent 
conclusion or opinion on his examination. The analyst does not necessarily have 
to be independent or even unbiased. His way, in his opinion, should be the only 
way to go, even if it is biased. Yet, without an independent audit on the way he 
chose to go, whether the right way or the wrong way, third parties would have no 
way of knowing whether he chose the right or wrong way. 
This leads us to the part the independent public accountant will play in this in-
creased emphasis on auditing for efficiency and effectiveness. 
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Public Accountants' Involvement in Audit ing Management's 
Performance in Government 
Touche Ross's recent Report on Progress & Perspectives 1980 says: " T h e 
public sector remains one of the most important areas of growth for Touche 
Ross." 8 They then mention several national and international governmental 
organizations they have just started to audit and indicate that their engagements 
include both financial and operational audits. 
I believe you can see that Touche Ross, the firm sponsoring this forum, is now 
in the process of doing what I have said has been done in the GAO—making 
financial, management, and program audits. And, I believe that public accounting 
firms will do more of this in the future. For example, this year Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Company is auditing Virginia Tech not only for an opinion on its 
financial statements but also for a conclusion on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
particular operations. This has come about as a result of a change in attitude by 
the Auditor of Public Accounts of the State of Virginia, who gave them the con-
tract. But will auditing governmental activities and programs have any effect on 
the work the public accountants do in the private area? 
Possible Expansion of Audits of Corporate Activities and Programs 
In the February 22, 1980 issue of Deloitte Haskins Sells The Week in Review 
they say: 
In a recent article in the Financial Analysts Journal, John C. Burton, 
Professor of Accounting and Finance at Columbia University, responded 
to questions from William C. Norby on accounting and reporting trends in 
the 1980's. . . 
Where do you see the accounting profession going? 
My personal view is that, with the new kinds of data being presented, 
the profession is going to have to get used to different kinds of reports and 
to different levels of assurance regarding those reports. There will be 
greater emphasis on the accountant's review and his analytical services, 
and on internal control evaluation and reporting. The auditor's principal 
output will shift away from reports on whether the financial statements 
conform to GAAP. 
Evidently the profession's average level of capability will have to gear up 
considerably? 
I agree. Auditors will no longer be following a formula. They will have 
a more judgmental role to play. At the same time, they will be under 
pressure to do their job with greater efficiency.9 
I agree with John Burton 100%. I also believe that from understanding how 
to make these efficiency, economy, and effectiveness types of audits, by doing 
them in the governmental area, public accountants will be ready for whatever hap-
pens to them in the corporate reporting area. If you do not believe me in regard to 
the expansion of auditing, look at what is happening in the field of internal con-
trol. Audits of internal control, incidentally, are effectiveness audits. Or look at 
peer reviews—they also are effectiveness audits. 
I believe you can see that I am very optimistic about the future of the account-
ing profession in government as well as in public accounting. Yet, I am also a little 
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fearful, fearful that if the accounting profession does not accept these additional 
responsibilities, wherever found, that some other profession will. And, if others 
such as management consultants, program evaluators, EDP specialists, etc., take 
over the newer fields of auditing, and financial statement auditing becomes less 
and less important, then what happens to the accounting and auditing profession? 
I hope we have enough wisdom to make sure it doesn't go the way of the voucher 
auditor. 
Appendix I 
Illustration of the Use of Audit ing Concepts 
in Reporting on Effectiveness Audits 
Let me tell you what one G A O staff member said to me concerning the use of 
a conceptual structure in his audit. One Friday evening last fall, I was waiting in 
the airport in Atlanta for a flight home. Also waiting in the airport for his flight 
back to Washington was a high level member of G A O ' s directorate with one of 
his fairly new, advanced level, staff members. This director from G A O introduced 
me to the new staff member by saying to that person that I was the one in G A O 
who had thought up the idea of criteria, causes, and effects that they had so suc-
cessfully used in developing their audit finding during the past week. Criteria, 
causes, and effects had come directly from the conceptual structure that was used 
in training this particular member of G A O ' s directorate. 
To illustrate how these conceptual terms are used in an audit report, and can 
as easily be used in the various stages of making the audit, let me pick out some of 
these terms from a rather recent G A O audit report. The title of the report is 
"Energy-Saving Strategies for Federal Procurement," EMD-79-68. 
As was said earlier, an effectiveness audit is one that determines whether 
management has carried out standards that achieved the goal of the program. 
Each of the particular elements of the audit are identified below. 
Energy-saving Strategies for Federal Procurement 
Background Information 
The sheer volume of Federal procurement makes it an important process 
through which energy conservation can be effected. The Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act (EPCA) of 1975 states that the President shall . . . establish or 
coordinate Federal agency actions to develop mandatory standards with respect to 
energy conservation and energy efficiency to govern the procurement policies and 
decisions of the Federal Government and all Federal agencies, and shall take such 
steps as are necessary to cause such standards to be implemented. This respon-
sibility was delegated by the President through Executive Order to the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). 
Goal of the Program 
To reduce energy consumption in the United States by developing and using 
procurement techniques that are energy efficient. 
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Effects 
The goal of reducing energy consumption in the United States by developing 
and using procurement techniques that are energy efficient has not been effec-
tively accomplished. 
Criteria 
(Only three criteria as standards that should be followed are described. 
However others are listed but not described.) 
—Life cycle costing 
Life cycle costing should be used because it considers operating, maintenance, 
and other costs of ownership, as well as acquisition price. Because energy expen-
ditures constitute an increasingly large portion of the operating costs of many 
items, life cycle costing represents significant energy conservation potential. 
—Energy efficiency standards 
Energy efficiency standards should be used because they are simple, item-by-
item requirements of minimal energy efficiency. The procurement of an energy 
consuming product with less than the prescribed efficiency as set by the standard 
would be prohibited. 
—Design versus performance specifications 
Design specifications describe the way a product must be constructed. Per-
formance specifications describe the way a product must perform; the product 
may be constructed in any way imaginable, and of any materials the contractor 
deems suitable. A greater emphasis on performance, rather than design, should be 
used because it offers more opportunity for improving energy efficiency. 
—Value incentive clause 
—Purchasing items made from recycled materials 
—Transportation of Government purchases by energy efficient means 
—Requiring use of returnable beverage containers in government in-
stallations 
—Change i n product 
Causes 
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy has not provided satisfactory 
guidance to procuring agencies and has not assured that measures to achieve 
energy conservation through the procurement process have been implemented. 
This responsibility for guidance to procuring agencies and for measures to achieve 
energy conservation was delegated to OFPP over three years ago, and all they 
have done is to issue a statement that principles of energy conservation and effi-
ciency should be applied in the procurement of property and services. 
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The Department of Defense inserted in their procurement regulations that 
energy conservation and efficiency criteria shall be considered. The General Ser-
vices Administration used the same statement in their procurement regulations. 
These general statements or other specific standards had not been included in im-
plementing procurement regulations. 
The Department of Energy had not given full recognition in their procure-
ment policies and procedures to energy conservation. 
Conclusion and recommendations 
Although it has been over 3 years since E P C A was passed, the Federal 
Government has not satisfactorily developed and implemented procurement 
strategies for reducing energy use as intended. We recommend that OFPP em-
phasize the potential for saving energy through the procurement process by im-
mediately revising its policy letter to (1) explicitly identify the types of action and 
strategies that can be used and (2) require procuring agencies to: 
—determine which strategies should be implemented, based on the type of 
items to be procured, 
—develop specific procedures and issue guidelines on when and how to ap-
ply energy efficient procurement techniques, and 
—ensure that procurement officials are informed that they are to imple-
ment those techniques. 
We also recommend that OFPP actively follow up on agency actions to make 
certain that energy does indeed become a major consideration in the procurement 
process.10 
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Discussant's Response to 
A n Historical Perspective of Government Auditing 
With Special Reference to the U.S. General 
Accounting Office 
Richard E. Brown 
Kansas Legislative Post Auditor 
Critiquing Professor Herbert's paper is an assignment of great interest to me 
for a number of reasons. Some years ago while a doctoral student at Harvard 
University, I was literally forced by a professor to write a seminar paper on the 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Later I turned that paper into a doctoral disserta-
tion, and ultimately into one of the world's smallest selling books. Shortly after 
this I was a consultant to the G A O and, among other tasks, helped the G A O up-
date Senate Document 11: Financial Management in the Federal Government. 
And the relationship continues even now. The Kansas Legislative Division of 
Post Audit, the Kansas Legislature's audit agency which I head, is in reality a 
mini-GAO. Indeed the office was based on model legislation developed some years 
ago by the G A O . Like the G A O , my office performs a variety of audit work, in-
cluding both financial and performance auditing. The audit staff in Kansas, like 
that in the G A O , is a multidisciplinary audit staff. I could continue this analogy in 
many ways. 
Summary of Key Concepts In Paper 
Professor Herbert makes it very clear that his paper is a record of his own im-
pressions, a very personal account of government auditing and accounting, 
especially with regard to the G A O . He takes us from early voucher auditing, 
through balance sheet audits in the earlier days of the republic up to about 1920, 
and finally, with the G A O ' s creation in 1921, to the larger concerns of the pro-
fession with audits of financial statements and auditing with concern for generally 
accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards. Pro-
fessor Herbert mentions the 1945 Government Corporation Control Act, which 
made the G A O ' s audits of government corporations comparable to those of C P A 
firms, and he also discusses the 1950 Budget and Accounting Act to a limited ex-
tent. This latter piece of legislation mandated that the G A O should be the public 
accountant for all agencies and departments, and not only for government cor-
porations. In effect, this Act extends the 1945 lessons in commercial-type audits 
to all government entities, calling for on-site financial audits of all agencies. 
The paper discusses several other developments which occurred in the mid-
1950s, and it is important in this connection to keep in mind that Professor 
Herbert joined the staff of the G A O in 1956. According to Professor Herbert, of 
6,000 employees at that time, only 1,226 could be classified as accountants and 
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auditors. Of these, only 226 were "professionals." Moreover, "most of the 
agencies and departments of government," in Professor Herbert's words, "did 
not have an accounting system that would provide information that could in any 
way be said to be in accordance with G A A P . ' ' Thus, the G A O was unable to ex-
tend its financial auditing to all governmental entities in keeping with the thrust of 
the 1945 and 1950 legislation. And thus was born the term "comprehensive 
audit," the early term used by the G A O for a partial financial review, coupled 
with economy and efficiency audits of small parts of organizations. As Professor 
Herbert points out, Congress seemed pleased with the turn of events. Financial 
statement audits, according to the author, were eventually eliminated except for 
corporation audits. 
In the 1960s there was still a further shift in the audit work of the 
G A O . A congressional push toward effectiveness audit work developed. 
Professor Herbert states: " B y the end of the 1960s, G A O had practically 
divested itself of that punitive approach to auditing—reviews for legal com-
pliance, for errors in individual vouchers, and for efficiency and economy 
of individual actions . . . " The trend toward overall reviews for effec-
tiveness, according to the author, automatically brought about more con-
cern for the future than for what had happened in the past. 
Finally, Professor Herbert makes a few predictions for the future. He 
says that state and local governments will move to the same auditing mix 
as the G A O , that is, less auditing of financial statements and more 
auditing of program performance. He also feels that there will be a grow-
ing role for C P A firms in governmental auditing, including performance 
audit work, and that C P A firms will take the lessons they learn in their 
governmental practice to their audits of private sector firms, thereby ex-
panding the scope of the traditional financial audits performed there. Pro-
fessor Herbert also predicts fairly major and rapid changes in generally ac-
cepted accounting principles for government. Lastly, he concludes that 
while he is optimistic about the future of the profession, he is also a little 
fearful; fearful that if others "take over the newer fields of auditing, and 
financial statement auditing becomes less and less important, then what 
happens to the accounting and auditing profession?" 
A Differing V i e w of Events 
Reading Professor Herbert's account of the history of governmental 
accounting and auditing in America, and the G A O ' s influence on it, 
brings to mind the story of the three young boys watching a couple em-
bracing on the sofa: 
—The seven-year old says: "They're fighting.'' 
—The nine-year old says: "Don't be silly; they're making love.'' 
—The eleven-year old says: "Yes, and badly at that.'' 
In short, I view these same historical events quite differently. While I share 
Professor Herbert's concern for the future role of the profession, I believe the 
G A O has helped put us in this quandry. As I view the situation, the G A O , 
throughout its history, has made several key decisions the wrong way, and has 
failed to make some other decisions it should have made. 
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T o begin with, the G A O had a very slow start in American financial manage-
ment. The same 1921 Budget and Accounting Act which created the then 
Bureau of the Budget, also created the G A O . It is significant, however, that while 
the Bureau of the Budget proceeded rather rapidly to become a strong financial 
arm to the White House and to the Presidency, the same cannot be said of the 
G A O and its relationships to the U.S. Congress. The detailed on-site voucher 
checking and the associated attitude and atmosphere which permeated the early 
G A O lasted well into the 1940s. The more modern and broader view of auditing 
as a strong management and congressional tool of oversight did not take hold in 
the G A O until much later. Indeed, Professor Frederick C. Mosher writes in The 
GAO: The Quest for Accountability in American Government: 
The beginning of the transformation of the General Accounting Office 
coincided approximately with the conclusion of World War II . . . In 
1947, for example, the G A O : 
—Maintained 100,000 appropriation limitation accounts, 44,000 per-
sonal accounts with accountable officers, and about 270,000 other ac-
counts; 
—Countersigned 60,000 Treasury Department warrants and approved 
14,000 requisitions for disbursing funds; 
—Audited 93,000 accountable officers' accounts (containing 35 million 
vouchers), 5 million transportation vouchers, 1.5 million contracts, 
260 million postal money orders, 57 million postal notes, and 26 
million postal certificates; 
—Settled 108,000 accountable officers' accounts, 354,000 postmasters' 
accounts, and 773,000 claims; 
—Reconciled 490 million checks; 
—Issued 1,300 reports on inspections, surveys, and special investigation, 
made 6,200 replies to miscellaneous inquiries from members of Con-
gress, issued 400 reports to the President, Congress and to the Bureau 
of the Budget, and issued 7,400 decisions of the Comptroller General 
and 2,200 reports to the attorney general.1 
Indeed, one could argue that it is only in the last decade or so that the G A O 
has come into national prominence as a strong financial management tool of and 
in American government. 
Once having begun to become an effective force within government, there are 
scattered signs that the G A O may have moved too far, too quickly, and perhaps 
even in the wrong directions to gain recognition. As indicated above, the 1945 
Corporation Control Act, coupled with the 1950 Budget and Accounting Act, 
were expected to extend commercial-type, financial statement audits to all entities 
of government. In essence, this would have entailed an audit of the financial 
statements of governmental entities, and in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards, leading to an opinion that the statements were fairly presented 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. This development, 
however, has not occurred. Professor Herbert's data suggests that a lack of 
qualified staff, a lack of adequate accounting systems, and congressional disinterest 
are the culprits. Out of this period came the "comprehensive audit.'' While I am 
not entirely certain exactly what this audit is, it is certainly a very partial financial 
audit. 
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A glimpse of the division of audit effort today in the G A O is most revealing. 
Professor Mosher presents the following data in his study.2 
Percentages of G A O Work by Program Category 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Financial 14 13 14 12 11 10 
Economy & 
Efficiency 56 53 54 52 49 41 
Program 
Results 30 34 32 36 40 49 
Source: The GAO's monthly "Overview Report." 
The bottom line is that ten percent of the G A O ' s audit effort in 1977 was 
devoted to financial auditing while 90 percent was spent on performance auditing, 
including efficiency and program results work. It is difficult to reconcile this situa-
tion with recent financial problems and crises in American government. It is also 
puzzling, given recent actions by the Federal government, through its Federal 
Revenue Sharing Act and through the Office of Management and Budget Circular 
A-102, Attachment P, to in effect mandate that all state and local units of govern-
ment receiving substantial amounts of federal funds receive audits conducted in 
accordance with G A A S , of financial statements basically prepared on the basis of 
G A A P . One can not help wonder why, if this is such a good idea for state and 
local units of American government, the G A O has not found it necessary to work 
toward this same end in the Federal government. Moreover, it is worth noting 
that both of these efforts to bring about uniformity and accountability in Ameri-
can financial management have come through executive agencies, the Office of 
Management and Budget and the Department of Treasury, and not through the 
nation's audit agency, the G A O . A t this very moment, as a variety of prestigious 
study groups are attempting to revise the concept of generally accepted ac-
counting principles for American government, and while there seems to be a 
determination to ensure that state and local units of government are brought into 
compliance with such accounting and related audit requirements, there seems to 
be an equal determination that the Federal government itself shall not be covered 
by such requirements. 
If there are difficulties with this end of the audit spectrum, the same could cer-
tainly be said of the other end of the audit spectrum—that relating to performance 
auditing. The G A O ' s movement to program evaluation occurred swiftly in the 
1960's and 1970's. Yet we find Professor Herbert writing: 
I have always made a distinction between program auditors and pro-
gram analysts or program evaluators. The auditor must be independent in 
order to render an independent conclusion or opinion. The analyst does 
not necessarily have to be independent or even unbiased. His way, in his 
opinion, should be the only way to go, even if it is biased. Yet, without an 
independent audit on the way he chose to go, whether the right way or the 
wrong way, third parties would have no way of knowing whether he chose 
the right or wrong way. 
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Program evaluation does indeed seem to be different than performance 
auditing in a few crucial ways. We can not pursue these differences in any depth 
here, but their existence and their importance is raised in a volume by Sar A . 
Levitan and Gregory Wurzburg, Evaluating Federal Social Programs: An Uncer-
tain Art: 
By insisting on preserving its independence and, in particular, failing 
to adequately acknowledge other literature and incorporate it where ap-
propriate, the G A O divisions that do the vast majority of the social pro-
gram evaluations may be forcing their work into a strait jacket that 
reduces the effectiveness of their work. G A O tends to ignore the 
legislative and administrative agendas behind social legislation and over-
simplify the reality in which social programs are implemented. The work 
rarely questions the practicality of congressional mandates and pays too lit-
tle attention to the inevitable difficulties inherent in the implementation of 
social policies. 
The insistence upon independence for financial auditing is, of course, 
justified. But elsewhere, the limitations this puts on G A O reduce the 
usefulness of its products. The benefit of independence in evaluating the 
complexities and nuances of intricate social programs is ambiguous at 
best. . . 3 
Much needs to be done to establish that performance auditing is still auditing, 
and, due to its volatile nature, independence will become more and not less impor-
tant. More significantly, according to Professor Herbert, the G A O ' s effectiveness 
work necessitates a futuristic view. I do not agree with such an assessment, and 
the implications are serious. The G A O is in danger of becoming a "think tank" 
for the Congress—doing much work which is similar to that conducted by con-
sulting houses, the Legislative Reference Service, and the Congressional Budget 
Office—and not an audit organization at all. (One person's definition of a policy 
analyst, incidentally, is a scholar who really wants to be governor or president but 
does not want to bother running for office or hold that kind of responsibility.) Pro-
fessor Mosher concludes in his book that the " G A O has stretched its meaning of 
the word 'audits' beyond anything contemplated twenty years ago, and some of 
its work—an increasing share—can hardly fit within that rubric, however it is 
defined.'' One must question using the cloak of auditing, and the power and tradi-
tion normally associated with that term, to look not at past actions and per-
formance of management, but instead to conducting future-oriented studies, 
analyses, and evaluations. In the wrong hands this becomes a method to use the 
power of auditing to second-guess elected representatives in a democratic system 
and perhaps even to wield their authority for them. Ultimately, such an approach 
may discredit government auditing of all kinds, whether financial or performance. 
In any event, there would seem to be other organizations around capable of doing 
such future-oriented analyses. 
There is one final substantive comment that I would make on the content of 
the paper by Professor Herbert. That relates to the almost total lack of discussion 
of the vital role played by others in the evolution of government auditing over the 
last several decades. Nearly all developments are attributed to the U.S. General 
Accounting Office and the Federal government. Of course state officials grow ac-
customed to this, and officials from small states learn especially fast. Let me 
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merely indicate that the American states are also involved in a leadership role in 
this area, and are certainly up with the G A O in matters relating to progressive 
auditing. 
Item: performance auditing. Lennis Knighton's classic doctoral dissertation 
and book in the mid-1960s on The Performance Post Audit In State Govern-
ment, makes it clear that the performance audit movement was well under way in 
the states at that time. Performance auditing is presently conducted in a number 
of states and is quite good. This work is presently as well done as that of the G A O , 
is probably presented to decision makers on a more timely basis, and has a con-
siderable amount of impact. 
Item: financial auditing. Financial auditing is done more frequently at the state 
level, practicing in effect what the "feds'' are preaching. 
Item: organizational advancements. Pressures for a national state auditors 
association, for the national system of intergovernmental audit forms, and for 
quality review have resulted as much from the pressures by state audit groups as 
from a leadership effort by the U.S. General Accounting Office. 
Conclusions 
In closing, let me return to Professor Herbert's predictions for the future. He 
states that state and local governments will move toward the same mix of audit 
work as the G A O . He must therefore mean that state and local entities will do less 
financial auditing and more effectiveness—including futuristic—kinds of studies. 
M y assessment would be that this development is unlikely, given the varied 
federal laws and regulations which now exist and which in effect mandate a dif-
ferent kind of audit emphasis. Moreover, I personally do not believe state audit 
agencies should follow the G A O lead any longer in this matter. While state 
legislators are very interested in performance auditing and, indeed, are demanding 
such audits more than ever, it appears they are interested in performance auditing 
as an add-on to basic financial audit work, and not as a substitute for it. They seem 
far more concerned over auditing and assessing past performance than in using 
auditors to try to read the future. 
Professor Herbert states that C P A firms will play a greater role in governmen-
tal auditing, including performance audit work, and that the lessons they learn in 
government will be brought into the corporate audit work that they conduct. I 
believe that this is probably a reasonable assessment of what is occurring in Kan-
sas, as well as in a number of other states in America. This is so in large measure 
due to the recent requirements placed on state audit organizations by the federal 
government. It is unlikely that state audit staffs will be allowed to expand rapidly 
enough to themselves conduct all the required financial audit work. It should be 
noted, however, that C P A firms are unlikely to learn to conduct high-quality per-
formance work in the near future. On one recent occasion one of the Big 8 public 
accounting firms was considering hiring me as a consultant to prepare a brochure 
on performance auditing for the firm. The effort was finally aborted by a national 
partner who feared that "someone might read the brochure and actually believe 
that his firm could do performance audit work!'' 
And finally, Professor Herbert fears that if others "take over the newer fields 
of auditing, and financial statement auditing becomes less and less important, then 
what happens to the accounting and auditing profession?" I share Professor 
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Herbert's concern in this regard. "Others"—the evaluators, the analysts—are 
indeed trying to take over the new fields of auditing. This trend, however, is in 
large measure due to a lack of forward-looking leadership by the G A O , the 
American Accounting Association, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, and most others who have an important role and stake in this mat-
ter. Apparently they are too easily satisfied that these newer kinds of auditing are 
simply not auditing at all, and so do not want to be involved. A n d thus, policy and 
decision makers are looking outside the auditing profession for the conduct of 
modern audit work, and these groups generally do not have the all-important 
traditions and guidelines of auditing to see them through. 
Our professional societies and related groups must begin to be more respon-
sive and imaginative, and begin to bring such new techniques and developments 
into the well-established audit fold. A related issue today is the fact that there is 
less interest in financial auditing by decision makers at a time when this should 
not and need not be the case. Again, however, in my view much of the blame for 
this development must be directed to our professional leadership organizations, in-
cluding the G A O . Through their attention—their research priorities and their 
decisions—these groups have failed to persuade public officials that financial 
auditing is important and, coupled with the newer forms of auditing, can indeed 
provide a valuable service to them and to the taxpayers of this country. 
Footnotes 
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Art, The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, September 1979. 
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Critical Requirements of a System 
of Internal Accounting Control 
Robert J. Sack 
Touche Ross & Co. 
This paper will review those requirements of a system of internal control 
which can be considered to be "critical." First, it will be important to define and 
clarify some terms, and establish a context for the discussion in the paper. The 
body of the paper will review a series of critical requirements, considering first the 
required-elements of a system and then considering the required characteristics of 
a system. And finally, the paper will explore the possibility that leadership is the 
most critical element of any internal control system. 
Definitions and Context 
Before beginning an analysis of the critical requirements of a system, it is im-
portant to ask, "critical for what purpose?" In fact, that question can be asked in 
a number of ways: We can ask what requirements are critical for the preparation 
of accurate financial statements, intended for public reliance. Or we can ask what 
requirements are critical for the preservation and protection of the entity's assets. 
Or we can ask what requirements are critical to the development of operating and 
analytical data, necessary for the running of the business. A system that is de-
signed to assure reliable operating data will function at a level of detail, and with 
such breadth as to assure the protection of assets, and the development of ac-
curate, public financial statements. Because that is the broadest objective, that will 
be the context of this paper. 
By establishing that broad objective, we will also be saying that we expect the 
system to control errors at a fairly low level of materiality. Because the system 
must provide accurate information for operating decisions, materiality will be 
measured against the cost of a wrong decision. Because decisions are ongoing, a 
wrong decision can have a multiplying effect, and the measure of materiality—the 
tolerance of the system—must be quite low. Conversely, if we had said that the 
objective of the system was to preserve the entity's assets, the standards of the 
system—the materiality of the losses it is designed to control—could be relatively 
easier. The assets of the entity may be quite valuable, but it is usually more effec-
tive to insure against the loss of an asset, rather than to design a system which will 
provide comprehensive protection against its loss. Or, if we had said that the ob-
jective of the system was to produce accurate financial statements for public con-
sumption, the standards applied to the system—the measure of materiality 
required—might have been even less stringent. Published financial statements 
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present a macro view of the entity, summarizing a host of individual transactions. 
If our objective was only to produce accurate published statements, it would be 
wasteful to establish a system which controlled to a level of materiality greater 
than that which would impact the statements themselves. 
The fact that there might be different standards and different measures of 
materiality for different objectives of a system seems clear, upon reflection. Still, 
we stumble over the idea that published financial statements might not be subject 
to a first level system of controls. That anomaly is one cause of the continuing 
conflict over the SEC's proposal to require public reporting on internal control 
systems. Careful research into this materiality question would be helpful to all of 
those who work with systems, at the various levels—corporate executives, inter-
nal auditors, and external auditors. 
Also, when we talk about a system of internal control, it is important to 
understand how the word "system" is used. For purposes of this discussion, the 
word "system'' must mean all elements of the company which are directed to the 
gathering and presentation of operating and analytical data—the objective of the 
system which we described at the outset. Let us be clear that we mean all of the 
quantitative factors which are normally ascribed to a "system," including policies 
and procedures, or tests and checks. But also the "system" must be understood 
to include qualitative factors characteristic of the entity, including its ethical code 
and its business atmosphere. 
Because this discussion is directed to a "system," it should be understood 
that the discussion is directed to an entity of some size. Typically, the smaller en-
tities find it impossible or impractical to employ the usual quantitative elements of 
a system and so they must rely on the qualitative elements for their internal con-
trols. The unique internal control problems of the smaller entities warrant an en-
tirely separate discussion. The discussion in this paper will assume that the system 
we are analyzing operates in an entity of enough size to justify both quantitative 
and qualitative aspects. 
The body of this paper will discuss the elements and the characteristics of a 
system as individual factors. In an analysis of the critical aspects of a system, it is 
necessary to review the system in pieces. However, it should be understood that 
the pieces do not operate individually, but function as a system of internal control. 
We will presume that all of the elements of the system work together in a coor-
dinated way, with proper balance. Coordination and unification may be one of the 
most critical requirements of a system of internal control. But that requirement 
may be presumed in an analysis of the individual factors which make up the total, 
and the search for critical requirements must go deeper into the system's compo-
nent parts. 
T h e Critical Elements of a System of Internal Control 
There are two ways to approach an inquiry into the critical requirements of a 
system of internal control. One approach is to ask what elements are required. 
A n d this next section will review the elements of a system which can be con-
sidered to be critical to the system overall. 
Checks and Balances One of the most critical elements of a system of internal 
control is a requirement that no one individual has complete jurisdiction over an 
accounting transaction. Typically, we say that the cashier must not have access to 
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the accounts receivable records, lest he be given the opportunity to kite remit-
tances. But also, checks and balances are important in a broader sense. It is impor-
tant that a second perspective be brought to all accounting entries, including those 
which might not have a direct cash effect. For example, monthly journal entries 
ought to be reviewed and approved by someone independent of the preparer. That 
independent check is important not because the preparer might be tempted to 
manipulate an entry for his own advantage, but because the preparer cannot be ex-
pected to independently challenge his own work. 
In the same way that a system of checks and balances is critical for the system 
of internal control overall, a clear line of responsibility is critical for the successful 
operation of the checks and balances. It is of course important that the lines of 
responsibility within the entity be clearly understood and maintained. But more 
fundamentally, the responsibility lines must be challenged to be sure that they are 
logical and not just traditional. It has been traditional to have the internal audit 
department report directly to the entity's top financial officer. However, to 
preserve the effectiveness of the internal audit function as a corporate balance 
wheel, it is more logical to make the internal audit department responsible directly 
to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors. 
Policies and Procedures Written policies and procedures are critical to the suc-
cess of the system because they establish a consistent response, determined in ad-
vance, apart from the heat of the moment. Comprehensive, written policies and 
procedures promote the efficiency of the system, of course. But more importantly, 
they reduce the possibility of an ad hoc response to a problem, and they therefore 
reduce the possibility of management override. 
The accounts receivable control clerk knows that he is responsible to reconcile 
the details of the customer accounts with the receivable control account. Written 
procedures tell him where he is to find the reconciling data, and they also tell 
others in the organization that he is entitled to have that data. But to have real 
payoff, the policies and procedures describing his job must tell him what he is to 
do, and who he is to contact when he encounters unusual, or unreconcilable 
items. His instructions should be sufficiently specific so that he will not be 
dissuaded from a vigorous pursuit of problems he encounters in the reconciliation 
process. 
The written policies and procedures should establish the parameters of the 
system. The written procedures must establish who is authorized to enter into or 
approve transactions. And the operating procedures must set the limits of those 
authorizations. For example, if the accounts payable clerk is to monitor the enti-
ty's disbursements—to be sure that the entity pays only for what it ordered—he 
must understand: 
1. How large a commitment the purchasing agent is entitled to make; 
2. How much of an overshipment, beyond the amount ordered by the 
purchasing agent, the disbursement agent is entitled to approve; and 
3. What he must do with the transaction that exceeds those limits. 
Incidentally, the disbursing/purchasing agent example here provides an illustra-
tion of the need for a logical reporting relationship, and an opportunity to depart 
from a traditional relationship. Traditionally, it might have been appropriate for 
the disbursing agent to review all overshipments with the purchasing agent, and 
abide by his approval of any excesses. However, a logical analysis of the transac-
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tion and the objective of the controls suggests that the disbursing agent ought to 
refer all excess shipments to the purchasing agent's superior—so as to preserve 
the integrity of the control which restricts the ability of the purchasing agent to 
commit the entity to transactions of a limited amount. 
Capable People The system must be operated by people who have the skills to 
do their job. There are some obvious skills which anyone participating in a system 
of control must have—including the ability to deal with forms and with numbers. 
But those skills may be presumed, and are not at issue here. More importantly, 
the people who operate the various aspects of the system must have the ability to 
understand the implications of their findings. The credit and collection people 
must understand the system enough to know what it means when the receivables 
of a division begin to show serious past-due problems. They must understand that 
a pattern of past-due receivables may be indicative of an economic problem in that 
division's region. But they must also understand that it may be indicative of ac-
count manipulation. 
In addition to having the ability to do their job, the people operating the 
system must have the time (and the other resources required) to do their job com-
pletely. Internal controls are most effective when they are exercised on a timely 
basis. The timely exercise of controls preserves the integrity of the system. And in 
some cases (particularly where the objective of the system is to assure accurate 
operating data) timely exercise of controls may be critical, in and of itself. For ex-
ample, the unit which is responsible for the preparation of customer invoices must 
be adequately staffed such that they are able to promptly account for the 
numerical sequence of shipping documents. Where that control is a vital step in 
assuring that all of the goods shipped are billed, it must be exercised on a timely 
basis: 
1. T o assure that the customer is invoiced promptly so that the entity's 
cash flow is maintained, 
2. To let the people in the shipping unit understand that their activities are 
subject to the oversight of an independent unit, 
3. T o assure that the records of finished goods, and the resultant 
production schedules are maintained accurately. 
A n d finally, the people operating the system must have a sense of personal integ-
rity. Personnel procedures should be designed to inquire into the background of 
individuals who are hired to run the system, and of course appropriate bonding 
contracts provide fall-back protection. To maintain that individual integrity, the 
overall system must be maintained. The environment of the system, the at-
mosphere of the entity, is the subject of the concluding section of this paper. 
Oversight and Supervision A l l of the elements described above presume a 
hierarchical structure which supervises the operation of the system. That supervi-
sion must be both apparent and real. The supervisory hierarchy ought not to be 
involved in the day to day affairs of their supervised units, but they should be in-
volved in the resolution of conflicts, and the follow-up on exceptions. To the ex-
tent that they do so, the involvement of the supervisory hierarchy in the system is 
real. But for the system to be effective on a long-term basis, that supervision must 
also be apparent. The supervision must follow up on exceptions promptly to keep 
the pipeline clean and to demonstrate the strength of the controls. Without that 
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supervisory follow-up, the system soon appears to be weak, and eventually 
becomes weak. 
A healthy system requires a balance between strong supervision and in-
dividual integrity. The individuals operating the system must understand that 
their operations are scrutinized: But they also must understand that there are 
limits to the authority of the supervision. They must feel confident of their posi-
tion so that they can maintain their own integrity, and the integrity of the system. 
There is something about that individual confidence which is within the individ-
ual himself: But that individual confidence can be enhanced by a comprehensive 
set of policies and procedures which describes the individual's position, establishes 
his authority, and spells out the role (and the limits) of the supervisor. 
T h e Critical Characteristics of a System of Internal Control 
As noted earlier, there are two ways to approach an inquiry into the critical re-
quirements of a system of internal control. The first approach, above, was to in-
quire into the elements of a system. A second approach is to ask what 
characteristics are required in a system. 
A Cost/Benefit Relationship A l l controls have benefits, and of course every 
control has a cost. One of the characteristics of a properly designed system of in-
ternal controls is that the cost/benefit relationship has been thoroughly thought 
out, and the tradeoffs carefully evaluated. To make that evaluation, the system 
planners must identify all of the costs of the proposed controls, and all of the 
benefits as well. For example, a department store's credit experience would benefit 
from a control that required specific approval of every credit card transaction. 
However, the cost in customer frustration would likely exceed the benefits ob-
tained. Therefore, most stores have established a floor limit, which allows the 
sales clerk to complete the sale without obtaining credit department approval so 
long as the transaction is below a designated dollar limit. 
Often, there are different levels of benefits which accompany a control. There 
are the obvious benefits which inspired the control in the first place. But on a sec-
ond level, the system as a whole may be enhanced by individual controls—the 
system as a whole may benefit from an atmosphere of control which flows from 
strengthened individual controls. And there may be benefits outside the entity, 
which will in turn benefit the entity. Stronger controls over purchasing (for in-
stance, a requirement to obtain a number of bids for purchases beyond a certain 
amount) may benefit the entity's suppliers and in turn may benefit the entity. If 
the suppliers are freed from the possibility of paying gratuities to the entity's pur-
chasing units, the supplier's prices may be lower and service more businesslike 
and straightforward. 
The passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1978, introduced a new 
element to the cost/benefit analysis. The Act talks only about controls and 
benefits, but does not deal with costs. Many critics of the Act have said that it is 
impractical because it does not explicitly deal with the cost/benefit question. 
However, one of the Congressmen who sponsored the Act answered those 
challenges in the following way: 
a. Congress understood the need for a cost/benefit relationship, and there 
was never any intention that an entity would have to control itself out of 
business. However, Congress was not prepared to legislate an analysis of 
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a cost/benefit tradeoff. Instead, they felt that it was more appropriate to 
let that tradeoff be analyzed in the courts. That approach is traditional 
for Congress—they reason that laws cannot be totally precise, and am-
biguities are to be settled on a case-by-case basis through the court 
system. Nonetheless, most business people are very uncomfortable with 
that traditional approach to a law which goes to the heart of their 
business. To the legislators it may be a traditional approach, but to the 
business people it appears cavalier. 
b. The sponsor of the bill has also cautioned business people to consider all 
of the benefits when they make their cost/benefit analysis. He observed 
that an entity must of course consider the benefits which accrue to it 
directly and indirectly. But also he suggested that an entity must con-
sider the benefits which accrue to society as a whole. He agreed that 
controls against bribery might not benefit an entity directly, and perhaps 
not even indirectly. However, he stated that Congress had concluded 
that society would benefit greatly from controls against bribery, and that 
the societal benefit ought to be included in each entity's cost/benefit 
equation. In the abstract, that notion is noble: In a specific situation, 
however, that idea makes a rational cost/benefit analysis almost impossi-
ble. 
Specific and Anticipatory A system of internal control should not be designed 
in the abstract but in the specific. The system should not be designed to establish 
specific controls, but it should be designed to control specific potential errors. The 
designers of the system (and those who are asked to evaluate the system) must ask 
themselves, "What could go wrong, and what controls will prevent those errors 
from getting out of hand?" That analysis requires a thorough understanding of 
the entity's objectives and the transactions to be controlled. 
The development of controls to deal with specific error types will of course 
proceed from experience. It will not be difficult to design controls to deal with er-
rors that have occurred before. It takes more imagination to anticipate problems 
that could occur, given a little twist on history. 
There are a number of tools which have proven to be helpful to this error/con-
trol analysis: 
1.The analysis might begin by developing a series of control questions 
suitable to each of the entity's business systems. For the payroll cycle, 
the control questions might ask—What controls assure that payroll cost 
is properly classified? What controls assure that individuals are paid 
only for time worked? What controls assure that payroll records are ac-
curate? 
2.Often, the analysis is enhanced when the entity's data flow is 
flowcharted. Good flowcharting procedures identify potential conflicts of 
interest and control omissions. 
3.The analysts should plan to spend a disproportionate amount of time 
and attention on the more exotic transactions. It is relatively easy to 
design a system which exercises control over purchasing of raw 
material. It is more difficult to design a system to control purchasing of 
fixed assets, because the transaction is usually one of a kind. It is even 
more difficult to design a system to control purchases of services, 
because of the intangible nature of the benefit received. 
Implementability The system will be operated by people and the system's 
30 
demands must not exceed their capabilities. Earlier, this paper argued that one of 
the critical elements of a system was that it be manned by capable people. To say 
that the system must be implementable is not to contradict that earlier 
requirement—nor is it redundant. Rather, to ask that the system be implemen-
table is to ask that it be practical. For example: 
1. The system should not ask the petty cash clerk to approve the 
President's travel expense report; 
2. The system should not ask a clerk to obtain his supervisor's approval for 
transactions in excess of $ 500 if the average transaction is $400; 
3. The system should not ask for the simultaneous participation of two 
people if manning tables provide for two people only during peak 
periods. 
Leadership Is T h e Critical Requirement 
A l l of the features of a system of internal control which we have discussed so 
far are important. However, the most critical requirement of any system is leader-
ship. With appropriate leadership, the most rudimentary of systems can function 
effectively. Without control-conscious leadership, the most tightly drawn system 
will fail. 
The leaders of the entity can affect the system in many ways. Most obviously, 
they affect the system in the way they allocate resources. Control systems cost 
money, and use valuable people. Even where a careful cost/benefit analysis ap-
parently justifies a control, the leadership of the entity may be hesitant. They may 
be reluctant to commit the resources because the payout is immediate while the 
benefit appears to be a longer term thing. Or they may be tempted to put their 
money where the return is more tangible. But, there is no free lunch; an under-
resourced control system carries a sure cost which must ultimately be paid. The 
investment in controls requires an element of vision and a sense of perspective. 
Also, the leaders of the entity affect the system in the way that they operate it. 
By definition, the leaders of the entity are in a position to make the system work 
or fail. Where the system calls for a cross check, or a follow-up, the leaders of the 
entity must allocate their attention to those duties. Careful attention to the control 
system by the subordinates will be for naught if the leadership fails to diligently 
play their role. 
Ultimately, the leadership of the company affects the control system most by 
the tone they set for the entity. A n Audit Committee, or a Board of Directors who 
tolerate unethical conduct in a corporate officer is inviting unethical conduct from 
other officers and employees as well. A n officer of an entity who winks at his own 
system is inviting his associates to do the same. Control is an attitude, and 
establishing an entity's attitudes is a prime responsibility of leadership. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Critical Requirements of a System 
of Internal Accounting Control 
Jay M. Smith, Jr. 
Brigham Young University 
The first time I met Bob Sack was as a participant in the 1976 Trueblood 
Seminar that I attended. Bob led many of the case discussions we had, and I was 
impressed with his forthrightness and succinct comments. Many of you have pro-
bably had similar experiences with Bob. It was not surprising, therefore, to find 
Bob's paper also very succinct. So succinct at times, that the transition seemed to 
be missing between sections. For example, in the first part of the paper, Bob 
stresses that there are three levels at which one can address the subject of controls: 
(1) accurate financial statements, (2) protection of assets, and (3) development of 
operating and analytical data. He seems to argue that any controls at the third 
level would encompass any controls at the two higher levels, and that at the third 
level, a lower level of materiality would be required than would be true of the 
other two levels. He then selects the third level for his paper, but the body of the 
paper never touches this point again, either to substantiate the claim of all-
inclusiveness, or to indicate how his critical requirements would have differed if a 
higher level of objectives had been selected. I found that one must read carefully to 
capture all the nuances Bob is implying. In fact, filling in between the lines is 
somewhat risky, for one is never sure if he is filling them in the way Bob would do 
it. On the other hand, on a topic like internal control, I, as a discussant, must ad-
mit that brevity and succinctness is a quality to be admired. 
After receiving Bob's paper last week, I read through it and then decided I 
should do a little catching up myself on the internal control literature of the past 
few months, both from official sources and otherwise. I have found it increasingly 
difficult to keep up on accounting developments to use in the intermediate ac-
counting text I am involved with and also keep current in auditing literature. 
Reading material in either one by itself is a full job. Thus, some of the incoming 
auditing material had been filed in that proverbial drawer marked " T o Be Read 
Later." "Later" arrived, and I went through the pile and identified the many 
pamphlets, articles, research reports, exposure drafts, and statements issued on 
the general topic of internal control. The FCPA has triggered a flurry of activity 
by almost everybody even tangentially related to accounting in the general topic of 
internal control. Just a comment on the inevitable move to alphabetical iden-
tifiers. F C P A sounds like some special type of C P A . Perhaps it is fitting to have 
accountants increasingly involved in an act that almost bears the name of the pro-
fession. 
Most of the publications I scanned were prepared by national C P A firms and 
were directed to management in an attempt to help them meet their newly defined 
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responsibility concerning maintaining an adequate internal control system to 
safeguard assets and maintain meaningful and accurate records. Some were ad-
dressed to C P A ' s and dealt with the auditor's role in assuring readers of the ade-
quacy of the internal control system. Almost all of the articles referred somewhere 
to the FCPA, and discussed how it was going to affect the auditor's role in 
evaluating and reporting on internal control. Few of them discussed criteria for 
evaluating a control system. Generally, the material merely observed that stand-
ards were lacking and that the profession was addressing the problem. 
Turning back to Bob's paper, it became more clear that he was trying to set 
up a framework for such criteria. He calls them critical requirements that a 
system must have. By critical, I assume he means that no internal control system 
can be evaluated as "good" or "adequate" without these ingredients. These re-
quirements are then separated by Bob into two parts—elements and 
characteristics—plus one super element that overrides all the rest. This division 
confuses me. I have looked in vain in the paper for a definitional distinction be-
tween the terms, but I found none. In fact, it took some careful review to see what 
Bob had identified as elements and characteristics. The list is as follows: 
Critical Elements of a System of Internal Control 
1. Checks and balances 
2. Policies and procedures 
3. Capable people 
4.Oversight and supervision. 
Critical Characteristics of a System of Internal Control 
1. A cost/benefit relationship 
2.Specific and anticipatory 
3. Implementability 
Overriding Element 
1. Leadership 
Webster defines an element as a constituent part; one of the factors determin-
ing the outcome of a process. A characteristic is defined as a distinguishing trait, 
quality, or property. As I reread the paper, I found myself asking, "Is this item 
really an element or a characteristic?" For example, "capable people" could be 
considered an essential element of the control system, but it also represents a 
quality that must exist in all parts of the system. As a further level of capable peo-
ple, Bob has identified "leadership'' ability and attitude as an overriding element. 
As indicated earlier, much of the recent literature has emphasized the objec-
tives a system should have and hasn't addressed the question of what criteria is 
needed for a good system. One classification of accountants interested in 
establishing criteria is the auditing textbook writer. A review of recently pub-
lished textbooks on my book shelves revealed a great diversity, both in ter-
minology and content, in lists prepared of internal control essential requirements. 
The summary chart in the Appendix illustrates the problem. In some cases, I had 
to stretch the concept to fit a given category. The sources are listed across the top 
with criteria down the side. I used criteria because no one else did. Details of the 
sources are also included in the Appendix. 
Several observations could be made based on my somewhat limited survey of 
textbooks. I hope I didn't miss someone's favorite text. 
First, there really are no accepted terms that are emerging as descriptive of the 
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criteria. Elements, characteristics, conditions, features, principles, factors—all of 
them are used interchangeably in the current texts. 
Second, I found no one that included in their lists two different levels of 
criteria such as Bob developed. In fact, no one included in their lists cost/benefit 
analysis, although somewhere in the discussion, the trade-off between costs and 
benefits was included. None of the other sources included implementability, 
perhaps because it was taken for granted that any system had to be implementable. 
Third, most discussions were very brief and broad in scope. The one notable 
exception was Rod Anderson's taxonomical treatment. I have reproduced the 
topical outline of the seven control elements he defines with his subdivisions of 
those elements that he includes in Chapter 7 of his exciting two-volume text. (See 
Appendix.) I want to revisit that chapter when I have more time to digest all that 
Rod has to offer. 
Fourth, although the broad objectives of the F C P A called for a periodic recon-
ciliation of the assets and the records, only two textbooks included this concept as 
a specific item in their lists. The concept was not identified in Bob's paper. 
Another objective included in the F C P A and included in almost all of the lists ex-
cept Bob's was physical control over assets and records, or the safeguarding of 
assets. I'm really not sure how Bob looks at this area. As I indicated earlier, he 
listed this ingredient as a possible objective of an internal control system, accepted 
a lower objective, and indicated that maybe it was cheaper to insure against asset 
loss than to provide a system to protect the asset. I'm sure the cost of insurance 
would rise if there was no system to protect the asset. 
Fifth, almost all of the criteria in the lists were static in nature. They em-
phasized the elements that should be present in a system at a point in time. I only 
found one of the sources that discussed the need to provide for continuous 
development of the system as conditions change. The Minihan report issued in 
1979 by the A I C P A identified this characteristic as "monitoring," their last 
phase of a three phase approach. I didn't see any reference to this element in 
Bob's paper, but I consider it to be a critical requirement for any internal control 
system. Perhaps a good term to describe this criterion would be "adaptability." 
The system must be established to be sensitive to changed conditions. I had per-
sonal experience with this in my one "missing asset" audit experience while in 
public accounting. It involved a country club in Southern California. There had 
been no control problems year in and year out, and then the environment 
changed. A n essentially cash-oriented club permitted members to charge their ac-
counts. Within six months, the entire control system had disintegrated. Cash was 
unaccounted for, and the records were in shambles. There was no procedure for 
monitoring the system and adapting it to the changed conditions. I would consider 
this to be a critical requirement, feature, element, characteristic or whatever in 
any system. 
After making this brief survey, I am convinced we need a conceptual 
framework for internal control systems. I do not think Bob's list is complete nor 
always mutually exclusive in coverage. But neither were any of the others I looked 
at. A standardization of terms and professional agreement as to the level of objec-
tives, the degree of materiality required, and the critical requirements of the con-
trol system are needed. I did not see this developed in the Minihan report. Before 
auditors can be expected to evaluate internal control systems, there must be more 
agreement as to what constitutes an acceptable system. 
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Enough of these comments on the overview of Bob's paper. Let me say a few 
things about some of Bob's specific comments on individual elements and 
characteristics. In the discussion of "capable people" and later in discussing 
"leadership," Bob emphasizes the importance of basic integrity in the leaders and 
members of the organization. While no one would argue that such an ingredient is 
not desirable, it becomes a very difficult element to obtain or evaluate. We will be 
having presentations tomorrow on the subject of management fraud. As Steve 
Albrecht and Marshall Romney have emphasized in their study, part of the prob-
lem creating the increase in fraudulent acts is the environment within which 
business operates. With a constant erosion of personal integrity evidenced in 
government and business activities, it is easy for people in the system to rational-
ize their failure to observe the system or even to overtly circumvent it. Control 
systems are designed to prevent and/or detect honest mistakes and intentional 
mistakes. If the basic integrity of personnel were unquestionable, the system 
would only have to be concerned with honest mistakes and, because of this, could 
be less complex and specifically directed to just this area. However, because no 
one has designed a successful measuring device for personal integrity, we can 
never know objectively how the people in a system rate as to personal integrity. It 
seems that the system, therefore, must assume a level of integrity equal to the 
average integrity of society at the time, and thus systems must establish controls 
more extensive than might be the case in a more perfect world. 
This, of course, leads naturally to the cost/benefit relationship. The F C P A 
stresses that the controls should provide "reasonable assurance." As Bob points 
out there is no mention of cost in the bill, but at least one U.S. Congressman who 
is not identified in the paper has verified that the cost/benefit trade-off was con-
sidered but then left to the courts to evaluate. To me, that seems like an extremely 
inefficient way to deal with this basic issue. Not only is using the court system ex-
pensive for all parties, but it is time consuming and does not always lead to a 
workable and fair conclusion. 
The quotation Bob included from the sponsor of the bill seems to imply that 
any cost is justifiable because of the overall societal benefit which, though not 
measurable, is always felt to be large. 
We have still had very little solid research in the area of cost/benefit analysis. 
The same type of analysis is needed by auditors when they must decide between 
compliance and substantive audit tests and select that set of procedures that leads 
to a solution of minimum costs with maximum assurance. I personally do not 
think societal benefits can be brought into either analysis. A n auditor must 
evaluate long-term benefits to his firm that operates in a free enterprise system and 
so must a company in evaluating its control system. Not only is there a benefit 
from avoiding loss by safeguarding assets, but there is a benefit competitively by 
establishing an image of integrity and orderliness that well-oiled systems can 
generate to employees, customers, suppliers, and the government. No one can 
produce numbers to place on this benefit but management itself. 
In their several volume work on internal controls, Price Waterhouse 
recognizes the difficulty of measuring the cost and benefits in the following state-
ment: 
Cost-benefit analysis for internal accounting control is an emerging prac-
tice that will evolve as experience is gained through implementation. Cost-
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benefit analysis should not be ignored simply because it is practically dif-
ficult, nor simply because it is not yet well defined.1 
They go on to discuss a practical approach to the problem, and this seems to be a 
type of analysis which must be done to reach more desirable conclusions in this 
area. I don't think Bob gives too much help in carrying out this need. He primar-
ily argues that it should be a consideration, and again, I cannot disagree. 
A third specific area that I would like to comment on is the error analysis ap-
proach to internal control review that Bob introduces under the heading, 
"specific and anticipatory." I'm not sure if that title really captures what Bob is 
saying. Two basic approaches to dealing specifically with internal control analysis 
seem to be developing. One relates to establishing control objectives and evaluates 
the system against the objectives. This approach, for example, is used by Arthur 
Andersen & Co. in their booklet on internal controls. They divide five processing 
cycles into 117 objectives for analysis. The recently issued SAS exposure draft, 
"Financial Statement Assertions, Related Audit Objectives, and the Design of 
Substantive Tests" suggests this approach as being preferable. Another approach 
to the analysis is to focus on the specific errors that could occur in any system and 
to evaluate the controls that are in place to prevent or detect these errors. This ap-
proach focuses on the mirror image of the objective. Perhaps the major advantage 
of the error analysis approach is its specificity. For example, a common internal 
control objective is "Each authorized order should be accurately shipped on a 
timely basis." Restating this from an error analysis approach, the following 
specific errors could be identified and analyzed. 
I. Goods shipped differed from goods ordered. 
A . Goods ordered but never shipped. 
B. Goods shipped but never ordered. 
C. Goods shipped but in a different quantity or different quality from 
that ordered. 
II. Wrong time period credited for the sale. 
A . Goods invoiced in one period, but shipped in a subsequent 
period. 
B. Goods shipped in one period, but invoiced in subsequent period. 
In my research project with Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., I attempted to 
establish criteria to determine what substantive audit procedures are required, 
regardless of the circumstances, and which ones can be deleted if accounting con-
trols are found to be sufficient. I found conceptually the task much easier to pur-
sue when I analyzed specific error types than when I tried to analyze this problem 
from an objectives approach. A t least two national firms are approaching their 
analysis in the way Bob suggests: his own, Touche Ross and Co., and Deloitte, 
Haskins and Sells. It was also discussed by Loebbecke and Zuber in the February 
1980 Journal of Accounting article, "Evaluating Internal Control." I believe 
it is an area that deserves much more attention and evaluation than it has re-
ceived. 
There are many other items that I could comment on, many again that are 
found between Bob's lines. He has touched on many topics that are germane to 
this field. I would, however, like to conclude my remarks by commenting on the 
oversight element. I make a plea from an educator for the profession to cease its 
negative posture on accepting added responsibility for evaluation of a client's in-
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ternal control system and, in the place of these efforts, more actively pursue the 
development of the critical requirements against which any control system can be 
evaluated. There are many subjective elements to internal control evaluation, but 
so are there in the evaluation that leads to audit opinion. Why must the profession 
always be pulled protesting into the lights of a new arena? Why can't we for once 
be ahead of the SEC and Congress in cleaning our houses or accepting respon-
sibility that only we can best meet? 
I was personally pleased when the Cohen Commission on Auditor's Respon-
sibilities concluded: 
A major step in implementing the commission's proposed evaluation, 
which should be adopted as soon as possible, would require the auditor to 
expand his study and evaluation of the controls over the accounting 
system to form a conclusion as to the functioning of the internal account-
ing system.2 
Since this recommendation was made, I have been discouraged by the profes-
sional accountants who have spent much of their effort trying to prove that this 
major step is neither possible nor desirable. Typifying this negative approach to 
this vital issue was an article that appeared in the May issue of the C P A Journal. 
A partner of a national C P A firm concluded the article by saying: 
The passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has added to the increas-
ingly heavy burden that practitioners and corporations have to bear. It 
should not become the basis for imposing additional impractical re-
quirements, however well-intended.3 
The requirement referred to was the proposed reporting on internal control still 
under SEC study. I think our profession is capable of establishing the critical re-
quirements for a system of internal controls and of adding an independent evalua-
tion on top of management's oversight and evaluation. The currently outstanding 
exposure draft "Reporting on Internal Accounting Control'' is a step in the right 
direction. I think the SEC's proposed requirement, by-and-large, is a reasonable 
request. I do feel badly that the request must always come initially from outside 
the profession and result in a law that forces action in a legal environment. 
Footnotes 
1. Guide to Accounting Controls, "Establishing, Evaluating, and Monitoring Control 
Systems," #1, (New York: Price Waterhouse & Co., 1979), p. 26. 
2. The Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations, '' 
(New York: The Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities), p. 60. 
3. Chazon, Charles, " A n Accountant Looks at the F C P A , " CPA Journal, May 1980, p. 45. 
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E L E M E N T S OF I N T E R N A L C O N T R O L 
Rodney J. Anderson 
I. Organizational Controls 
A . Honest and competent personnel 
B. Segregation of functions 
C. Overall plan of organization 
D. Accounting/finance plan 
II. Systems Development Controls 
III. Authorization and Reporting Controls 
A . General authorization, specific authorization, and approvals 
B. Budgets, responsibility reporting, management information system 
IV. Accounting Systems Controls 
A . Ensuring that the transactions are initially recorded 
B. General ledger and chart of accounts 
C. Journals, sub-ledgers, balancing routines 
D. Document design 
E. Cost accounting 
V . Additional Safeguarding Controls 
A . Restricted access 
B. Periodic count and comparison 
C. Protection of records 
D. Insurance 
VI. Management Supervisory Controls 
VII. Documentation Controls 
Source: Anderson, R.J., The External Audit, Volume 1, Concepts and Tech-
niques, (Toronto: Copp, Clark Pitman, 1977), p. 142. 
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3 
A Taxonomization of Internal Controls 
and Errors for Audit Research 
Miklos A. Vasarhelyi* 
Columbia University 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 and the advent of in-
creased electronic data processing in organizations have focused increased atten-
tion on management's responsibility to establish and maintain adequate systems 
of internal accounting controls. 
The Act requires organizations to maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls to provide reasonable assurances that 
—transactions are authorized 
—transactions are recorded to 
a) permit preparation of financial statements 
b) maintain accountability for assets 
—access to assets is restricted 
—assets are accounted for 
These requirements are similar in nature to the definition of accounting con-
trol codified in SAS#1 (AICPA, 1973). 
The advent of widespread use of electronic data processing led to changes in 
the nature of accounting controls prompting increased scrutiny and further for-
malization. Manual systems had allowed for informal controls of a pattern 
recognition nature by human information processors. Special emphasis was given 
to the examination of processing consistency and supervision. Automated systems 
partially changed the nature of control systems. The emphasis now is on system 
design and integrity as consistency is substantially assured. 
These two major developments led to a series of procedural reactions by major 
C P A firms (e.g. Arthur Andersen & Co., 1978; Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 1979; 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 1978), to statements of position and proposed 
rules by the A I C P A and other standard setting bodies (e.g. AICPA, 1979; SEC, 
1979), and to the renewed interest of the academic accounting profession in the 
theoretical issues surrounding internal accounting controls. 
Among the expressions of interest by the academic profession is the research 
*This project was funded by a grant from the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Foundation through its 
Research Opportunities in Auditing program. The author wishes to thank the Foundation for its ad-
ministrative assistance in carrying out the project. The views expressed herein are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Foundation. 
The assistance of Susan Weber Swoboda, Bachar Yazbeck, and Ian Daley in the preparation of this 
paper is gratefully acknowledged. 
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proposal by the author (Vasarhelyi and Ginzberg, 1978) which suggests a set of 
experiments for the measurement of internal controls. This project is composed of 
eight steps, the first two of which examine the literature and construct schemae 
for classifying types of internal controls and errors. These two steps are discussed 
in this paper. The remaining steps will encompass a more complete analytical for-
mulation of the categories specified in the schemae of this paper, and the develop-
ment and utilization of typical but simplified cases in both computer and 
behavioral laboratory simulations for internal control evaluation purposes. Yet 
these subsequent steps first require the taxonomic specification criteria developed 
in the next section. 
Definitions, Criteria, and Objectives 
Cushing (1974) attempted, as one of his objectives, "to describe a means of 
representing internal control in mathematical terms," showing the usefulness of 
this approach and pointing out "implications of this approach for future 
research" (p.24). 
Cushing's emphasis was on the utilization of reliability theory for the evalua-
tion of internal control procedures. Bodnar (1975) expanded Cushing's work by 
incorporating the problems of human reliability in a chain of controls (Meister, 
1971) and the issues relating to control redundancy (serial vs. parallel com-
ponents) and complementarity. Bodnar also raised, but did not satisfactorily 
resolve, the issues surrounding the validity of simple multiplicative probability 
models and the statistical independence of multiple controls and errors. Car-
michael (1970, p. 238) is mentioned as asserting that "an assumption of in-
dependence is necessary in internal control because of the commonly expressed 
opinion that an internal control system collapses with collusion" (Bodnar, p. 
753). A third issue that may be raised concerning Cushing's approach is that it 
does not discriminate between different types of controls and errors. 
We shall start with Cushing's formulation and notation but will not use 
reliability theory in our development. Cushing's basic statements and presenta-
tion are of great value as foundations for the work here presented. It is necessary, 
however, to define a few basic concepts to place the internal control problem in 
context. 
Churchman (1968) points out five basic considerations to be kept in mind 
while thinking about a system: 1) Objectives, 2) Environment, 3) Resources, 4) 
Components, and 5) Management. The business organization's objectives are to 
be met by its management utilizing efficiently the organization's components and 
resources within its corporate environment. 
The business organization is the macro-system where internal controls are 
located. Internal controls are sub-systems within it. These sub-systems may be 
considered as a whole, or in part with different resulting environmental bounda-
ries, system interactions and available components. 
"Control is a function through which the executive is able to identify 
change, discover its causes, and provide decisive action in order to main-
tain a state of equilibrium . . . " (Strong & Smith, 1968, pp. 2-3). 
It is necessary to identify the mechanisms through which organizations exert 
controls. 
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" A n internal control procedure (ICP) is a single control measure, 
such as the checking of a control total'' (Cushing, 1974, p.25). 
We shall differ slightly from Cushing by defining: A n internal control cluster 
(ICC) consists of one or more internal control procedures related to one or more 
types of error or activity, while an internal control system (ICS) is a set of ICCs 
that constitute a particular cycle of the business organization. 
Figure 1 displays the five dimensions of the internal control process within the 
organization. The cycles of a business entity are simply subsystems of the ICS as 
defined by the auditor. The department or function is another type of component 
to be set in the systems design stage. Finally, numerous types of ICPs and errors 
can be found in the literature with a varied array of features. These ICPs or errors 
must be classified on the basis of similar nature into a more restrictive set of 
categories if they are to be adequately represented in analytic formulations. 
Figure 1 
EXAMPLES OF T H E 
FIVE DIMENSIONS OF T H E INTERNAL CONTROL PROCESS 
Cycles Objectives 
Department 
Function 
Interna! 
Control 
Procedures Irregularities 
I. Treasury 
II. Purchasing 
III. Payroll 
IV. Conversion 
V . Revenue 
V I . Financial Reporting 
A . Authorization 
B. Accounting 
B1) Transaction 
Processing 
B2) Classification 
B3) Substantiation 
C. Safeguarding 
1. Order Entry 
2. Shipping 
3. Billing 
4. Credit & Collection 
5. Maintenance of 
Receivables Records 
Etc. 
a) Segregation of duties 
b) Physical assets 
restriction 
c) Direct Supervision 
d) Indirect Supervision 
e) Periodic Compliance 
Audit 
f) Backups 
g) Insurance & Fidelity 
Bonds 
h) Safes, etc. 
i) Batch Totals 
j) Controlled Custody 
k) Prenumbering 
l) Accounting for 
Prenumbering 
m) Physical Counts 
n) Organizational 
Charts 
o) Job Descriptions 
Etc. 
i. Lack of Approval 
ii. Bad Total 
iii. Incorrect Posting 
iv. Incorrect Amount 
v. Unauthorized 
Adjustment 
vi. Missing 
Transaction 
vii. Duplicate 
Transaction 
viii. Missing Assets 
Etc. 
In order to further clarify issues relating to ICPs and their features we shall use 
Cushing's (1974) multiple-control multiple-error case to introduce a general for-
mulation of the problem (see Figure 2). 
The formulations in Figure 2 may be expanded by assuming an infinite 
population E of potential errors that may exist in a system. 
A n error may be defined as a discrepancy between the empirical relational 
system (ERS) (containing all transactions, economic entities, and levels within the 
system) and its numerical relational system (NRS) (representing the 
measurements of these entities made within a framework of measurement rules). 
When there is a discrepancy between the " real " value of an entity within the 
ERS and its measured value in the NRS under the established rules of measure 
ment and coding (in this case G A A P ) an error is said to exist. 
The population E of potential errors is infinite, reflecting the fact that any 
measurement of the value of an entity may be incorrectly stated with an infinite 
number of variations. Despite this set being infinite, in practice internal control 
systems are developed considering three main aspects: (1) designer's (or manage-
ment's) perception of exposures due to errors, (2) corporate experience with er-
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Figure 2 
Cushing's Generalized Control 
Case 
C: Multiple Control - Multiple Error Case 
Control 
# 1 
Control 
# 2 
Completion 
of Process 
Error # 1 
Correction 
Error § 2 
Correction 
Error # 3 
Correction 
Probabi l i ty that the control step j w i l l not signal an error i 
given that none exists 
The probabi l i ty that the correction step j w i l l correct an error 
i given that one exists and has been signaled 
The probabi l i ty that a fa i lure of the control step j w i l l be detected 
and no correction made given that the control signals an error i 
when none exists 
R = Overall system r e l i a b i l i t y (probabil i ty that no errors of any kind 
are present subsequent to the last control step) 
n = number of different error types possible in the system 
rors and irregularities, and (3) the cost/benefits of internal controls. 
However, not all errors and irregularities can be predicted by the designers. 
With the passage of time new errors are experienced and new controls will have to 
be enacted. Therefore the set of errors that a particular ICS may attempt to cover 
is E ' (a subset of E). 
This population of errors can be represented by a vector E ' (e1, e2, . . . en) 
where each e is a particular type of error which may assume different magnitudes 
and characteristics. This vector has a definable length commensurate with the 
designer's perception of potential errors within any group of designed controls, 
but still a subset of vector E. 
The same reasoning can be extended to ICSs. A n ICS is composed of ICCs 
which may or may not be the "cycles" as defined by the auditors. ICCs are com-
posed of ICPs. Therefore we have a global population C of potential controls, of 
which the population C is formally implemented. C can be represented as a vec-
tor C (C 1, C 2 , . . . Cn) of the types of internal control procedures used within the 
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p 
where: j i = R e l i a b i l i t y of the system with respect to the i
th error at the 
completion of the jth control step 
P(e..)= 
P ( c i j ) = 
P(d..)= 
R = (R 
R j i R j-1 i P(S i J ) + R j-1 i ( 1 - P ( S i j ) P (d i j )+ (1-R 
j-1 
i ) P(ei j) P(cij) 
R-
r 
1 ) (R 
r 
2 ) . . . (R 
r 
n 
ICS. Each of these types of ICPs may assume a value (if ordinal, interval or ratio) 
or a nature (if nominal) within an ICC. As internal control procedures are mainly 
nominal in measurement nature the element C n (say separation of duties) may 
assume different values (for example at different levels of the organization). 
Therefore C can be represented as C'(Cij, . . . ) where j represents the different 
values for ICP Ci. 
The question that follows concerns the relationship between controls and er-
rors, both at general and specific levels. In general Figure 3 can represent a con-
trol phenomenon: 
FIGURE 3  
A Control Phenomenon 
In order to clarify, let us suppose that control 1 is a system of batch totals, con-
trol 2 is separation of duties, control 3 encompasses a good organizational chart 
and careful job descriptions, while control 4 is supervision. Controls 2 and 3 will 
be effective against collusion and control 1 ineffective in this dimension. On the 
other hand in the case of errors in amounts, or bad client numbers, or incorrect 
posting to accounts, control 1 may prove effective while others are ineffectual. Us-
ing this example as a base and considering the assertions in some of the scholarly 
literature, [for example, (Cushing, (1974,1975); Bodnar, (1975); Toba (1975)], 
the following assertions may be made: 
Each control will have a potentially different effect upon each type of error. 
Cushing states: " . . . the probabilities pertaining to the control procedure and 
to the error correction procedure should be unique for each control procedure.'' 
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Each transaction will be controlled by different sets of controls and may 
generate a multiplicity of errors of identical and/or different types. 
Each cluster of controls may have different effects upon different errors. 
The finer the focus of a control upon a particular error type the more likely it 
is to be ineffectual in relation to other errors. 
The combination of controls may have additive, counteractive, multiplicative 
and neutral effects upon particular error types. 
Bodnar (1975) criticizes Cushing's multiplicative probability modeling and 
shows differences in the effects of parallel and serial controls. The problem is still 
rather simple if it can be represented in these terms. The difficulty lies in dealing 
with the lack of independence between controls and between errors (collusion) as 
well as in defining the configural relationships between controls. 
In consequence the relationships between controls and error types should be 
represented in two types of matrices. The first would relate each type of ICP to 
each type of error. The second would relate internal control clusters and types of 
errors. The entries in the matrix may be expressed as the probabilities of an error 
of the particular type being detected. These matrices are represented in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 
I l l u s t r a t i on o f 
Contro l & E r r o r I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
ICC 1 
ICC 2 
{ 
ICP 1* 
ICP 2 
ICP 3* 
ICP 4 
ICP 5 
ICP N* 
E r r o r 
Type 1 
E r r o r 
Type 2 
E r r o r 
Type 3 
* These c o n t r o l s are part o f ICC n 
Figure 1 represented the five dimensions of the internal control process. Any 
combination of its elements (e.g. II.A.3.a.iv) may describe a type of internal con-
trol and error. The limited number of categories considered already allows for 
18000 (6x5x5x15x8). The consideration of ICCs versus ICPs, described while 
discussing Figure 4 above, further expands the number of alternatives that may be 
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considered. Methodologies are necessary for the evaluation of clusters as well as of 
the independent effect of an individual control upon a given error type. 
Clearly some combinations are nonsensical, others may make sense but are 
not currently implemented and finally a few are currently in use. This leads to the 
conclusion that comprehensive formulations are infeasible and that analysts 
should pursue two main routes: 
(1) use of a building block type of approach for simplifying their analyses and 
(2) construction of taxonomies of internal controls and errors that will sum-
marize and add parsimony to the number of possible combinations. 
This study addresses the second of these routes. 
Some Existing Classifications 
Arthur Andersen & Co. (1978) divides controls into preventive and detective 
controls. Cushing (1975) uses three categories: structural, feedforward and feed-
back. Mair, Wood and Davis (1976) divide controls into: preventive, detective 
and corrective controls. 
We would define preventive controls as those that reduce the probability of an 
error (or irregularity) occurring. 
A detective control reduces the actual frequency of errors in the system. 
A corrective control changes the nature of the probability distribution in the 
discrepancies between the ERS and the NRS. 
Other classifications also cited by Mair, Wood and Davis (1976) include 
logical vs. technical controls or vertical vs. horizontal controls. 
SAS #3 divides controls into: general and application controls. The first relate 
to all EDP activities while the latter refer to specific accounting tasks. Within 
general controls one would include six general classifications: (1) Organization, 
(2) Operations, (3) Documentation, (4) System development and programming, 
(5) Hardware and systems software, and (6) Access and library. Application con-
trols are, on the other hand, divided into: (1) Input controls, (2) Processing con-
trols and (3) Output controls. 
SAS #1 states that the " . . . essential characteristics of internal accounting 
controls include: "(AICPA, 1973, Secs. 320.30 and 320.35.48) 
Personnel 
Segregation of functions 
Execution of transactions 
Access to assets 
Comparison of recorded accountability with assets 
Recent internal studies at Peat, Marwick and Mitchell have proposed the 
classification of controls into six categories: 
1) Authorizations 
2) Validity 
3) Population 
4) Transfer 
5) Process 
6) Segregation 
Additional classifications may be found in the literature relating to internal 
controls. On the other hand, classifications of types of errors are somewhat less 
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frequent in the literature. Touche Ross and Co. (1979) classifies control 
weaknesses and resultant risks into four categories: 
1) A flaw that will always result in error 
2) A flaw that has produced occasional error 
3) A probable flaw signaled by skewed analytical results 
4) Universal and improbable flaws (p. 15) 
Y u and Neter (1973) classify errors into two categories: monetary and non-
monetary. Each ICS is classified by whether it has one of these two errors. ICSs 
range from s1 = (0,0) (no errors of any type) to s4 = (1,1) indicating the presence 
of both monetary and nonmonetary errors. 
In order to simplify the difficult task of providing an evaluation, which com-
pares each type of ICP combination to every other type of ICP combination and to 
ICCs, and then of relating this evaluation to all error types, we shall next attempt 
to provide summary taxonomies of controls and errors. We shall aim to develop 
classifications that allow: 
1. Development of a matrix of ICP combinations 
2. Development of a matrix relating ICC classes to error classes 
3. Development of control combination rules for evaluating the 
impact of combinations of controls 
4. Usage of analytical representation 
5. Usage of a common measurement method for evaluation 
A n d we shall also try to: 
6. Devise precise, mutually exclusive classifications 
7. Develop a comprehensive set of classifications 
This paper is restricted to logical and conjectural developments in objectives 1 
thru 5 since their quantification requires the experimental and analytical work to 
be pursued in the later stages of this research (Vasarhelyi and Ginzberg, 1978). 
T w o Taxonomies of Controls 
The control and error taxonomies were developed through successive element 
listings followed by successive iterations attempting to improve the classification 
schema. Elements were drawn mainly from professional publications (e.g. Touche 
Ross and Co., 1978) while starting schemae were based on some of the classifica-
tions discussed in the previous section. 
The Peat, Marwick and Mitchell classification was modified into an 8 class 
framework, one of which divided into four subclasses. These classes and 
subclasses are: 
1. Authorizations 
2. Validity Controls 
3. Population and Transfer Controls 
4. Process Controls 
5. Coverage Controls 
a. Segregation 
b. Supervision 
c. Rules and Procedures 
d. Insurance 
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6. Access Controls 
7. Audit (ex-post facto) Controls 
8. Compliance with G A A P Controls 
A distinction was made between internal accounting controls and exclusively 
management oriented controls. The first were considered to be directly related to 
the types of controls mentioned in the F C P A while the second were mainly 
oriented towards quality and efficiency issues. These management controls were 
excluded from the study. 
Authorization Controls prevent the occurrence of exchanges, allocations, or 
valuations not in accordance with company policy (e.g. a credit check may be re-
quired before a sale is completed). 
Processing Controls ensure accuracy when data has changed form through ag-
gregation or disaggregation, content through processing, or mode of presentation 
through different formats of presentation and timing (e.g. calculation of deprecia-
tion controls, footing, etc.) 
Coverage Controls are generic in nature, applicable to one particular process 
or set of transactions. 
Segregation of Duties ensures that certain activities or responsibilities 
are assigned to separate individuals. It implies the need for collusion to 
override controls as well as the application of sequential controls on tasks. 
1. Custody vs recordkeeping for an asset 
2. Activity vs control over that activity (sales/credit approval) 
3. Interrelated activities (credit/approval/bad debt writeoffs) 
Supervision Controls refer to the supervision by a superior of a task be-
ing performed. It does not imply authorizations or specific approvals. 
Rules and Procedures refers to the formalization and documentation of 
control steps. 
Insurance Controls relate to the expenditure of resources, to counter-
balance potential losses related to a particular event. 
Access Controls ensure limitations placed on access to physical or informa-
tional entities in the system (e.g. passwords). 
Audit Controls serve to ex-post facto find errors and irregularities in the con-
trol and accounting data (e.g. visual checks for authorization on a sample bases). 
Compliance with GAAP Controls cover procedures used to verify whether 
transactions are being registered in accordance with current accounting rules. 
Appendix I lists controls drawn from several publications (Arthur Andersen 
& Co., 1978, p. 43-44; Touche Ross & Co., 1978, p. 75 and p. 100; Peat, Mar-
wick & Mitchell, 1978, p. 33 and p. 40; Ernst & Ernst, 1978, p. 24, among 
many) and classified into the above categories. The taxonomy seemed to fit the 
controls in the list but often controls were found in the boundary of two classes. 
A n additional taxonomy of controls with very similar characteristics was de-
veloped and can be found in Appendix II. The choice between these will be based 
on the ease of developing analytic formulations. 
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A Taxonomy of Errors 
After a series of classification attempts a feasible classification of seven 
categories was developed for errors: 
I. Procedural Errors (violations or lack of internal controls) 
II. Computation Errors errors in the numerical processing of 
transactions) 
III. Accounting Errors (incorrect accounting transactions) 
IV. Integrity Errors (addition, deletion of unauthorized transactions or 
duplication of authorized transactions) 
V . Timing Errors (transaction registered at the wrong time) 
VI. GAAP Errors (transactions not measured in accordance to 
accounting practice) 
VII. Irregularities (fraudulent & deliberate transactions) 
VIII. Legal Errors (transactions or events that violate legal clauses) 
Appendix III lists a series of errors within each class of the taxonomy devel-
oped along similar lines to the classifications of internal controls described earlier. 
These two taxonomies, which allow for the classification of the ICPs and er-
rors, seem to present some of the previously mentioned desirable features. 
Composite Modeling 
The complexities involved in the assessment of the reliability of internal con-
trols, even if process consistency over time is assumed, are overwhelming. Let us 
consider a simple key stroke verification of card punching preparation of worked 
hours, as diagrammed in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 
P(0.01) 
P(.05) 
card punch verif ication 
correction 
The probability of error (in other data preparation) at the punch step is 0.05 
but is reduced to .01 with keystroke verification. The real difficulty, of course, 
arises with the combining of controls. Figure 6 displays some potential inter- rela-
tionships of controls. Finding the rules for control combination becomes an em-
pirical question to be answered by future research. 
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FIGURE 6  
Sample 
Control Relat ionships 
I. Sequential Controls 
or 
C = Cj x C2 
P a r a l l e l Controls 
C3 
C4 
III. Independent Controls (Venn Diagram) 
IV. Overlapping Controls 
V. Redundant Controls (d i f ferent boundaries) 
Conclusions 
This paper examines the nature and multiplicity of internal control procedures 
and errors. It shows that a nearly infinite number of combinations of alternatives 
may be used in the attempt to decrease or eliminate a wide set of errors of different 
nature. In order to simplify the formulation of the problem, two taxonomies were 
developed that reduce the number of ICPs and errors to eight each. 
These simpler sets lead to a smaller group of combinations for composite 
modeling where combination rules are to be developed on the basis of empirical 
data. Future research entails empirical laboratory developing of combination 
rules, analytic modeling, and field testing of the results obtained. 
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C = C1 + c 2 C1 C2 
1 = 1 +1 
C C3 c4 
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Appendix I 
ICP'S (Ordered) 
I. A U T H O R I Z A T I O N S 
1. Approval of Master File maintenance reports 
2. Proper procedures of authorization 
3. Customers must receive advanced approval for returns 
4. Written authority required for removing assets from premises 
II. V A L I D I T Y 
5. Control over unused and voided billing forms 
6. Approved list of suppliers 
7. Preprinted official order forms 
8. Matching invoice to receipt 
9. Goods counted and inspected before acceptance 
10. Unmatched receiving reports and invoices investigated 
III. P O P U L A T I O N A N D TRANSFER C O N T R O L S 
11. Unissued checks numerically accounted for 
12. Batch totals 
13. Prenumbering 
14. Accounting for prenumbering 
15. Records maintained of costs incurred under product warranty 
16. Verification and validation of data entered in E D P system 
17. Scanning data for reasonableness before entry 
18. Reconciliation of interface amounts exiting one system and entering another 
19. Algorithms, check-digits 
20. Transmission verification techniques 
21. Written requisitions and purchase orders with multiple copies 
IV. PROCESS C O N T R O L S 
22. Reconciliation of balances (subsidiary to general ledgers) 
23. Transaction-by-transaction balancing 
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24. Depreciation calculations independently checked for accuracy and reasonable-
ness 
25. Calculations independently checked for accuracy and overall reasonableness 
(capitalization and amortization) 
V . C O V E R A G E 
V.a S E G R E G A T I O N 
26. Segregation of duties 
operational resp/financial record keeping 
custody of assets/accounting for assets 
authorization of transactions/custody of assets 
within the accounting function 
27. Segregation and rotation of input and processing duties 
28. Separate areas maintained for receiving, storage, and shipping functions 
29. Each cash fund assigned to one individual, independent of others 
30. Monthly statements sent to all customers 
31. Complaints (about monthly statements) handled independent of cashier or ac-
counts receivable bookkeeper 
32. Delinquent accounts handled independent of cashier 
V.b SUPERVISION 
33. Employee performance reviews 
34. Direct supervision 
35. Indirect supervision 
36. Physical storage methods reviewed to spot inventory deterioration 
37. Interest expense regularly posted (fluctuations investigated) 
38. Operational planning 
V.c RULES A N D PROCEDURES 
39. Competitive bidding 
40. Clearly defined processing and exception procedures 
41. Competent and trustworthy personnel 
42. Adequate documents and records 
43. Established cut-off procedures 
44. Chart of accounts and accounting procedures manual 
45. Procedure for reflecting necessary general ledger corrections 
46. Continuing education programs 
47. Formal policy for capitalization and amortization 
48. Flowcharts of control system 
49. Prompt processing of billings and credits 
50. Each day's receipts deposited intact that day 
51. Paid notes cancelled and retained 
52. Organizational charts 
53. Job descriptions 
V . d INSURANCE 
54. Insurance and fidelity bonds 
55. Backups (for master files) 
56. Retention paid of source documents, tape and disc files (son, father, grand-
father) 
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VI. ACCESS 
57. Dual signatures required for access to securities and adjustments on a timely 
basis 
58. Physical access restriction 
59. Safes, etc. (locked enclosures to protect assets from people and physical 
hazards) 
60. Controlled custody 
61. Password procedures in EDP system 
62. Movement of inventory subject to verification by the area assuming responsi-
bility for it 
63. ID tags or serial numbers affixed to assets 
64. Guards and/or alarm system used 
65. Employees identified by badge or card 
66. Unissued checks locked up 
VII. A U D I T (ex-post analysis) 
67. Regression analysis for forecasting expected activity level 
68. Physical counts 
69. Internal auditing 
70. Variance analysis 
71. Periodic compliance audit 
72. Intercompany accounts balanced regularly 
VIII. C O M P L I A N C E W I T H G A A P 
73. Assignment of responsibility and establishment of procedures for accumula-
tion of notes to financial statements including a review 
74. Revenues recognized on long-term projects based on engineering estimates 
75. Formal policies for assigning lives and depreciation method 
76. Allowances for depreciation regularly reviewed for adequacy 
77. Leases reviewed for classification as capital or operating 
78. Intercompany profits eliminated 
79. Periodic analysis of intangible assets; review for loss in value 
80. Formal policies for identifying, reporting permanent and timing differences 
81. Timing differences allocated between current and non-current 
82. Warranty reserve regularly reviewed for adequacy 
83. Estimated costs to complete long-term contracts regularly reviewed. 
X . Management Controls 
84. Appropriate cost system in use (job v process v standard v direct cost) 
85. Compliance with loan covenants and lease agreements monitored 
86. Current intercompany accounts zeroed out regularly 
87. Investments previously written off, or fully reserved, regularly reviewed for 
possible realization 
88. Selling and administrative expenses under budgetary control 
89. Employees handling receipts bonded 
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Appendix II 
Alternate Taxonomy of ICP's 
(by number) 
A . Organizational Controls 
2, 3, 6,10, 15, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 
45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 73 
B. Repetition and Matching Type Controls 
8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 22, 24, 25, 68, 72, 76 
C. Authorization and Supervision 
1, 4, 34, 35, 57, 62 
D . Physical Controls 
7, 21, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66 
E. Audit Type Controls 
48, 67, 69, 70, 71 
F. Economic Compensation Controls 
54, 89 
G . Process Moment Controls 
16, 17, 19, 20,23 
H . G A A P Obedience Controls 
74 ,75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81 ,82, 83 
Appendix III 
A Taxonomy of Errors 
I. P R O C E D U R A L ERRORS 
1. Lack of approval 
5. Unauthorized adjustment 
11. Goods shipped to bad credit risk 
17. Assets unnecessarily exposed to unauthorized use. 
25. Unauthorized services performed 
27. Lack of communication between departments (purchase v. production depts) 
resulting in overstocking of useless materials 
II. C O M P U T A T I O N ERRORS 
2. Bad total 
32. Miscalculation for depreciation 
39. Miscalculation of contingent lease payments 
III. A C C O U N T I N G ERROR 
3. Incorrect posting 
19. Sales discounts not recognized, or recognized when they shouldn't be 
23. Misapplication of overhead 
29. Sales misclassified 
35. Misclassification of long- or short-term debt 
IV. INTEGRITY ERROR 
4. Incorrect amount 
6. Missing transaction 
7. Duplicate transaction 
8. Missing assets 
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9. Sales recorded but goods not shipped 
10. Goods shipped but not invoiced 
13. Inflated payroll 
14. Misappropriation of funds (cash received posted at lower amounts or not at 
all) 
22. Accepting shipments of unauthorized quality/quantity 
24. Fictitious employees 
38. Capital leases not recorded/operating leases recorded 
42. Dividends paid to wrong parties/wrong amounts 
45. Investment losses not monitored 
46. Goodwill, patents, other intangibles carried in excess of value 
49. Investment losses not reflected in accounting records 
V . T I M I N G ERROR 
12. Sales recorded in wrong period 
16. Conditions affecting accounting valuations not recognized on a timely basis 
43. Profits recognized prematurely on intercompany sales 
47. Intangibles remain on books after disposal or expiration 
48. Tax liability/expense not reflected in accounting records 
VI. G A A P ERROR 
15. Nonconformity to G A A P 
26. Computation of LIFO inventory does not meet IRS regulations 
VII. IRREGULARITIES 
18. Defalcation and fraud 
33. Kickbacks 
36. Pledged assets not disclosed 
44. Management conceals permanently impaired value of investment (uncollecti-
bility of intercompany receivable) 
VIII. L E G A L ERRORS 
37. Violation of restrictive covenants resulting in default 
40. Unauthorized sale of shares (violates legal requirements) 
41. Unauthorized stock options exercised (violates option terms) 
MISCELLANEOUS M A N A G E M E N T ERRORS 
20. Financial reports do not fairly represent firm 
21. Receiving or producing poor quality assets 
30. Idle assets not identified 
31. Undetected deterioration of property 
34. Company becomes obligated for debts at unfavorable terms 
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Discussant's Response to 
A Taxonomization of Internal Controls and 
Errors for Audit Research 
John K. Wulff 
Main Hurdman & Cranstoun 
The objective of Dr. Vasarhelyi's project, namely " . . . to formalize and sum-
marize the key issues in the relationships between individual internal control pro-
cedures, clusters of internal controls, internal control systems and the diverse 
types of errors which may occur.'' is admirable. The sheer number of controls 
and combinations thereof coupled with the multiplicity of possible errors renders 
the project particularly challenging. However, the project offers the potential to 
significantly enhance our understanding of internal controls and thereby to im-
prove existing techniques used to evaluate the effectiveness of internal control 
systems. 
I tend to agree with Dr. Vasarhelyi that a crucial first step in the project is the 
development of a succinct taxonomy of internal controls and errors. Indeed, the 
subject of internal control, because of its complexity is difficult to analyze or 
discuss without first grouping controls and errors with similar attributes. 
The development of taxonomies, of course, is not an end in itself but rather a 
means to assist the author in portraying internal control situations analytically— 
thereby clarifying the relationship between controls and errors. Because the 
overall project is only in its initial stages, it is impossible to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the suggested taxonomies in enabling Dr. Vasarhelyi to achieve his 
ultimate objectives. The paper, moreover, fails to demonstrate why the particular 
taxonomies suggested by the author are likely to be more useful than alternative 
classifications. Under these circumstances, it is difficult and probably premature to 
either praise or criticize the author's groupings. Nevertheless, I will make a few 
brief observations. 
Classification of Controls—Exclusion of Management Controls 
Dr. Vasarhelyi distinguishes between internal accounting controls and "ex-
clusively management oriented controls'' with the stated intention of excluding 
the latter from his study. It is not clear whether the phrase "exclusively manage-
ment oriented" refers to the characteristic of the control or its purpose. A 
budgetary system, for example, is traditionally characterized as an administrative 
or management control. Nevertheless, effective budgeting (including variance 
analysis) may highlight unauthorized disbursements and otherwise improve 
management's ability to meet internal accounting control objectives. I believe 
that distinctions between management controls, on the one hand, and internal ac-
counting controls, on the other hand, are, in many instances virtually impossible 
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to make, either on the basis of control characteristic or control objective. 
Moreover, even if such distinctions were feasible, the exclusion of management 
controls which serve accounting control objectives would severely limit the 
usefulness of Dr. Vasarhelyi's project. The presence or absence of certain 
management controls such as a budgeting system will impact the relative effec-
tiveness of internal accounting controls. As the A I C P A Special Advisory Com-
mittee on Internal Accounting Controls noted, "Internal accounting controls 
cannot be evaluated in a vacuum.'' 
Classification of Errors 
The author's attempt to classify errors represents a potentially fruitful line of 
research—an area which, perhaps, has not received the degree of attention 
directed to the development of control taxonomies. In this regard, however, con-
sideration should be given to eliminating the "accounting error'' category on the 
basis that all accounting errors may be classified as either "computation" or 
" G A A P . " 
Introduction—Historical Perspective 
Dr. Vasarhelyi leaves the unfortunate and incorrect implication that the 
enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act lead to a series of procedural reac-
tions by major C P A firms. In general, the so-called procedural reactions 
represented the culmination of many years of work initiated long before enact-
ment of the F C P A . 
In summary, I believe that Dr. Vasarhelyi's work offers significant potential. 
Because the project is still in its infancy, it is premature to evaluate the suggested 
taxonomies. However, I suspect that the author will find it necessary to address 
more effectively the problem of management controls and their relationships to ac-
counting controls in order to achieve his ultimate project objectives. 
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4 
A n Investigation of a Measurement Based Approach 
to the Evaluation of Audit Evidence 
Theodore J. Mock* 
University of Southern California 
Arnold Wright* 
University of Nevada, Reno 
Several definitions of the auditing function have been proposed, e.g., Mautz 
and Sharaf (1961, p. 15); American Accounting Association (1972). A t the root 
of these definitions is the notion that the accumulation of evidence is the cor-
nerstone of the auditing, attestation process. There is also widespread recognition 
that the "quality'' of the many types of audit evidence varies considerably ( A A A , 
1971; Toba, 1975; Robertson, 1976; AICPA, 1973). In evaluating the propri-
ety of a given assertion, an auditor must weigh the quality as well as the quantity 
of evidence gathered. Some forms of evidence are compelling such as observation 
of marketable securities while others are merely suggestive. Thus, evidence 
evaluation is a complex, vital decision. How should an auditor, then, consider the 
many factors involved and arrive at an appropriate judgment? What guidelines or 
tools are available to aid in this difficult task? Although there have been 
numerous attempts to provide theoretical frameworks which examine the nature 
of evidence,1 the concepts proposed are generally vague and not operational. Most 
importantly, an overall approach for evaluating evidence has not been presented. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of a measurement 
based approach as an integrative, operational process to evaluate audit evidence. 
Towards this end the paper addresses four main topics. The first section considers 
the nature of audit evidence and its role in the audit process. This discussion is 
followed by a review of the literature. Several evidence evaluation frameworks are 
identified and analyzed. The third section introduces the measurement based ap-
proach and illustrates its use in audit evidence evaluation. The final section 
discusses the implications of this approach for practice and explores avenues for 
future research. 
T h e Nature of Audit Evidence and its Role in the Auditing Process 
Figure 1 presents a model of the role of evidence in the audit process. The 
model contains three major elements: 
* The authors wish to gratefully acknowledge the comments and ideas expressed by the participants 
at the University of Southern California Accounting Research Forum. 
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(1) the Accounting Information System (AIS); 
(2) the Auditing Information System (ADIS); and 
(3) the evaluative factors in planning audit tests and analyzing the 
evidence gathered. 
Figure 1 
ROLE OF EVIDENCE IN T H E AUDIT PROCESS 
Accounting Information System (AIS) 
inputs, hardware, controls, procedures, etc. 
Qualities of AIS : error rate, reliability, accuracy, timeliness, etc. 
AIS Outputs 
1. Data Base 
2. Financial Statements: 
Assertions Concerning 
a. completeness 
b. existence 
c. rights & obligations 
d. valuation & allocation 
e. presentation & disclosure 
Audit Information System 
Audit Procedures, Controls, etc. 
Characteristics of Audit System: 
cost, reliability, validity, bias, etc. 
Characteristics of Evidence: 
competence, sufficiency, reliability, cost, timeliness, objectivity. 
Audit Judgments 
Judgments Contained in Auditor 's Report: 
fairly present, etc. 
Judgments Contained in Auditor 's Work Papers: 
reliance, scope, nature, timing, etc. 
Evaluative Factors in 
Designing & Executing Audit 
Professional Standards: 
•Sufficient, competent evidence 
•Adequate procedure to provide reasonable basis 
•Rational relationship between cost and usefulness 
•etc. 
Audit Objectives: 
•bona fide accounts 
•appropriate valuation 
•proper disclosure 
•etc. 
Audit Firm Criteria: 
•materiality 
•risk 
•internal control 
•cost 
•contribution 
•etc. 
The primary output of the AIS is the financial statements. Underlying these 
statements are several broad assertions represented by management: 
completeness; 
existence; 
rights and obligations; 
valuation or allocation; 
presentation and disclosure (AICPA Auditing Standards Board, 1979). 
The vital role of the audit process is to independently test whether these assertions 
appear warranted based on the evidence accumulated and, thus, express an overall 
opinion as to the fairness of the financial statements. 
The ADIS attempts to gather evidence to provide the basis for various audit 
judgments. Toba (1975, p. 9) emphasizes this significant function of evidence as 
"the basis on which one ought to fashion one's belief or draw some conclusion 
with respect to the proposition established." The value of an audit lies in the 
"warranted assertions" ( A A A , 1972) made by the auditor. Warranted asser-
tions are those believed to be appropriate based on the evidence examined and the 
circumstances. The audit opinion, thus, adds credibility to the financial state-
ments because of the declared belief by the professional auditor that management 
assertions are appropriate. 
Figure 1 identifies three key evaluative factors that appear to be significant 
considerations (criteria) in weighing various types of audit evidence to support a 
given assertion: 
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(1) professional standards, e.g., SAS#1, Section 330 (1973); 
(2) audit objectives (AICPA Auditing Standards Board, 1979); and 
(3) audit firm criteria. 
The first two factors are self explanatory. Audit firm criteria are matters relating 
specifically to the given assertion under investigation in its client setting. Some of 
the important firm criteria noted are (SAS#1, Section 330, 1973 and Anderson 
et al., 1970): 
• risk of assertion; 
• evidence cost; 
• materiality; and 
• internal control. 
The model of the role of evidence in the audit process, as discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs, highlights the function of evidence as the means of af-
fording the auditor the basis to state beliefs regarding financial statement asser-
tions. Therefore, the auditor must be able to evaluate the "adequacy" of various 
evidential matter necessary to support a warranted assertion. The evaluation of 
evidence is a very complex decision involving numerous variables (Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Co., 1976, p. 20-24; A A A , 1972, pp. 34-50). Thus, guidance and 
aids in this area appear vitally needed. Additionally, an overall systematic ap-
proach that encompasses the major factors to be considered would be highly 
desirable and promising. 
The next section examines some of the existing evidence evaluation ap-
proaches found in the professional and research literature. A n overall summary 
and critique of these approaches is then presented. Finally, the need for an in-
tegrated process is discussed. 
Existing Approaches to Evaluating Audit Evidence 
Professional Standards. SAS No. 1, Section 330 is the primary normative 
framework available in the professional literature on evidence evaluation. Figure 2 
outlines the criteria advanced by this framework. 
Figure 2 
AUDIT EVIDENCE AS INDICATED IN SAS 1, 330 
Evaluative Factors Contained 
in SAS 1, para. 330 
Financial 
Statement 
Assertions 
A u d i t 
Objectives 
A u d i t 
Procedures 
A u d i t 
Evidence 
Sufficient Competent Evidence 
Competence is a matter of judgment and is affected by perti-
nence, timeliness, existence of corroborating evidence, 
relevance and validity. 
Validity is related to reliability which varies with source independ-
ence, quality of internal control system and directness of knowl-
edge. 
Sufficiency is a matter of judgment. Relevant considerations in-
clude nature of item, materiality, risk, susceptibility of item to 
misstatement and competence. 
Other considerations 
Relationship between cost and usefulness, relative risk, and cer-
tain statistical criteria. 
A u d i t 
Judgments 
Assertions 
Warranted? 
Evidence 
Cost 
Beneficial? 
The third standard of field work states: 
Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspec-
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tion, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis 
for an opinion regarding the financial statements under examination (para. 
.01). [emphasis added] 
The decision as to what constitutes "sufficient" evidence is considered to be a 
"matter of professional judgment," although four factors are mentioned as 
significant to the decision (para .09): 
(1) the nature of the item examined; 
(2) materiality; 
(3) the risk involved, which is dependent upon the adequacy of internal 
control and the susceptibility of an item to misstatement; and 
(4) the competence of the evidence available. 
"Competent'' evidence is defined as that which is both valid and pertinent. A 
final criterion is presented in paragraph .10: "In the great majority of cases, the 
auditor finds it necessary to rely on evidence that is persuasive rather than con-
vincing." Thus, SAS No. 1, Section 330, entitled "Evidential Matter," provides 
three general criteria to guide practitioners in assessing the quality of audit 
evidence: 
(1) competency; 
(2) validity; and 
(3) sufficiency. 
Additionally, a number of other considerations such as cost effectiveness and risk 
are noted in SAS No. 1. 
The criteria provided by SAS No. 1, although identifying significant concepts 
and issues, appear to have several shortcomings: 
(1) the concepts noted are vague and not operational; 
(2) measurement of the criteria is not addressed; e.g., how does one 
measure "validity?" 
(3) a scientific, systematic approach is not presented. Thus, the reliability 
and validity of evidence gathered employing this standard is open to 
question; and 
(4) on occasion, terminology and concepts appear to be used in an 
inconsistent, imprecise manner which may result in confusion. For ex-
ample, validity is said to be directly related to reliability (para .08). 
Such concepts have distinct, separate scientific meaning, as will be 
noted later. 
A later exposure draft (AICPA Auditing Standards Board, 1979) outlines the 
nature of major audit assertions and related objectives and substantive tests but 
does not address the issue of evidence evaluation criteria. 
Research findings. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) propose essentially the same 
evaluation criteria as Section 330: 
In the degree of influence it exerts on the mind of the auditor, audit 
evidence varies from compelling through persuasive to inconclusive. . . . 
Audit evidence must be reviewed critically with respect to its validity and 
pertinence before it is permitted to influence the mind of the auditor with 
respect to an assertion at issue (p. 110). 
Robertson (1976) similarly defines competent audit evidence as: relevant, objec-
tive, and free from bias. 
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Toba (1975) provides valuable insights as to the nature and evaluation of 
evidence. The concept of the weight of evidence is discussed. Evidence is divided 
into two categories: confirming evidence and supporting evidence. Confirming 
evidence establishes the validity of a proposition. Supporting evidence merely 
makes a proposition more tenable. 
Statement (evidence) q may be said to have confirming power for state-
ment p if statement q is well established and renders p more probable than 
not - p (expressed as p). In symbols, for q to have confirming power: 
P(p|q)>P(p|q) 
Statement (evidence) q may be said to have supporting power for statement 
p if the probability P(p | q) is greater than the prior probability of statement 
p. In symbols, for q to have supporting power: 
P(p|q)>P(p) (Toba, 1975, p. 9) 
Toba also classifies propositions as: 
(1) elementary, stating facts or events; 
(2) general, describing a value judgment or generality; 
(3) immediate, self evident; and 
(4) demonstrable, subject to proof. 
A general proposition cannot be directly proven, as can an elementary statement, 
but must be rephrased into elementary propositions while maintaining 
equivalence between the general proposition and the surrogate elementary 
statements. Demonstrable propositions can be proven to some degree of con-
fidence (probability), while immediate statements do not require proof. Thus, in 
Toba's framework the evaluation of internal control is not evidential matter, but 
an elementary proposition to be proven, providing supporting evidence as to the 
fairness of the financial statements. Finally, Toba notes that auditing is essentially 
a heuristic, demonstrative process of persuasion rather than an investigative, 
learning approach. 
While Toba does much to develop a general theory of evidence, the concepts 
provided are broad and not operational. For example, evidence is said to have con-
firming power if it is "well established and renders p more probable than not-p." 
However, neither a definition nor criteria are proposed to determine what con-
stitutes "well established" evidence in a given situation. Further, a basis to 
analyze the strength of various forms of evidence is not offered. 
Kissinger (1977) addresses a number of "deficiencies and oversights" in 
Toba's paper and extends the framework. He especially disagrees with Toba's 
conclusions as to the conditions necessary for fair presentation. Kissinger pro-
poses twelve general propositions considered in an audit and symbolically presents 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the various types of opinions. 
Sneed (1978) examines similarities in evidence accumulation problems and 
objectives for historians and auditors.2 Several evidence evaluation criteria are ad-
vanced: 
(1) authenticity; 
(2) credibility; 
(3) reliability; and 
(4) relevance. 
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Schandl (1978) proposes five "Principles of Evidence'': 
(1) availablity (sufficient evidence needed); 
(2) independence; 
(3) directness (reliability, distance source is removed from the assertion 
tested); 
(4) confirmation (need corroborating evidence); and 
(5) bias. 
These principles should be jointly considered in examining the strength of various 
evidence sources. 
A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts (ASOBAC) ( A A A , 1972) deals ex-
tensively with the nature of audit assertions and the investigative process. How-
ever, the issue of evidence evaluation is only incidentally addressed. A S O B A C 
merely notes that evidence must be competent and sufficient to provide adequate 
belief that an assertion is warranted. A prerequisite to competency is 
''intersubjectivity'' (objectivity). 
There has been extensive research on the nature of the audit decision process 
and the role of evidence in this process (Kinney, 1975; Scott, 1973; Tracy, 1969; 
Elliot and Rogers, 1972). These works discuss the usefulness of various decision 
models to auditing such as the Bayesian method. However, an integrated ap-
proach to assess the strength of a particular type of evidence is not proposed. In-
stead, these papers provide a general framework to organize and direct audit ef-
forts. 
Summary and Critique of Existing Evidence Evaluation Approaches 
Generally accepted auditing standards (SAS No. 1, Section 330) emphasize 
the importance of obtaining "sufficient competent'' evidential matter to provide a 
reasonable basis for the auditor to express an opinion. However, only vague 
criteria are provided to assess the adequacy of evidence gathered, i.e., validity; 
competency and sufficiency. Mautz and Sharaf (1961), Schandl (1978), Robert-
son (1976), and others attempt to provide criteria to evaluate evidence but do lit-
tle to clarify or provide more concrete guidelines. 
Toba (1975) and Kissinger (1977) present a general theory of evidence and 
outline the heuristic decision process employed during an audit. These works pro-
vide a theoretical framework to address the purposes and evaluation of evidence. 
However, the model proposed is not operational and does not outline an approach 
to evaluate the strengths of various forms of evidence. 
The existing approaches, thus, suffer from two major deficiencies: 
(1) they provide only heuristic intuitive concepts, i.e., they are not 
operational nor subject to empirical testing; and 
(2) they do not provide an integrated, scientific approach to the evaluation 
of evidence. 
The first deficiency has resulted in several heuristic beliefs in auditing to access 
the strength of evidence. While many of these heuristic rules are undoubtedly 
useful and valuable, some of these "rules of thumb" may result in serious errors 
in audit judgments. Few of these beliefs have been empirically verified. 
A n example of such a heuristic rule is contained in SAS No. 1: 
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When evidential matter can be obtained from independent sources outside 
an enterprise, it provides greater assurance of reliability than that secured 
solely within the enterprise (para .08). 
This belief has, for example, resulted in heavy reliance by auditors on accounts 
receivable confirmations. Recent empirical results suggest that, in fact, such 
evidence has a high error rate (Sorkin and Meuwissen, 1978). 
Need for an Integrated, Scientific Approach 
Many individuals would argue that the evaluation of audit evidence is by its 
very nature a matter of professional judgment and, thus, cannot be subject to any 
scientific approach. The same argument existed for many years about the entire 
auditing process. Undoubtedly, auditing should not be viewed as a purely precise 
scientific discipline. However, Mautz and Sharaf (1961) have demonstrated the 
applicability and advantages of a scientific approach to auditing. Since that time 
several scientific notions have been applied successfully such as statistical sam-
pling (noted in SAS No. 1, Section 330) and the explicit recognition of audit 
assertions or hypotheses (AICPA Auditing Standards Board, 1979). 
The scientific approach tends to add rigor, precision, and greater reliability to 
an endeavor, thus, improving quality control. As Anderson et al. (1970) state: 
The auditor must be able to say that he has enough evidence to sustain or 
refute one of the evidential propositions. Thus, quantification of the 
evidence needed, however crude the measurement, is an essential aspect of 
the discipline (p. 5 27). 
Two additional factors that support the need for a scientific approach to 
evidence evaluation are: 
(1) difficulties generally encountered by decision makers in arriving at 
complex judgments; and 
(2) the threat of government intervention into the auditing profession and 
the extensive legal exposure facing CPAs. 
Research findings (Libby and Lewis, 1977; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1977) on 
human information processing indicate that individuals often arrive at judgments 
that seriously deviate from normative models in complex decision settings, e.g., 
demonstrate poor accuracy, low consensus, poor consistency. For instance, 
several studies of auditor's judgment have found widely varying recommendations 
even when auditors were presented with identical problem situations (Ashton, 
1974; Joyce, 1978; Weber, 1978; Wright, 1979). This type of finding also has 
been observed with respect to auditor's evaluation of the nature of audit evidence. 
In a series of five related field experiments, Mock and Turner (1978, 1980) found 
that experienced auditors frequently differed as to whether three audit procedures 
were compliance, substantive or dual purpose tests. Such findings strongly sug-
gest that, if quality control is to be maintained at high levels, professional judg-
ment alone cannot be relied upon. Guidance, training, a rigorous approach, 
and/or other tools are needed. 
The Metcalf (1976) and Moss (1977) reports allege that a number of 
bankruptcies and frauds have led to loss of confidence in the auditors' opinion. 
Federal government intervention was recommended. The prospect of interven-
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tion, coupled with the legal exposure accompanying certified audits, attests to the 
vital need for the profession to maintain and improve quality control and to pro-
vide proper documented support for audit judgments. A systematic, scientific ap-
proach appears promising in addressing these concerns for the assessment of audit 
evidence. 
In response to these needs, the measurement based approach is now intro-
duced. A n illustration of the use of this approach in the area of inventory is then 
presented. 
A Measurement Based Approach to the Evaluation of Audit Evidence 
The preceding review of the audit evidence evaluation problem has indicated 
that this is a complex, multiple-factor problem. Professional standards suggest that 
the decision as to what constitutes "adequate" audit evidence should be based 
upon factors such as competency and sufficiency and is primarily a matter of 
"professional judgment.'' 
From the perspective of information economics and measurement theory, the 
issue of developing sufficient competent evidence might be viewed as the issue of 
designing and implementing an efficient audit information system (ADIS) which 
provides audit evidence of acceptable quality. Our discussion begins with a con-
sideration of those factors which affect the factual quality of audit evidence (a view-
point based upon measurement theory concepts). Then the question of the cost-
effectiveness of the ADIS is considered. 
The factual quality of evidence. Research directed at the evaluation of the 
data, evidence, or measures provided by an information, audit, or measurement 
system3 may focus on two interrelated questions. The overriding question is 
whether the evidence is useful. This question is labeled the purposive view in 
Figure 3 which depicts the basic factors underlying measurement system evalua-
tion. The purposive view will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
A second view identified in Figure 3 asks two related questions concerning the 
factual quality of measures. Are the attributes correctly measured and are the 
assigned numbers correctly processed? A n attribute may be thought of as a 
characteristic of an object such as accounts receivable or an event such as a sale. 
Relevant attributes in auditing might include the reliability of a system of account-
ing controls over payroll, the bona fides of a receivable or the net realizable value 
of obsolete inventory. 
As indicated in Figure 3, the factual quality of measures of such attributes 
depends on three criteria: (1) reliability, (2) valid representation or validity, and 
(3) scale type. In discussing each of these criteria, our concern will be with the ad-
vantage, if any, of these criteria as compared to existing audit evidence criteria as 
discussed in professional standards and the literature in general. Some of the 
potential advantages of the measurement based approach include improved 
guidance, a more systematic approach, and more operational and rigorous defini-
tions. 
Reliability. The notion of the reliability of a measurement procedure em-
phasizes the errors inherent in that process. Measurement error may be the result 
of a number of factors including calibration errors, observer errors, and sampling 
errors. Ackoff (1962, p. 208) reports upon experiments which showed important 
differences in observer error rates among auditors who were testing credit-
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Figure 3 
A BASIC F R A M E W O R K FOR M E A S U R E M E N T SYSTEM E V A L U A T I O N 
Purposive view: 
Are the measures 
useful? 
Useful 
Measurement 
Information 
Behavioral 
Constraints 
Factual view: 
Are the numbers 
correctly processed? 
Cost-Effectiveness. 
Numerical 
Statements 
(Processing) 
Relevancy 
(Decision 
Context) 
Meaningfulness 
Are the attributes 
correctly measured? 
Measurement 
Scale 
Valid 
Representation 
Reliability 
Scale Type 
Adapted from: Mock and Grove (1979). 
compensation forms. Sampling error (sampling risk) has been an important audit 
consideration for many years and results when the audit procedures are not ap-
plied to the entire population of interest. Sorkin and Meuwissen (1978) have 
researched alternative audit confirmation procedures and have reported significant 
differences in terms of their reliability. 
A n important feature concerning reliability as a potential criterion for audit 
evidence evaluation is the previous research which has been done on defining and 
operationalizing the concept. Definitions of reliability focus on the stability and ac-
curacy of a measurement procedure. Stability implies that a measurement pro-
cedure applied to the same object or event should arrive at identical (or at least 
very similar) numerical assignments (assuming the attributes have not changed in 
the period between measurements). Clearly the reliability of audit tests could be 
measured (estimated) in this manner. 
Reliability has also been conceptualized in terms of accuracy defined as a func-
tion of the difference between a measure (Y) of an attribute and its true value (X). 
Thus the error (e) in a test is mathematically defined as e = X - Y and reliability is 
operationalized as the average error (e= E i(X i - Y i)/N), the mean squared error 
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σ2 = Σi(Xi - e)2/N) or some other transformation of e. Further details of this ap-
proach can be found in Mock (1976) and Mock and Grove (1979). Clearly the 
reliability aspect of measurement procedures offers several alternative approaches 
that would assist the auditor in obtaining operational measures of the reliability of 
audit procedures and evidence. 
Validity. The issue of validity or whether the numerical assignments are a 
valid representation of the attributes being measured is a more difficult concept to 
define and operationalize. Rigorous definitions have been developed in formal 
measurement theory which emphasize that the assigned numerals should be 
related in the same manner as the measured objects or events (i.e., the measures 
should be a homomorphism of the measured phenomenon). The auditor has the 
same objective in mind when deciding that the reliability attribute of one system 
of controls is .95 and another is .85. Hopefully, the first system is in fact more 
reliable than the second. A number of operational approaches to empirically 
testing validity in this sense are reported in Mock (1976). 
In the behavioral sciences a valid measure is one that measures the attributes 
it is designed to reflect, e.g., an IQ measure actually reflects intelligence. Many 
audit attributes may be as difficult to validly measure as intelligence: nonsampling 
risk, audit risk, audit materiality, and reliability of an accounting control. Several 
approaches to operationalizing the validity of a measurement system have been 
developed in the behavioral sciences including construct and criterion validation 
(see Kerlinger, 1973). Such approaches would seem to be applicable to the evalua-
tion of the validity of audit evidence. 
Scale type and meaningfulness. The third evaluative factor identified in Figure 
3 is the scale type of the measurement system being evaluated. Possible scale types 
include nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio scales. Scale type is important in that 
it relates directly to the meaningfulness of numerical statements which are based 
upon processed (aggregated) measures. The meaningfulness of a numerical state-
ment, inference, or assertion may be determined analytically (see Ackoff, 1962 or 
Mock 1976). The analogous issue in auditing would be whether audit assertions 
were or were not meaningful. This would depend partly upon the underlying scale 
type of the audit procedures. Potential areas where the meaningfulness of audit 
assertions and aggregations may be questioned include (1) reliability scores and 
compliance rates which are aggregated into reliance factors, (2) ordinal reliance 
judgments and internal control questionnaire enumerations which are factored 
into beta risk and ultimately sample size decisions and (3) the aggregation of 
multiple, related tests such as negative and positive confirmations into an audit 
judgment. 
As is apparent in the preceding, consideration of the factual qualities of 
measurement systems may have some application in evaluating audit evidence 
and procedures. Purposive aspects are also important. 
The purposive view. The question in Figure 3 associated with the "purposive 
view'' asks whether the obtained measures, related measurement procedures, and 
numerical statements are useful. Although factual level criteria are depicted as im-
pacting usefulness, they are not sufficient criteria. The designer of the measure-
ment, information, or audit system will also need to consider relevancy, cost, and 
certain behavioral constraints. 
In a management information system, relevancy is dictated by a decision prob-
lem or decision context. In auditing, relevancy seems to depend on the particular 
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audit assertions which are being evaluated. A recent exposure draft concerned 
with evidential matter (AICPA, 1979), translates audit assertions into audit ob-
jectives and the auditor is expected to implement the necessary audit procedures 
to achieve these objectives. The exposure draft presents an illustration but does lit-
tle in the way of providing guidance in evaluating alternative audit procedures ex-
cept to suggest that the evidence be "adequate to achieve the audit objectives" 
and "provide a reasonable basis concerning the validity of individual assertions" 
(paraphrased from A I C P A , 1979). 
Cost and behavioral constraints may also affect the usefulness of alternative 
measurement and auditing procedures. Cost is clearly an important factor in com-
paring packages of audit procedures in light of the reliance that may be placed on a 
system of internal accounting controls (Turner and Mock, 1980). Behavioral con-
straints may include tendencies of auditors to anchor on last year's audit program, 
halo effects and idiosyncratic information search heuristics (Mock and Turner, 
1978). 
Although both the identified considerations in the factual and purposive views 
could be discussed in much greater depth, we now turn to the question of applica-
tion and then present an illustration. References are included in the bibliography 
for those interested in further details. 
Application of Evaluative Factors Contained in the Measurement Based 
Approach to Auditing 
The evaluation of audit evidence and audit procedures involves two issues that 
are identified in Figure 2: Are management's assertions as contained in the finan-
cial statements warranted? Does the benefit of the evidence collected justify its 
cost? To consider the applicability of the evaluative factors identified in the 
preceding section, Figure 4 replaces the criteria contained in Figure 2 with the 
measurement based criteria. The questions contained in the figure are identical 
except that " A r e the numbers correctly processed?" is replaced by " A r e the 
assertions correctly drawn?" As discussed earlier, this question may be evaluated 
in terms of the meaningfulness of the assertions given the results of an audit test of 
a certain reliability, validity and scale type. As before, the issue of the correctness 
of the attribute evidence is directly a function of reliability and validity. Note also 
that the figure replaces measurement scale with audit test (procedure). 
Given that the factual qualities of an audit test or a set of audit procedures is 
known or knowable (recall that each of these underlying factors has been opera-
tionalized), the analysis shifts to the usefulness of the evidence. As before, impor-
tant evaluative factors include cost, relevance, and behavioral constraints. In addi-
tion, audit risk is added to the figure. As will be discussed in the illustration, risk 
is a necessary addition to the evaluation which is somewhat unique to the audit in-
formation system. 
Some previous research has been completed on the procedures one might ap-
ply in using a measurement based approach in evaluating information systems in 
general (Mock and Grove, 1979). In the case of audit evidence evaluation, the 
following reformulated steps seem appropriate. 
Step 1: Identify audit assertions to be evaluated. 
Step 2: Identify the financial statement attributes which need to be 
investigated. 
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Figure 4 
AUDIT EVIDENCE E V A L U A T I O N AS INDICATED IN MEASUREMENT BASED APPROACH 
Evaluative Factors Contained in Measurement Based Approach 
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Step 3: Identify alternative audit tests (programs) which may provide 
evidence on the appropriate attributes. Analyze each alter-
native in terms of the validity and reliability of the evidence 
and the meaningfulness of possible audit assertions. 
Step 4: Analyze the usefulness of each alternative in terms of 
relevancy, cost, audit risk, and behavioral constraints. 
Illustration of the Use of the Measurement Based Approach: 
Audit of Inventory 
To illustrate the application of the measurement based approach, the effec-
tiveness of the procedure of inventory observation is now examined. The analysis 
parallels the four step process outlined earlier. 
Step 1: Identify audit assertions to be evaluated. 
The general assertion is that inventory is fairly presented on the financial 
statements. To test this assertion, the auditor must partition the general proposi-
tion into several elementary assertions such as (AICPA Auditing Standards 
Board, 1979): 
completeness 
existence 
rights and obligations 
valuation 
allocation 
presentation and disclosure 
Step 2: Identify the financial statement attributes which need to be investigated. 
The attribute of inventory existence will be the focus of this illustration. Of 
course, during the course of the audit all of the above attributes would be ad-
dressed through the various audit tests. 
Step 3: Identify alternate audit tests (programs) which may provide evidence on 
the appropriate attributes. 
Analyze each alternative. 
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For brevity, only inventory observation is examined as a source of evidence to 
test the assertion of existence. In fact, audit tests are often interrelated and may 
provide corroborating evidence. For example, analytical review may also be relied 
upon as evidence of inventory existence. Audit assertions may also be related. For 
instance, the attributes of existence and valuation of a jeweler's inventory are af-
fected by the grade and quality of diamonds. 
For simplification, such interrelationships are not dealt with in this illustra-
tion. However, such complexities do not appear to impair the value of the 
measurement based approach. This approach can alert the auditor to apparent 
problems in a particular source of evidence. Greater reliance can then be shifted to 
other evidence sources or strategies can be taken to reduce the problems (errors) 
suggested by the measurement based approach. Three alternate forms of evidence 
that may be evaluated along with observation are: 
(1) outside expert observation; 
(2) greater reliance in and testing of the purchasing system; and/or 
(3) analytical review with limited observation. 
Unless the choice is obvious, each of the alternative audit tests should be analyzed 
employing the measurement based approach to select the most advantageous pro-
cedure. 
A t the factual level the following measurement characteristics of inventory 
observation could be examined: 
(1) validity: can an auditor appropriately identify an inventory item when 
viewed? 
method of testing: a series of field experiments to see if auditors can 
spot deliberate misrepresentations of inventory. 
(2) reliability4: to what extent are there errors in auditor test counts? How 
does the count plan affect reliability? 
method of testing: 
(a) field experiments where various auditors take controlled test 
counts; 
(b) field experiments where the error rate is determined under alter-
nate count plans. 
method of measurement: reliability could be operationalized as the 
mean error or mean squared error. Analysis of variance could also be 
utilized in a multi-variate approach. 
(3) scale type: no apparent problems 
Step 4: Analyze the usefulness of each alternative in terms of relevancy, cost, 
audit risk, and behavioral constraints. 
Inventory observation appears to be a highly relevant source of evidence since 
it directly tests the assertion of existence. However, observation is a costly pro-
cedure and is of unknown effectiveness. There are several behavioral constraints 
to consider such as limited auditor experience and environmental biases (Wright, 
1979). Additionally, inventory is usually a high risk area in that it is often a 
material amount and, if misstated, could result in the financial statements being 
misleading. The ultimate risk of testing the assertion of existence is significantly 
dependent on the internal control system. Ultimate risk may be stated as (Robert-
son, 1976, p. 368): 
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UR=βx(CUPL)x(1-SP) 
where: UR = ultimate risk 
β= probability substantive tests will fail to detect a 
material error. 
CUPL= probability the internal control system has allowed 
and failed to detect a material error. 
SP= probability supplemental procedures will uncover a 
material error. 
A t the purposive level the overall cost-effectiveness of a source of evidence 
must be determined by weighing all of these variables (cost, relevance, risk, 
behavioral constraints). If two procedures appear equally effective, the less costly 
one should be employed. The implications of the measurement based approach, as 
illustrated by the evaluation of inventory observation, are addressed in the final 
section. Avenues for future research and conclusions are then presented. 
Implications and Avenues for Future Research 
From the illustration several implications of the measurement based approach 
are brought forth. First of all, the systematic nature of the process is displayed. 
The approach requires specific statements as to assertions, measurement criteria, 
methods of testing effectiveness, and overall considerations in arriving at a conclu-
sion. Secondly, the effectiveness of a procedure is subject to empirical testing. 
The analysis indicates several hypothesized tradeoffs in relying on inventory 
observations: 
(1) unknown validity; 
(2) unknown reliability; 
(3) significant costs; 
(4) high relevance; and 
(5) behavioral considerations. 
Observation is traditionally considered among the most competent forms of 
evidence (Windel, 1961, SAS#1, Section 330, 1973). The measurement based 
approach analysis suggests that there may be important validity problems in rely-
ing on such evidence. Specifically, do the auditors assigned to observe the count 
and take test counts have the expertise to identify various inventory items? For ex-
ample, can an auditor correctly differentiate between types of electronic printed 
circuit boards or a transistor and a capacitor? Often the auditors performing such 
tasks have limited technical knowledge in the client's industry. Obviously, the 
ability of the auditor to identify the inventory and, thus, the validity of this 
evidence source varies among industries. The illustration indicates that the valid-
ity of the procedure should be empirically tested when in question. A n important 
general hypothesis, thus, emerges from this analysis for future auditing research: 
• Inventory observation may produce evidence of limited validity. 
The heuristic evidence evaluation approaches discussed earlier tend to lead 
auditors to accept inventory observation as a highly compelling form of evidence. 
A similar possible misperception regarding the apparent strength of accounts 
receivable confirmations was alluded to earlier. It is of interest to note that both in-
ventory observation and accounts receivable confirmations are required under 
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generally accepted auditing standards. Such requirements may have resulted in 
unwarranted perceptions of the quality of these forms of evidence. 
Another implication of the approach is that alternate evidence sources should 
also be evaluated when a decision is not evident. Alternate sources to inventory 
observation were noted earlier. 
Several additional avenues for future research in this area appear promising. 
A n obvious extension would entail attempting to apply the approach to evaluate 
alternate evidence sources in practice. Much work needs to be done to opera-
tionally define and obtain agreement on the measurement of the criteria presented 
in this paper. The problem of the interrelationship of various audit evidence is not 
addressed in this study. Another significant area of research would be to use the 
approach to identify overlapping, duplicate forms of evidence that may be un-
necessary and, thus, lead to inefficiencies in the audit. 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the measurement based approach as a 
systematic means of evaluating audit evidence. Grounded in measurement theory 
and the scientific method this approach appears to offer greater rigor and precision 
than traditional heuristic evidence evaluation procedures. Further research in ap-
plying and refining the approach is, thus, greatly encouraged and needed. 
Footnotes 
1. For example: see Mautz and Sharaf (1961); Mautz, (1964); Arens, (1970); A A A ASOBAC 
(1971); Kissinger, (1974); Toba, (1975). 
2. Evidence evaluation is also a significant concern in many other disciplines such as law and history. 
See Mautz and Sharaf (1961, p. 76) for a comparison of evidence approaches in various fields. 
3. Although some significant differences exist between information systems in general and audit or 
measurement systems in particular, this paper emphasizes their similarities. Each system is con-
cerned with the development of data which meets both factual and purposive objectives. Rather than 
mix terminology, our discussion relies primarily upon measurement concepts and definitions. The 
basic concepts are developed in Mock (1976) and Mock and Grove (1979). 
4. In the statistical sampling literature (Vanasse, 1976; Robertson, 1976) the term "reliability" is 
used to indicate the confidence level provided of making a correct decision given sample results, i.e., 
the representativeness of the sample or 1 - α. This concept of reliability actually provides a measure 
of decision risk and does not conform to the precise meaning adopted in measurement theory, as 
defined earlier on page 18 (Mock and Grove (1979). The approach presented in this paper cor-
responds closely with the constructs of measurement theory. 
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Discussant's Response to 
A n Investigation of a Measurement Based Approach 
to the Evaluation of Audit Evidence 
Bart H. Ward 
The University of Oklahoma 
The paper by Mock and Wright contains the kernel of a good idea which if 
more rigorously defined and/or redirected might enhance the auditor's ability to 
anticipate and control potential threats to the validity of evidential inferences in 
auditing. However, the paper may implicitly lead some readers to over value the 
benefits from attempting to "objectively measure" the validity and reliability of 
audit procedures. 
For the most part I will discuss limitations associated with the scope, findings, 
and conclusion of this paper. Doing so will provide the opportunity to explore 
alternative findings and conclusions that might result from elimination or relaxa-
tion of limitations or oversimplifications in the Mock and Wright study. M y ob-
jective in exploring limitations and simplifications are two. One of my objectives is 
to clarify the overall performance evaluation criteria for an audit. The other objec-
tive is to broadly explore the fundamental heirarchy of inference and decision in 
auditing. This hierarchy provides a framework for relating evidential matter 
(through inductive inference) to audit conclusions, to the overall goals of an audit 
and to the performance of a professional firm. 
To accomplish these objectives, I will first set out the purpose and method of 
the Mock and Wright study as I understand them. I will then organize my com-
ments accordingly. 
Concerning Purpose and Method 
This study proposes an investigation of a measurement-based approach to the 
evaluation of audit evidence. This investigation is accomplished by: 
1) Establishing a framework for the audit process. 
2) Identifying a role for evidence evaluation within that framework. 
3) Assessing the ability of existing approaches to perform the evidence 
evaluation role required by that framework. 
4) Outlining an alternative evidence evaluation scheme whose 
performance in the required evidential evaluation rule dominates the 
performance of existing approaches with regard to the scientific criteria 
of rigor and precision. 
5) Illustrating (synthetically) the use of this alternative (measurement 
based) approach. 
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Concerning the Audit Framework 
I am in essential agreement with Mock and Wright with respect to the goal of 
an audit. We agree that the goal of an audit is to, in Mock and Wright's words: 
Independently test whether financial statement assertions appear war-
ranted based on evidence accumulated, and, thus to express an overall 
opinion as to the fairness of the financial statements. 
We may disagree, however, as to the implication of this goal on measuring audit 
performance. The Mock and Wright model seems to reduce this goal to a single 
criterion measure—success or failure in verifying or refuting financial statement 
assertions at several levels of reduction. 
The primary dilemma encountered by any audit process developed from their 
model is a simple one; but one with important implications. The dilemma follows: 
no single criterion can fully express success or failure of a professional firm or of 
an audit, even though a single decision must be reached in each engagement. A t 
best therefore, the audit process must rely on some composite of several criteria to 
direct and evaluate evidential relationships, inferences and conclusions. 
Perhaps it is not widely known or understood that a professional organization 
such as a public accounting practice is not appropriately judged exclusively by 
either the non-monetary outcome assessments typical of not-for-profit enterprises 
nor by the single and all encompassing criterion of profit so widely applied to 
business enterprises. Just as it is unproductive to judge a professional firm's per-
formance on the basis of profitability so too is it unjust to evaluate professional 
performance based exclusively on the effectiveness (in the scientific sense of 
rendering a correct or incorrect opinion about financial assertions) of each engage-
ment. 
The audit goal statement does not suggest that audit performance be adjudged 
exclusively by whether or not the opinion was correct. If it did then considerations 
related to the appropriateness of the audit conducted, and the efficiency of the 
audit would matter not in adjudging audit performance. These considerations 
would be relegated instead to the role of "firm criteria" as has been done by 
Mock & Wright. A t all levels of criterion reduction, appropriateness and effi-
ciency would be simple intervening variables imposed in the interest of self-
interest by the auditor. In such circumstances the measure of audit success would 
be an absolute one based on congruence (or lack of same) between the truth 
(veracity) or falsity of financial statement assertions and the related support or lack 
of support for those assertions by the audit report. As a result terms such as war-
ranted assertion and opinion (based on reasonable degree of certitude) would be 
forced out of audit goal statements. 
I believe that the customary and agreed upon audit goal statement should lead 
to composite criteria which measure not only effectiveness, but appropriateness 
and efficiency as well. As used here, effectiveness may be measured by whether a 
given audit report has veracity for a given financial statement. Appropriateness 
deals with whether the audit was properly conducted. Efficiency compares 
resource consumption to proper performance norms. A t one level of reduction, 
appropriateness requires adherence to professional standards. Similarly, efficiency 
might reduce to maximal cost containment. 
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A fuller set of criteria, such as the triad just defined, correctly leads to audit 
process models which reduce evidential requirements to more than simple finan-
cial assertion objectives. Consideration in such models is correctly given at the 
first level of reduction to such criteria as (and measures for) strategic and opera-
tional threats to financial statement integrity; the detection of appropriate profes-
sional responsibilities; and professional viability. A t lower levels of reduction these 
criteria may in turn suggest assessments (measurements) related to the degree of 
credibility of assertions, material error limits, etc. More importantly multiple 
criteria provide for cross fertilization. Cross fertilization allows the auditor to con-
sider determining the potential for material error as it might relate to specific 
threats, and to allocate resources accordingly, not in the interest of self-interest 
but in order to achieve congruence with the agreed upon and well established goal 
of auditing. 
Acceptance of efficiency and appropriateness in the composite criteria set for 
audits also suggests that dynamic branching and bounding can and should be used 
in pruning down all the alternative combinations of procedures and techniques 
which could be employed to achieve particular audit objectives. Such a conclusion 
would make it unnecessary—even inappropriate—to conduct such an extensive 
and rigorous an evaluation of alternatives as suggested by Mock and Wright. 
In my opinion over allegiance to the single criterion of veracity in audit result 
has led Mock and Wright to a model (see their Figures 2 and 4) of the audit proc-
ess which at best deemphasizes (and perhaps ignores) the role of evidence in plan-
ning for an audit. 
The paper appears to suggest that factors such as the nature of items exam-
ined, materiality, risk, and the competence of evidence available are merely mat-
ters of judgement. Undertaken perhaps without supportative evidence. In fact, 
however, there are fairly extensive evidential searches ranging from "knowledge-
of-the-business" to analytical review which support these judgments. Further-
more, these judgments are continually reevaluated and programs redesigned ac-
cordingly as audits progress. 
Essentially then, the Mock and Wright study downplays the role of evidence 
in structuring audits and formulating assertion at the testing level. It does so 
because it deemphasizes the role of appropriateness and efficiency as criteria in-
herent in overall audit goal attainment. 
Concerning the Role of Evidence 
The role of evidence is to support or contribute to a result. A result (even a 
'fact') is meaningful only as it can be determined to predict or measure some 
criterion. It is therefore no more relevant to goal assessment than is the criterion 
itself. 
The principal problem in auditing is not in selecting and calibrating test pro-
cedures at the 'factual' level. Rather the principal problems are 1) searching for 
goal relevant criteria and means of combining or generalizing attributes (data 
points) about specific occurrences or conditions into results which can be com-
bined in turn to measure the criteria and 2) coping at the same time with the prac-
tical difficulty of being incorrectly adjudged not on the long-run effectiveness of a 
professional firm, but rather on a short-run engagement-by-engagement basis 
which is fundamentally incongruent with the culturally well established goal of at-
79 
testation. Unfortunately, the single criterion model of Mock and Wright exacer-
bates both of these problems, in order to focus on problems of selection and 
calibration. Selection, calibration and similar issues brought to the forefront by the 
Mock and Wright model are not unimportant. But they should not be resolved at 
the expense of more important issues. Selection, calibration and validation of in-
dividual measures at the factual level of reduction are dominated by goal relevance 
and overall evaluation problems not for intrinsic reasons, but because an oc-
currence, event, condition or even an inferred result from such factual data can 
frequently be far removed from and/or minute with respect to its impact on overall 
evaluation of the fairness assertion and on overall performance. (Similar problems 
arise in other disciplines as well [Smith].) 
For example, Mock and Wright mention that in experimental study, receiva-
bles confirmations have been shown unreliable with regard to the valuation objec-
tive (valuation assertion). But just how important is such a conclusion? Of what 
consequence is it? 
Shall the auditor understand this potential for bias with respect to valuation 
and consider this flaw when assessing the likelihood that a material overstatement 
of receivables might be missed by this procedure when arriving at a composite 
result concerning the valuation assertion? Shall he conduct field experiments on 
the veracity of his clients' customers in hopes of isolating and measuring the ex-
tent of potential bias associated with the application of confirmation to the popula-
tion of receivables at hand? Shall he run the risk of generalizing from (i.e. assum-
ing the external validity of) the results of confirmations with respect to these 
characteristics; or shall he in the interest of efficiency simply be content to confine 
his generalization of results from confirmations to the existence objective (with 
which he can usually be fairly comfortable as demonstrated by a recent study) 
[Ashton and Hylas]? 
In many audit circumstances a rough cost/benefit analysis of such alternatives 
will probably eliminate those courses of action which are most closely allied with 
the measurement-based approach of Mock and Wright. 
Concerning Arguments Against Contemporary Evidential 
Evaluation Schemes 
There are four primary criticisms advanced by Mock and Wright regarding 
the contemporary evidential evaluation schemes they reviewed. These criticisms 
are: 
1. Concepts are vague and not operational. 
2. Measures of criteria such as validity are not defined or set forth. 
3. Contemporary approaches are not scientific, and systematic. Both the 
reliability and validity of evidence evaluated under contemporary ap-
proaches are open to question. 
4. Terminology is confusing. For example, validity is said to be directly 
related to reliability, but such concepts have distinct separate scientific 
meanings. 
As to the first of these four criticisms, I agree that concepts of evidence evalua-
tion in auditing are vague but I disagree with the assertion that auditing concepts 
are not operational. They are merely subject to various operational interpreta-
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tions. They are flexible enough to enable different auditors to achieve ends of 
similar value by different combinations or styles of evidential relationships. Of 
course, whether such flexibility is dangerous or desirable remains a moot ques-
tion. 
As to the second criticism, I agree. Measures of relevant evidential criteria are 
not set forth by contemporary audit evaluation schemes. Again, however, this 
may suggest that individual auditors' styles may dominate choice of measures 
without necessarily denying adequacy of performance. This is certainly an area in 
need of further investigation, by those wise in the ways of organizational behavior. 
The first two criticisms of contemporary auditing provide fertile ground for 
research. The third criticism however, seems misdirected. The audit approach is 
not that of science, nor should it be given our composite criteria for success. Fur-
thermore, to imply that the auditor is not systematic (presumably because he is 
not scientific) is unwarranted. 
The essential first step in any discipline or science is the determination and 
conceptualization of criteria relevant to the goal. Most contemporary audit proc-
esses are systematic in attempting to employ criteria, results and evidential in-
ference relationships that are relevant to the composite criteria I mentioned. 
I do not believe that the relevance of an evidential chain is as stated by Mock 
and Wright, "dictated by a decision problem or decision context and therefore 
depends on the particular audit assertions which are being evaluated.'' If this were 
so then the auditor's goal, like that of the scientist, would be exclusively the 
verification or denial of hypotheses and he would appropriately be adjudged by 
success or failure in ferreting out truth. As established earlier, however, the 
auditor is not properly evaluated in this way. The important question in auditing 
is not how to eliminate the question of whether an hypothesis is true (as it is in 
science) but rather to structure resolution of this question in each audit engage 
ment, in a manner consistent with the composite criteria of appropriateness, effi-
ciency, and effectiveness. 
The final (fourth) criticism is one with which I agree. Terminology in auditing 
is imprecise. However, I do not believe the "scientific" measurement-based ap-
proach can end such confusion by distinctly and separately defining "validity" 
and "reliability." Indeed, it may not be proper even in science to distinctly or 
separately define validity and reliability. 
To quote Kerlinger, " T h e subject of validity is complex, (and) controversial 
. . . it is not possible to study validity without sooner or later inquiring into the 
nature of one's variables." [Kerlinger, p. 444]. In auditing this inquiry would 
bring us to the evidential criteria debate concerning appropriateness and efficiency 
as well as effectiveness. 
Distinctive definition. In reviewing research methods literature, I discovered 
in reading about validity and reliability the following alternatives for "validity'' in 
science: Content validity, predictive validity, construct validity, convergent valid-
ity, discriminant validity, external validity, internal validity, and statistical valid-
ity. I eliminated still other forms which were not clearly distinct from one or more 
of the above. This same review provided several reliability definitions as well. The 
essence of all this is summed up by John Campbell, an eminent behavioral scien-
tist: "nobody needs to be reminded that there is no such thing as a reliability or a 
validity." [Campbell, p. 220]. Perhaps not, but auditors ought to be initially in-
formed about this dilemma before adopting a measurement-based approach. 
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Separation of validity and reliability. Several behavioral science sources con-
sulted stated that validity and reliability are not separate at all but rather represen-
tative of ends of a continuum concerned with representations about 
measurements. According to this view the problem of reliability turns on the ex-
tent to which scores on a sample of observations can generalize to the class 
(population) of observations to which they belong. 
For example, the reliability of internal control evaluation procedures might be 
thought of as the extent of agreement between different evaluators and opera-
tionalized by comparing internal control questionnaire results compiled by an in-
ternal audit staff member from time to time on repeated reviews of a stable system. 
(Under control conditions involving limitations on access to prior audit work, 
etc.). 
Alternatively, we might operationalize reliability of control evaluation by 
including different results, all at the same level of evidential reduction such as 
questionnaire results, flowchart analysis, and attribute test results. In this case 
reliability could be viewed by some as the variance among these several indicators 
and any associated inferences about the accuracy of the control evaluation. Others 
would view this second approach as a means for determining the validity of the 
separate methods based on whether the measurement results converge one with 
the other. 
Clearly then, only to the extent that we can agree on the content of the struc-
ture for the audit evidence evaluation chains of inference and decision can we 
agree as to the significance of a particular attempt to meaningful operationalize the 
notions of reliability and validity—or is it representativeness?? As previously 
noted the preeminent problem will still be one of criterion(ia) validity (or mean-
ingfulness as addressed by Mock and Wright). 
Concerning the Illustration 
I have only limited comment here. As an illustration of an operational process 
within the context of an audit the example given is obscure. It is impractical to 
conduct the test required in a single audit. Yet I question the generalizability of 
the inventory experiments beyond the context of a single engagement. Even 
within a line of business, factors such as channels of distribution, warehousing 
techniques, financial policies, etc. make generalization risky. 
Conclusion 
The central premise of the Mock and Wright paper is that the concepts of 
validity and reliability as known in science can be used to improve the quality of 
evidential inference in auditing. I believe that this notion merits pursuit. 
However, we should choose avenues of pursuit different from those emphasized 
by implication or illustration in the work of Mock and Wright. 
In my opinion, we should focus initially on identifying candidate procedures 
which hold promise with regard to construct validity. In auditing this involves 
searching for multiple criteria which are goal relevant in the audit context. These 
multiple criteria in turn should control our search for procedures (measures) rele-
vant to the audit goal. Frequently in auditing the search must be carried through 
several levels of reduction involving a complex chain of data, results, and implica-
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tions. In this process construct validity, the search for rigorous definition of poten-
tial causes and effects so that tailoring of evidential procedures can logically 
(deductively) be thought to be relevant to the goals and criteria of the audit, is 
paramount. It must be noted that even within this dimension of validity there is a 
role for inductive (empirical) studies using such techniques as factor analysis, 
process tracing and convergent correlation studies to investigate and confirm hy-
pothesized (deduced) relationships within the evidential inference chains in audit-
ing. There is work to be done here which in my opinion is important to the core of 
audit theory and practice and to the ultimate meaning of audit evidence. Such 
study is far more urgent than studies of the relevative reliability or predictive 
validity of alternative audit procedures, whose contribution to audit inference and 
decision even under ideal conditions is often far removed from the criteria they 
serve. 
I believe that the full meaning of much audit evidence is obscured by questions 
of construct validity and that the threats to external validity associated with much 
of the research suggested by the Mock and Wright illustration will severely re-
strict the generalization of results concerning measures of the reliability and 
validity of data gathering audit techniques. Therefore, I recommend an alternative 
direction for empirical study in auditing. I call not principally for pursuit of 
reliability and validity measurements for audit techniques but for fuller delineation 
and development of threats to reliability and validity of evidential inference in 
auditing so that the potential source of such threats can be more fully known, con-
sidered, and avoided or controlled when designing audit programs. 
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Authors' Reply to Discussant's Response 
A n Investigation of a Measurement Based Approach 
to the Evaluation of Audit Evidence 
Theodore J. Mock and Arnold Wright 
The purpose of this reply is to help clarify the scope and objectives of our 
paper. Many of Professor Ward's comments appear to have resulted from a confu-
sion as to the intended purpose of the paper. Thus, a restatement of the objectives 
of our study seems warranted. Additionally, we would like to take the opportunity 
to respond to a number of other important observations by Ward. 
Purpose of the Study 
Ward begins his discussion by a consideration of the goal of an audit and the 
issue of measuring audit and firm performance. He states that audit performance 
should be judged by three criteria: 
(1) appropriateness, 
(2) efficiency, and 
(3) effectiveness. 
Ward concludes that the approach presented in the paper "seems to reduce this 
(audit performance) goal to a single criterion measure—success or failure in verify-
ing or refuting financial statement assertions.'' 
To restate, the primary focus of the study is stated in our paper to be " . . . to 
investigate the usefulness of a measurement based approach as an integrative, 
operational process to evaluate audit evidence '' (emphasis added). The specifica-
tion of appropriate performance measures for an audit of a firm, although impor-
tant issues, are outside the scope of the study. Given that auditors must evaluate 
the competency of evidence to establish reliance on such information, the study 
advances an approach that may be used to systematically judge the relative 
qualities of various evidence sources. 
Ward's three audit performance criteria are enlightening; however, there does 
not appear to be a consensus among practitioners or academics that such criteria 
are sufficient. Scholars have wrestled for many years with the appropriate goals for 
the private enterprise firm itself, e.g., profit maximization, survival, maximizing 
firm share prices, societal responsibilities. There continues to be wide disagree-
ment as to the proper objectives for the firm. Then, what are the chances that ac-
countants would agree on the criteria established by Ward? Are there other im-
portant criteria that should be considered such as ethics or development of staff? 
What about the difficulties of weighting the relative importance of the criteria 
themselves? Additionally, Ward's criteria are vaguely defined and do not appear 
operational. For example, how is "appropriateness'' to be measured? 
The measurement based approach does not ignore the importance of multiple 
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criteria in evidence assessment; such factors as "appropriateness and efficiency" 
are incorporated in step 4 of the process. These criteria are considered along with 
several others, since, as discussed, there is no universally agreed upon criterion of 
audit performance. 
Ward does concur that "effectiveness" is a vital criterion. Thus, there is a 
real need for the evaluation of evidence in order to appropriately render an opinion 
regarding management assertions. The measurement based approach addresses 
that need. 
Ward's apparent resolution of the evidence assessment problem is stated as: 
Acceptance of efficiency and appropriateness in the composite criteria set 
for audits also suggests that dynamic branching and bounding can and 
should be used in pruning down all the alternative combinations of pro-
cedures and techniques which could be employed to achieve particular 
audit objectives. 
This process of "dynamic branching and bounding'' is vague and unspecified and 
offers little hard guidance to an auditor in judging the strength of various sources 
of evidence. 
Other Issues 
Ward indicates that the measurement based approach "de-emphasizes (and 
perhaps ignores) the role of evidence in planning for an audit." This statement 
directly contradicts perhaps the major envisioned role of the approach: to provide 
ex ante information on the quality of various forms of evidence through field or 
other testing techniques. Such findings would provide guidance to auditors in 
designing audit programs and interpreting audit results. 
Ward suggests that the measurement based approach is almost solely based at 
the factual level. " T h e central premise of the Mock and Wright paper is that the 
concepts of validity and reliability as known in science can be used to improve the 
quality of evidential inference in auditing." The approach addresses the factual 
and purposive views and does not suggest at all that evidence be evaluated solely 
on factual considerations. This confusion may have resulted from the illustration, 
which does tend to focus perhaps unduly on the factual level. 
Ward notes that receivable confirmations have been found to be unreliable in 
empirical studies. He then poses the important questions of: "But just how im-
portant is such a conclusion? Of what consequence is it?" Such findings indicate 
that the significant reliance placed on confirmations may be misplaced; the auditor 
may be underestimating the ultimate risk on an engagement. Recognizing this ex-
posure, alternate procedures can then be evaluated. Confirmations may be sup-
plemented or replaced by alternate tests in designing programs. Such alternatives 
are now being actively investigated such as confirmation of individual invoices 
(Krogstad and Romney, Journal of Accountancy, February 1980). Ward perhaps 
answered his own questions at the conclusion of his discussion by saying: 
Therefore, I recommend an alternative direction for empirical study in 
auditing and call for . . . fuller delineation and development of threats to 
reliability and validity of evidential inference in auditing so that the poten-
tial source of such threats can be more fully known, considered and 
avoided or controlled when designing audit programs. 
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The comment that the paper implies the audit process itself is not systematic 
or scientific is unfounded. The study does not attempt to evaluate the entire audit 
process. Auditing is certainly systematic. The paper indicates that in the one area 
of evaluating audit evidence there does not appear to be an integrated, scientific 
approach present. Instead, heuristic rules, various concepts, learning and judg-
ment predominate. 
We concur that the statement in the paper indicating validity and reliability 
"have distinct, separate scientific meaning" was unjustified. The point we 
wished to make would have perhaps been better stated as: "Reliability and validity 
are indeed related but are not the same and are on two ends of a spectrum." We 
also agree that there are a number of definitions in the literature of these concepts. 
However, reliability and validity still provide normative guidelines in evaluating 
the competency of various alternate procedures. Agreement by the auditing pro-
fession on one or a select few operational definition(s) of these terms, such as those 
presented in the paper, can lead to valuable evidence assessment criteria. 
Conclusion 
Dr. Ward presents a number of interesting ideas and issues for the auditing 
profession. He suggests that the measurement based approach does not properly 
address the three audit performance criteria of appropriateness, effectiveness, and 
efficiency but instead simplifies by relying on a single criterion, success in verify-
ing assertions. The purpose of the paper is not to specify the performance 
measures for an audit or a firm. Rather, the objective is to address the complex 
problem of evaluating the strength of audit evidence. Accordingly, an integrated 
approach is presented based on concepts in measurement theory. Ward's proposed 
performance criteria are, of course, subject to dispute and a matter of opinion. It is 
believed these criteria, among others, may be incorporated into the measurement 
based approach. 
Nonetheless, the performance framework suggested by Ward does not obviate 
the real need for guidance on the evidence assessment judgment. This vital need 
was the reason for the formulation of the recent A I C P A Audit Evidence Task 
Force. Hopefully, the measurement based approach has provided a beginning by 
offering a systematic evidence evaluation process. 
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5 
A Look at the Record on Auditor Detection 
of Management Fraud 
Donald R. Ziegler 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Concluding that a perfect game has been pitched is a relatively simple matter. 
If the winning pitcher goes a full nine innings, during which his team has scored 
at least one run, and the first twenty-seven batters on the losing team fail to reach 
first base, we have a "perfect game." A single hit ruins a "perfect game" and 
even though the pitcher can claim 96.4% effectiveness, few people will long 
remember his performance. 
It's quite the opposite where auditors and management fraud are concerned. 
Turn in a "perfect record" and get no credit for it—that's what auditors are paid 
for, isn't it? But turn in a 96.4% performance and you've made it into the Hall of 
Fame. 
When it comes to detection of management fraud, what is a perfect record? In 
its strictest sense, it can only mean that every attempted fraud situation has been 
thwarted by the auditor. Similarly, an imperfect record is one in which an at-
tempted fraud was successfully perpetrated without detection by the auditor. 
Until such time as would-be perpetrators of fraud are required to report each 
attempt (perhaps to some governmental agency), there is no way to determine 
how perfectly or imperfectly auditors have performed. In the meantime, auditors 
will be presumed to have perfect records in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary. 
Undoubtedly, a number of management frauds have been successfully 
perpetrated without detection by auditors or others. It's only when the fraud 
comes to light that the possibility of audit failure becomes an issue. What this 
means is that some of the apparently perfect records may not be so perfect after all. 
"Failures" Widely Publicized; "Successes" Little Noted 
While alleged audit "failures" have received widespread publicity in recent 
years, little has been written about audit "successes.'' The reason is quite simple; 
unless the fraud or alleged fraud becomes a matter of public record the auditor can 
get no credit for its detection. 
Frauds or attempted frauds that have been detected by auditors during an or-
dinary examination (directed at the expression of an opinion on financial 
statements) rarely become part of the public record. This is because remedial ac-
tion is taken prior to the time the audit report is issued. 
Since their reports are directed to the integrity of the financial statements and 
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not (at least at the present time) to the integrity of management, auditors have no 
basis or requirement for publicly reporting that a fraud was perpetrated or at-
tempted. Similarly, management that has perpetrated or attempted to perpetrate 
fraud can hardly be expected to come forward and report that alert auditing 
detected it. 
Even if I thought some benefit could result from quantifying specific past per-
formances in the area of fraud detection (which I don't), there is no valid basis for 
tabulating successes and failures. 
So much for the record of auditor detection of management fraud. Let's now 
turn to the record (i.e., the known or recorded facts) on auditor detection of 
management fraud. This record consists essentially of: 
1. Information concerning auditors' responsibility for detection of 
management fraud, and 
2. Information concerning specific past fraud and alleged fraud situations. 
Differing Views on Auditors' Responsibility 
What is the auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud? The answer to 
this question depends upon the person of whom it is asked. Ask an auditor who is 
up-to-date on professional literature, and you will be told that the responsibility for 
detection of fraud extends only to those frauds which would result in a material 
misstatement of financial statements. Ask certain judges, Congressmen or 
regulatory agency officials and the answer is likely to be that auditors are responsi-
ble for detection of all management fraud. 
The different answers can be attributed to different perceptions as to the stand-
ards against which auditors' performance should be measured. In the area of fraud 
detection, is it sufficient to simply comply with generally accepted auditing stand-
ards ( " G A A S " ) , or is a higher standard of performance to be the benchmark? 
Auditors believe that they should be held accountable for failure to detect fraud 
that materially affects a client's financial statements only if such failure results 
from an inadequate performance, measured by G A A S . Others have often taken 
the position that compliance with G A A S is not enough. 
While there is always the risk that the auditors will be held to a higher stand-
ard in a particular situation, I think it is reasonable to assume that auditors who 
can demonstrate that their work was performed in accordance with G A A S should 
have little to worry about when it comes to undetected management fraud. 
GAAS and Fraud Detection 
Having concluded that, in the area of fraud detection, all the auditor need do is 
comply with G A A S , we turn to G A A S and look for the heading "How to Detect 
Management Fraud.'' Since, unfortunately, there is no such heading, we must 
look elsewhere to see what G A A S says about fraud detection. 
A good place to commence looking is Section 4 of The Report of the Commis-
sion on Auditors' Responsibilities (commonly referred to as the Cohen Commis-
sion Report) which was issued in January 1978. This Section, entitled Clarifying 
Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud presents a reasonably concise disserta-
tion on the history of auditors' responsibility for fraud detection as perceived by 
auditors and by users of audited financial statements. 
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Contrary to popular belief, the auditing profession wants to assume as much 
responsibility for fraud detection as can reasonably be expected by users of finan-
cial statements. Toward this objective, it has taken a number of significant 
positive steps in recent years. One of them was the establishment by the A I C P A 
of the previously mentioned Commission of Auditors' Responsibilities. Among 
other things, the Commission was charged with considering whether there was a 
gap between public expectations and needs and auditor performance, and to make 
appropriate recommendations if a gap were determined to exist. The final report 
presents a number of recommendations on a standard of care for fraud detection. 
Other steps taken by the A I C P A include the issuance of several Statements on 
Auditing Standards ( "SAS's" ) which were intended to clarify auditors' respon-
sibilities in the fraud detection and related areas. 
Statements on Auditing Standards 
The first of these SAS's was SAS No. 6—Related Party Transactions (1975). 
Its purpose was to provide guidance as to procedures to be followed in identifying 
and evaluating disclosure of related party transactions. It was issued in the after-
math of a number of publicized cases concerning alleged management fraud in-
volving non-arm's-length transactions with controlled or otherwise related en-
tities. The substance of this SAS is proposed to be incorporated in a pending revi-
sion of The Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation S-X. It is of in-
terest to note that SAS No. 6 effectively established disclosure requirements that 
would more appropriately fall under generally accepted accounting principles, but 
as to which generally accepted accounting principles were silent. Today, it con-
tinues to be the only authoritative guidance as to the accounting for and ap-
propriate disclosure of related party transactions. 
In 1977, four SAS's which should be of interest to persons concerned with 
fraud detection were issued. Perhaps the most important of these is SAS No. 16— 
The Independent Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregu-
larities. It was issued to clarify existing authoritative pronouncements concerning 
its subject matter. It acknowledges that " . . . the independent auditor has the re-
sponsibility, within the inherent limitations of the auditing process, to plan his ex-
amination to search for errors or irregularities that would have a material effect on 
the financial statements, and to exercise due skill and care in the conduct of that 
examination . . . " While implicit in prior pronouncements (at least in the views of 
many, including my own), this is the first time that the professional literature 
acknowledges that the auditor has a responsibility in an ordinary examination to 
search for fraud which may have a material effect on the financial statements. It 
was not an easy acknowledgment to incorporate in the literature. What finally 
tipped the scale, I believe, was the fact that both the courts and the regulatory 
agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission were, in fact, holding 
the independent auditor to that level of responsibility. With this in mind then, the 
issuance of SAS No. 16 does not really impose a new level of responsibility, but 
only acknowledges in writing what the auditor presently perceives and has ac-
cepted his responsibilities to be. It is interesting to note, however, that SAS No. 
16, while it is the most comprehensive authoritative pronouncement on fraud, 
uses the word only once. 
SAS No. 17—Illegal Acts by Clients—provides guidance to an auditor as to 
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actions to be taken with respect to possible illegal acts that come to his attention 
during an examination of financial statements. It also provides guidance to the 
auditor as to the attention that should be given, in performing an examination, to 
the possibility that illegal acts may have occurred. It is somewhat of a companion 
to SAS No. 16 and is equally concerned with the integrity of management and 
with possible acts by management which could result in a material misstatement 
of the financial statements. 
SAS No. 19—Client Representations—established a requirement for auditors 
to obtain certain specific written representations from management as part of an 
examination of financial statements. It cautions, however, that the representations 
are not substitutes for auditing procedures which would otherwise be necessary to 
provide a basis for the expression of an opinion. Insofar as possible fraud is con-
cerned, the potential benefit of requiring written representations is that the 
requirement may be a deterrent if management knows that ultimately a represen-
tation will have to be made in writing to the effect that no fraud has been com-
mitted. The value of requiring written representations in this regard has recently 
been enhanced by legislation which makes it a criminal offense for management to 
knowingly make a materially false or misleading statement to an auditor in con-
nection with an examination of financial statements. 
SAS No. 20—Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in Internal 
Accounting Control—is, among other things, responsive to the auditor's concern 
with the possibility that material weaknesses in internal control could be con-
ducive to the perpetration of fraud. While, of itself, the communication of such 
weaknesses does not provide the auditor with any significant assistance in his cur-
rent examination of financial statements, the attention given and actions taken by 
management in respect to such communications may go a long way in the future 
toward preventing frauds that might otherwise have occurred. 
A I C P A Standing Subcommittee 
One of the recommendations of the Cohen Commission was the establishment 
of a separate Subcommittee of the AICPA, of which I am chairman. The commit-
tee has been designated The Standing Subcommittee on Methods of Perpetration 
and Detection of Fraud (hereinafter referred to as the "Fraud Subcommittee"). It 
has been given the responsibility of studying and publishing analyses of methods 
of perpetration and means by which various types of fraud have been detected and 
to study specific instances of alleged audit failures and to publish the results of 
such studies if they indicate that new or revised auditing standards are necessary. 
The steps that have been taken by the profession provide, in my view, a record 
of which we can be justly proud. This is not to say that we can be complacent. We 
can't. We must always be alert to the possibility that financial statements may be 
materially false and misleading as the result of management fraud. 
In March 1979, the Fraud Subcommittee published a list of warning signals to 
alert the profession to conditions under which increased attention should be 
directed in an examination of financial statements to the possibility that manage-
ment fraud may have been perpetrated. 
The Fraud Subcommittee is assisting in the development by the A I C P A of a 
continuing professional education program on the subject of management fraud. 
This program is expected to be made available to state societies later this year. 
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The Public Record 
Finally, the Fraud Subcommittee has been involved (during the two-plus years 
of its existence) in looking at the public record of past frauds and alleged frauds to 
determine what is available that may help auditors detect fraud in the future. 
One thing that has become quite clear to me, particularly during the past cou-
ple of years, is that readily available information (i.e., information contained in 
SEC releases, courtroom transcripts, news clippings and the like) on past frauds 
and alleged frauds is not all that helpful when it comes to trying to determine how 
we should go about developing a plan or program for detecting (or deterring) 
possible future frauds. At the risk of being criticized for oversimplification, my 
reading of what's readily available tells me: 
1. Watch out for overstated assets and understated liabilities, 
2. Be wary of related party transactions, 
3. Pay particular attention to large complex transactions, and 
4. Get to know your client, his business and his industry before you 
report on his financial statements. 
Not very enlightening, to say the least but very necessary. There is no 
substitute for healthy skepticism and alertness on the part of the auditor when it 
comes to possible material fraud situations. 
Information concerning fraud or attempted fraud cases that is readily available 
ordinarily does not go into sufficient detail to give us an insight as to the methods 
by which the frauds were perpetrated or attempted. What we need to know is 
which audit procedures or techniques were successful in detecting frauds that 
were perpetrated and which were helpful in thwarting frauds that were attempted. 
I believe that a wealth of information concerning methods of perpetration and 
detection could be obtained from sources that heretofore have either been 
unavailable, except to parties at interest, or not readily available. What is needed 
especially are in-depth analyses and understandings of the auditors' successes in 
the detection of material management fraud in examinations of financial 
statements. 
Difficulty in Obtaining Non-Public Information 
Difficulty in obtaining non-public information has stalled our efforts to provide 
auditors with much information that would help them to detect management 
fraud. On several occasions we have requested (in the C P A Letter and in presenta-
tions to numerous interested groups) information, disguised as appropriate, con-
cerning management fraud situations. T o date we have received no meaningful or 
helpful response. 
While all information supplied to us will be held in strict confidence, we are 
still looking for a way to guarantee those who provide us with non-public informa-
tion that it will not be available to law enforcement agencies, plaintiff's lawyers, 
regulatory agencies or the AICPA's Ethics Committee. Until such time as we're 
successful, it is somewhat doubtful that much non-public information will come 
into our possession. 
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Summary 
The Fraud Subcommittee has a long way to go and a lot of work to do if it is to 
accomplish its overall objective of determining whether there is a need for new or 
revised auditing standards with respect to the detection of material management 
fraud. I guess it would be fair to say that we have come about as far as possible in 
the profession in closing the loop when it comes to the auditor's responsibility for 
the detection of fraud. In the early 1900's one of the auditor's primary objectives 
was the detection of fraud; in the late 40's and early 50's, the auditor considered 
it to be a "responsibility not assumed"; in the 60's he acknowledged that he was 
responsible for the detection of fraud that would normally be uncovered by an ex-
amination performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards; 
and now, in the beginning of the 80's, the auditor has the responsibility to search 
for fraud which may have a material effect on the financial statements. Not quite a 
360 degree closing of the "loop' ' , but about as near to it as possible in today's en-
vironment. 
To sum up, I believe that auditors' won and loss records are not really rele-
vant; that the record of the profession's attention to the subject of management 
fraud shows that it is keenly aware of and interested in, and has been responsive 
to, the needs of users of financial statements; and, finally, that much helpful, 
needed information could be furnished to auditors if only those who possess it 
would share it with the rest of us. 
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Discussant's Response to 
A Look at the Record on Auditor Detection 
of Management Fraud 
Robert L. Grinaker 
University of Houston 
I am pleased to review Donald Ziegler's paper on " A Look at the Record on 
Auditor Detection of Management Fraud.'' As chairman of The Standing Sub-
committee on Methods of Perpetration and Detection of Fraud, Ziegler speaks 
from a position of considerable knowledge, and his paper reflects the significant 
work of that subcommittee. Because I challenge only a point or two in the paper, I 
have chosen to emphasize and expand several of the points raised. Hence, I would 
like my remarks to be viewed as complementary to those of M r . Ziegler. 
The matters I have selected for emphasis are the following: 
1. M y understanding of the meaning of ''management fraud.'' 
2. The materiality threshhold for fraud. 
3. The relationship of internal control to management fraud. 
4. Ziegler's four-point program for fraud detection. 
5. Management fraud and implications for research. 
The Meaning of Management Fraud 
Because "management fraud" contains the adjective "management," the 
term is meant to be distinguished from fraud in general. While all fraud involves 
deceit, trickery, or cheating, management fraud connotes special characteristics. 
In my judgment, management fraud contains three special characteristics as 
follows: 
1. The fraud is perpetrated at levels of management above those to which 
internal control systems generally relate. 
2. The fraud frequently involves using the financial statements to create 
an illusion that an entity is more healthy and prosperous than it actu-
ally is. 
3. If the fraud involves the misappropriation of assets, it frequently is 
shrouded in a maze of complex transactions often involving related 
third parties. 
ASB (Auditing Standards Board), in its discussion of limitations on the effec-
tiveness of internal control, makes the point that controls can be overriden by cer-
tain levels of management. In SAS Section 320.34, ASB states as follows: 
procedures designed to assure the execution and recording of transactions may be 
ineffective against either errors or irregularities perpetrated by management with 
respect to transactions or to the estimates and judgments required in the prepara-
tion of financial statements." ASB reaffirms the point in SAS Section 327.09 in 
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which it states: " . . . management can perpetrate irregularities by overriding con-
trols that would prevent similar irregularities by other employees.'' The implica-
tions for auditing appear clear. Whenever the auditor sets about to test for 
management fraud, little, if any, reliance can be placed on internal control. 
When financial statements are used to create an illusion, the input data usu-
ally is manipulated to include false or questionable transactions or to include false 
or questionable judgments with respect to expense allocations or revenue recogni-
tion. The incentive for such deceit may be (1) to stave off creditors, (2) to raise in-
vestment capital at a cheaper cost than justified, or (3) to provide for subtle misap-
propriation of assets. With respect to the latter point, the financial statements may 
be manipulated to increase EPS for the purpose of enhancing the value of share op-
tions or management bonuses. 
If management fraud involves the misappropriation of assets, it frequently is 
the case that the fraud is covered by overstated assets just like McKesson-Robbins 
and its fictitious receivables and inventory. Almost, but not quite. Today the 
McKesson-Robbins type coverup would be caught by the auditor through ac-
counts receivable confirmation or inventory observation. Hence, the coverup fre-
quently involves complex transactions often involving related third parties. This 
has made it possible either to confound the auditor or to provide some evidence of 
bona fides. 
Hopefully, consideration of the characteristics of management fraud will help 
place in perspective the audit risks involved. 
Materiality Threshhold for Fraud 
Ziegler's point is well taken with respect to differing perceptions of the 
auditor's responsibility for fraud detection. Although the SEC may not believe 
that the auditor should be held responsible for A L L management fraud, it cer-
tainly appears that the materiality threshhold is lower than for other types of er-
rors. For example, the Commission's final rules on application of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act have been criticized for omitting materiality standards. Perhaps 
some small comfort can be taken from the following quote in the release (Section 
34-15570—February, 1979): 
The SEC believes that the concern expressed with respect to inadvertent 
and inconsequential errors is unwarranted. The statute does not require 
perfection, but only that the books, records, and accounts "in reasonable 
detail, accurately and fairly reflect transactions and dispositions of the 
assets of the issuer.'' 
I say small comfort when I read Commissioner John Evans' response to criticism 
for omission of the materiality standard (The Week in Review, Delotte Haskins & 
Sells, November 30, 1979): 
I do not expect to see a positive response in any Commission action at this 
time. Congress determined not to include the materiality concept in the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and for the Commission to engraft it now 
through a management report requirement could obfuscate that point. 
Moreover, it might lessen the sensitivity of all of us to what the Act re-
quires. 
Although I completely agree with Ziegler that the appropriate degree of audit 
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responsibility for fraud detection should be limited to those frauds having a 
material impact on financial statements, and although ASB (SAS Section 
327.05), clearly makes this point (clarifying ambiguities contained in SAS#1 Sec-
tion 110.05 08), it now appears that public expectations may have overridden the 
profession's attempt to establish clear and reasonable limits of responsibility. 
Hence, I am considerably less optimistic than is Mr . Ziegler that a G A A S audit 
will be sufficient defense with respect to undetected management fraud. In fact, I 
believe the profession must face the necessity (1) of distinguishing between finan-
cial statement errors involving bona fides of transactions or account balances and 
(2) those involving unintentional mistakes or poor judgment and for developing 
auditing standards applicable to each type of error. Perhaps reasonable standards 
would call for auditing in a fraud mode1 only if indicated by appropriate warning 
signals. Several lists of such signals exist, but I would commend the listing 
prepared by the Ziegler subcommittee and published in The CPA Letter (AICPA, 
March 12, 1974, P 4). 
The Relationship of Internal Control to Management Fraud 
For purposes of discussion, I have assumed that management frauds are 
perpetrated at levels of management above those for which internal controls 
systems generally are designed to be effective. Thus, if as a consequence of warn-
ing flags, the auditor chooses to test for management fraud, all tests must be 
substantive and no reliance can be placed on the system of internal control. 
In preparing my remarks, I reviewed a number of the SEC's Accounting 
Series Releases (ASR's) in which the Commission has chosen to spell out the 
details of cases purported to involve auditing deficiencies.2 A number of these 
cases indicated that the auditor placed inappropriate reliance on the client's inter-
nal controls. However, inappropriateness was often related to weak controls. This 
criticism is unfortunate. It misses the point that, with respect to management 
fraud, control systems are irrelevant. In my judgment, the criticisms should have 
taken the form that the circumstances called for auditing in the fraud mode and, 
hence, no reliance should have been placed on the control system. The point is il-
lustrated by ASR #209, in which the Commission states in its conclusion the 
following: 
When confronted with evidence that an audit client's internal accounting 
controls are unreliable, independent auditors should employ detailed ex-
panded procedures and insist upon obtaining evidential matter from exter-
nal sources. In this instance, (the auditor) . . . improperly relied upon the 
accounting data developed by Tidal. . . . 
In my judgment, the conclusion may lead to the unwarranted implication that, 
had the controls been strong, the auditor could more properly have relied on the 
accounting data developed by management. The fact is that the frauds were 
perpetrated by levels of management high enough to override even a strong con-
trol system. 
Nevertheless, while it currently is inappropriate to rely on internal control 
when auditing in a fraud mode, because of severe responsibilities imposed on 
auditors for the detection of management fraud, consideration should be given to 
whether control standards can effectively be imposed on higher levels of manage-
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ment than are currently contemplated. It may be feasible, for example, to carry 
the concept of "separation of duties" to higher levels. Thus, the generally 
recognized functions of general auditor, operations, treasurer, and controller 
might remain separated and independent to a level even as high as the board of 
directors. 
The feasibility of the foregoing suggestion is at least indicated by data gathered 
for as yet unpublished research. Among a sample of the companies in the Fortune 
500, 17% of the general auditors reported to a member of the board of directors 
in 1980 as compared to 9% in 1976. Whether raising reporting levels would be 
effective in deterring management fraud is a question best left to either experience 
or research. In any event, in my judgment, the matter deserves serious considera-
tion. 
Ziegler's Four-Point Program For Fraud Detection 
In this section, I am going to challenge another of Mr . Ziegler's conclusions. 
He lists a four-point program for which he sort of apologizes for whether it is too 
simple and not sufficiently enlightening. In my judgment, that program is quite 
enlightening and is made elegant by its simplicity. In order to add emphasis to the 
points made, I have taken the liberty of repeating the list: 
1. Watch out for overstated assets and understated liabilities. 
2. Be wary of related party transactions. 
3. Pay particular attention to large complex transactions. 
4. Get to know your client, his business and his industry before you 
report on his financial statements. 
I would like to address these items in more detail and I will begin with the last one. 
Every treatise on epistomology contains the admonition that the conduct of in-
quiry requires thorough knowledge by the investigator of the matter under in-
vestigation. Kerlinger states as follows: 
If one wants to solve a problem one must generally know what the prob-
lem is. It can be said that a large part of the solution lies in knowing what it 
is one is trying to do.3 
Cohen and Nagel make the point when they discuss the relevance of hypotheses: 
In the absence of knowledge concerning a subject matter, we can make no 
well-founded judgment of relevance. It follows that valuable suggestions 
for solving a problem can be made only by those who are familiar with the 
kinds of connections which the subject matter under investigation is 
capable of exhibiting.4 
I assert that the prior knowledge required of the auditor is, at the absolute 
minimum, a thorough knowledge of the client's business and the client's in-
dustry. For example, the question of inventory obsolescence and how to test for it 
would be very different for a retailer as compared to an airplane manufacturer. M y 
ability to design (and, yes, to carry out) the appropriate test would depend on my 
knowledge of each client and each industry. 
Why am I belaboring such an obvious point? In the ASR's I selected for 
review, over and over again, the point is made by the Commission that the auditor 
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simply did not understand the client's business. Examples are contained in the 
following quotes: 
ASR #173: . . . the auditors accepted assertions by management concern-
ing the special circumstances of the business involved although 
presentation of the supposed results presented unusual accounting and 
auditing problems. In considerable measure this occurred because the 
auditors were not sufficiently familiar with the business context to 
assess the representations of management. 
ASR #227: The Commission has previously addressed the audit con-
siderations inherent in having a thorough familiarity with the transac-
tions being audited. 
ASR #241: The senior accountant assigned to the engagement has no 
prior experience in auditing broker-dealers and was not provided with 
an audit program containing specific procedures designed for broker-
dealers. 
In my judgment, prerequisite knowledge of the client's business is so fundamental 
to audit inquiry that steps should be taken to assure that such knowledge pervades 
the entire audit team. I wonder how many staff training programs are directed to 
specific industries and specific clients. I assert that inclusion of such programs in 
the training budgets of accounting firms would be cost-beneficial. 
Consider now the question of related party transactions. These are specifically 
covered by ASB in SAS#6 issued in July 1975. A number of the audit failures in 
the SEC-described cases were attributable, at least in part, to insufficient attention 
given to the propriety of such transactions. I counted six references to related 
party transaction with the following quote being typical: 
ASR #227: When one party to a transaction is able to influence the 
operating policies of another party, the risk of the transaction lacking a 
legitimate business purpose rises substantially. In this regard, the 
auditors should have intimate familiarity with the business of the 
client in order to understand the opportunities which may exist for 
such transactions. 
Careful application of SAS #6 should materially reduce the likelihood that those 
frauds involving related party transactions would go undetected. 
Many of the SEC described cases involved large complex transactions. These 
transactions appear to have been conceived either to have created the illusion of 
legitimacy or simply to confound the auditor. The essence of the SEC criticism in 
these cases is that the auditor simply accepted management's representations 
regarding the underlying events rather than to dig down and obtain the necessary 
confirming evidence. Frankly, I am somewhat sympathetic with the poor auditors 
on these engagements. For example, Penn Central (ASR#173) involved almost at 
the same time not one but eight transactions each of which seemed to me to be 
truly mind-boggling. In one year, Tidal Marine International (ASR 209) involved 
five equally mind-boggling transactions. 
In one of the Tidal Marine transactions, the auditor was attempting to test the 
collectibility of a receivable from a company named Transoceanic for 
$1,082,058. In order to satisfy the auditor concerning the collectability of this 
receivable which had been created from a fictitious revenue transaction, Tidal's 
management furnished to the auditor an agreement and release involving four af-
filiated companies. The agreement recited that Tidal owed Barclay at least 
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$1,082,058, that Barclay owed Panocean $1,094,472, that Panocean owed 
Transoceanic $1,252,058, and Transoceanic owed Tidal $1,082,058. With cer-
tain adjusting payments all of the indebtedness was extinguished and the auditor 
now had evidence of a collectible receivable. 
Transactions of comparable complexity were found in five other cases. It also 
is interesting to note that many of the highly complex transactions used to deceive 
the auditor also involved related parties. Thus, the combination appears to be 
quite devastating with respect to the audit risk of undetected management fraud. 
It also is interesting to note that virtually every case detailed by the SEC in-
volved financial statements with either overstated assets or understated liabilities.5 
Overstated assets were either fictitious or overvalued. In many cases, the 
misstatements either were created or shrouded over by complex related-party 
transactions. Most of the other cases seemed to involve front-ended revenues, 
capitalized expenses, and unrecognized liabilities. I hope all of this indicates a con-
tinuing role for the balance-sheet audit, which I am sometimes led to believe is on 
the endangered species list. I hope not. Because, given the fact that management 
fraud is beyond the scope of internal controls as currently conceived, the balance 
sheet audit should continue to have a significant role in the audit process. 
Management Fraud and Implications For Research 
I share Don Ziegler's disappointment with the difficulty of obtaining indepth 
analyses of fraud cases and auditing procedures which have proven effective in 
either revealing or thwarting fraud. I would guess that the difficulty stems, not 
only from the concern for the legal implications, but also the reluctance of people 
to put in the many hours of work required. Any academic in the room can attest 
to the meticulous planning and arranging that must be made to get adequate 
responses to a questionnaire of even modest length or to get persons to serve as ex-
perimental subjects. In my judgment, the information being sought by the Ziegler 
subcommittee would have to be packaged up and be presented to and be 
"blessed'' by the executive committee of every participating accounting firm. 
Management fraud also should be a fruitful field for academic research. The 
work of Albrecht and Romney (including their paper to be discussed in the next 
session) is particularly encouraging in this respect. 
I will be so presumptuous as to list two or three other possibilities: 
1. Design and test the effectiveness of internal controls directed to top 
management. 
2. Design simulated frauds to test the effectiveness of alternative auditing 
procedures. 
3. Design and conduct staff training programs directed to understanding 
the business of specific industries and specific companies. The research 
might include follow-up tests of the effectiveness of such training. 
Summary and Conclusions 
1. Management fraud suggests three special characteristics— 
(1) The fraud is perpetrated at levels of management above those for 
which internal controls generally are designed. 
(2) It frequently involves using the financial statements to create an 
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illusion that an entity is more healthy and prosperous than it actually 
is. 
(3) If misappropriation of assets is involved, it frequently is shrouded in a 
maze of complex transactions often involving related third parties. 
2. I am less optimistic than is Mr . Ziegler that a G A A S audit will be sufficient 
defense with respect to undetected management fraud. I fear that public 
expectations already have overriden the profession's attempt to establish 
reasonable limits of responsibility. 
3. Internal controls generally are not designed to control higher levels of manage-
ment. Consideration should be given to whether controls can be redesigned to 
be more effectively imposed on higher levels of management. 
4. The four points in Mr . Ziegler's program comprise significant audit standards 
directed to management fraud. They surely contain the essence of the issues 
contained in the cases found on the public record. 
5. Because undetected management fraud impacts so severely on auditors, as-
pects of management fraud should be fruitful areas of research both for profes-
sional accountants and academics. 
Footnotes 
1. See W. Donald Georgen, "Management Behavior—an Auditing Horizon,'' Auditing Symposium 
III, University of Kansas School of Business, 1976. Mr. Georgen suggests the term "fraud mode" 
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ASR#173 issued July 2, 1975. 
ASR#196 issued September 1, 1976. 
ASR#209 issued February 16, 1977. 
ASR#210 issued February 25, 1977. 
ASR#227 issued September 21, 1977. 
ASR#238 issued January 16, 1977. 
ASR#241 issued February 10, 1978. 
3. Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, Second Edition, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, Inc., 1973, p 17. 
4. Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, "The Occasion and the Function of Inquiry," Knowledge 
and Value, Second Edition, Edited by Elmer Sprague and Paul W. Taylor, Harcourt, Brace & World, 
Inc., 1967, p 223. 
5. This is not meant to ignore the fact that management may be motivated toward the "flip side," 
i.e., understated assets or overstated liabilities. For example, smaller companies may wish to "save'' 
taxes; energy-related companies may wish to reduce reported profits below the "obscene'' level. 
99 
6 
Auditing Implications Derived from a Review 
of Cases and Articles Relating to Fraud 
W. Steve Albrecht* 
Marshall B. Romney* 
Brigham Young University 
For the past two years an interdisciplinary team of researchers1 has been stud-
ying the problem of management fraud. The motivation for the study was 
threefold: a noted increase in the number of management frauds being committed, 
an increased awareness of auditors' responsibilities for detecting frauds, and a 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. research grant. The objectives of the research 
were: (1) to conduct an extensive interdisciplinary review of the fraud related 
literature, (2) to identify individual, organizational, and societal factors that sug-
gest a high probability of fraud, (3) to partially validate these factors by comparing 
them to past cases of fraud, and (4) to organize these factors into an early warning 
system that could be used by auditors in detecting and deterring fraud. 
In completing the first objective, four data sources were investigated: (1) over 
1500 literature references (books, journal and magazine articles, monographs, 
newspaper citations, and unpublished working papers) were reviewed,2 (2) fraud 
perpetrators and victims were interviewed, (3) 65 organizations concerned with 
the detection, deterrence, prosecution, or punishment of fraud were visited in per-
son or contacted by mail or telephone, and (4) numerous legal and organizational 
documents (prison and parole records, Donn Parker's extensive files on computer 
fraud, and corporate records) were examined. 
In completing the second objective, a comprehensive list of all variables which 
appeared to influence or be associated with the perpetration of fraud was compiled 
as the data sources were examined. The variables identified were classified into 
three major categories: societal, organizational, and individual factors. During this 
process, patterns and relationships among the variables emerged and a tentative 
model explaining fraud was developed. 
The third objective, validating the fraud-related variables, involved examining 
72 past cases of fraud. Twenty of the cases came from Donn Parker's files (Stan-
ford Research Institute) and 52 cases came from published accounts3 of fraud. 
Each case was carefully analyzed to determine which of the items on the master 
list of variables appeared to be present in the case. A t the completion of this proc-
ess, each item on the master list was carefully reviewed and the master list revised. 
* This project was funded by a grant from the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Foundation through its 
Research Opportunities in Auditing program. The views expressed herein are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Foundation. 
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In revising the list, only those variables that could be associated with at least one 
case were kept. This is a very demanding criterion because certainly the authors 
who wrote about the cases probably had a perspective much different than ours. 
After completing the compiling and validation steps, a fraud checklist4 (objec-
tive 4) for use by auditors was developed. This checklist, which includes both 
questions auditors will ask themselves about the client and the client about 
themselves, should make auditors more aware of the possibility of fraud and hence 
increase the probability that fraud will be detected. The checklist includes both 
factors that could motivate an employee to commit fraud against a company for 
his own benefit and an executive to commit fraud on behalf of a corporation. 
The purpose of this paper is to present some conclusions and implications 
from the study that should be helpful to auditors. In presenting these implications, 
two assumptions will be made: 
(1) It is assumed that readers are aware of auditors' responsibilities for the 
detection of fraud as stated in the SAS's, Cohen Commission Report, 
and various court opinions. 
(2) It is assumed that readers agree with our definition of management 
fraud. The definition used (Improper actions resulting in a material 
misstatement of financial statements) excludes several types of 
criminal acts that have been classified as fraud. Some of the more com-
mon omissions are consumer fraud, false advertising, embezzlement, 
bribes, kickbacks, and violations of regulatory agency rules.5 
The remainder of this paper will be divided into three parts: (1) a description 
or profile of the typical fraud perpetrator, (2) an explanation of why fraud occurs, 
and (3) steps that can be taken by auditors to reduce their exposure to manage-
ment fraud. 
The Typical Fraud-Perpetrator 
One aspect of the study was an attempt to describe fraud perpetrators as a 
group and differentiate them from other groups. This task was extremely difficult 
because there are not many fraud perpetrators available to study. Two reasons ac-
counted for the sparsity of available subjects: our narrow definition of fraud 
eliminated many potential perpetrators, and most fraud perpetrators are never in-
carcerated. In trying to compile a sample, we contacted over 400 prisons nation-
wide as well as every state and federal probation and parole department in the U.S. 
and Canada. Many of the agencies and prisons responded that they could not com-
ply with our request because of one or more of the following reasons: (1) they had 
no fraud perpetrators fitting our description, (2) fraud perpetrators could be listed 
under many different crime categories, (3) they had no computerized files or 
organized data on fraud perpetrators, (4) our request would take too much time, 
or (5) responding to our request might violate security or privacy laws. As a 
result, our definition of fraud had to be expanded to include embezzlers who were 
in managerial positions. Thus, in describing fraud perpetrators, management 
fraud perpetrators and managerial embezzlers were compared with prisoners in-
carcerated for other property offenses (theft, burglary, larceny, bank robbery, 
etc.), and a sample of college students. The three groups were compared across 
several demographic, personal, and psychological characteristics. 
The results indicated that incarcerated fraud perpetrators were generally dif-
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ferent than other incarcerated prisoners and quite similar to the college students. 
When compared to other property offenders, fraud perpetrators were less likely to 
be caught, turned in, arrested, convicted, incarcerated, or to serve long sentences. 
The fraud perpetrators were also considerably older, which might be expected 
since it usually takes longer to get into managerial positions or other positions of 
trust. While only two percent of the property offenders were female, 30 percent of 
the fraud perpetrators were women. The fraud perpetrators tended to have a much 
more stable family situation; more were married, they had more children, were 
less likely to be divorced, and more likely to be active church attenders. 
Compared to other property offenders, the fraud perpetrators were better 
educated, more religious, less likely to have a criminal record or otherwise be 
criminally inclined, less likely to use alcohol, and considerably less likely to use 
drugs. Fraud perpetrators were in better psychological health. They enjoyed more 
optimism, self-esteem, self-sufficiency, achievement, motivation, and family har-
mony in contrast to the other property offenders who showed more depression, 
self-degradation, dependence, lack of motivation, and family discord. Fraud 
perpetrators seemed to have significantly fewer problems; they expressed more 
social conformity, self-control, kindness, and empathy while other property of-
fenders displayed greater social deviancy, impulsiveness, hostility, and insensitiv-
ity to other people. 
When compared to college students, the fraud perpetrators differed only 
slightly. The white-collar criminals suffered more psychic pain, were more 
dishonest, were more independent, more sexually mature, more socially deviant, 
and more empathetic. The comparisons showed that fraud perpetrators were 
much more similar to the students than to other property offenders. In fact, in 
most cases, they were so different from other criminals, that when incarcerated, 
they tended to associate more with prison guards and officials than with other 
prisoners. This part of the study produced one other interesting observation. 
While most of the fraud perpetrators had virtually no criminal background, there 
was a small minority that had several previous arrests and convictions. From this 
observation it might be hypothesized that there are really two types of 
perpetrators: the typical business person who succumbs to pressures or tempta-
tions, and the more criminally-inclined person who would be dishonest in most 
environments or would commit fraud as just one more in a series of offenses. 
A n Explanation of Fraud 
With all of these positive characteristics, why do these "non-criminal" type 
managers and executives get involved in fraud? Basically, they become involved 
because: (1) they are placed in situations where they are faced with a high degree 
of situational pressure; (2) they are faced with attractive opportunities to commit, 
conceal, or not be punished for their illegal acts; or (3) they have a low level of per-
sonal integrity or honesty. These three forces interact to determine whether or 
not a person will commit fraud. A person with a high level of integrity and little 
opportunity and pressure to commit fraud will most likely behave honestly. But 
criminal acts become increasingly likely as individuals with lower levels of per-
sonal honesty are placed in situations with increased pressure or convenient op-
portunities to commit a crime. Exhibit A is a graphic description of the interaction 
of the fraud motivating forces. 
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Exhibit A 
(High) Situational Pressures (Low) 
(High) Opportunities (Low) 
(Low) Personal Characteristics (Integrity) (High) 
Fraud No Fraud 
The forces that contribute to these three motivations are largely determined at 
three levels: society, the work place, and personal experiences. What is frighten-
ing is that the forces causing an increase in fraud are greater than ever today and 
are increasing on all three levels. The societal factors, which contribute to fraud 
by either increasing overall opportunities or creating situational pressures, provide 
a backdrop for the work place and personal factors. Exhibit B depicts this relation-
ship. 
There are at least eight societal factors that contribute to lowering the general 
level of honesty and magnifying the pressures and opportunities experienced by 
managers at work and in their personal lives. These factors7 are: (1) failure of 
businesses to prosecute, (2) problems with our ciminal justice system, (3) ostra-
cism of whistle blowers, (4) a lowered level of personal integrity, (5) inflation, (6) 
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Exhibit B 
SOCIETY 
Personal Experiences 
Situational Pressures 
Work Place 
Personal Experiences 
Opportunities Fraud 
Work Place 
Personal Honesty 
increased size of organizational units, (7) increased use of computers, and (8) pro-
liferation of egalitarian ideas. 
Certainly, it would be difficult for auditors to change many of these societal 
factors. Maybe a strong lobbying effort or high placed connections could help, but 
generally auditors must live with these factors. 
The combination of increased responsibilities to detect fraud, increased 
societal reinforcement for fraud, and the absence of an obvious criminal type pro-
file makes it imperative that auditors make fraud detection an explicit part of their 
audit. We believe there are two steps auditors must take to reduce their exposure 
to fraud. First, they must make sure that only "clean" firms are accepted as 
clients. Many well known frauds have involved new clients (e.g., Home-Stake 
Production, National Student Marketing, Republic National Life, and Stirling 
Homex). We have previously argued8 for the use of investigative agencies as a bet-
ter way to screen potential new clients. A thorough review of prospective clients 
should help to eliminate exposure to those frauds committed by the criminally-
inclined perpetrators. 
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Secondly, auditors can pay much closer attention to situational pressures and 
opportunities experienced by managers at both the work place and in their per-
sonal lives. One way to focus on these factors would be to include a "red flag" 
checklist as part of the audit program. Presently, there are several such checklists 
available.9 One rather comprehensive checklist that includes situational pressure, 
opportunity, and personal characteristic red flags is included in Exhibit C. 
Exhibit C 
Situational Pressure Red Flags 
Personal Situational Pressures 
1. High personal debts or financial losses 
2. Inadequate incomes 
3. Living beyond one's means 
4. Extensive stock market or other speculation 
5. Excessive gambling 
6. Involvement with members of the opposite sex 
7. Undue family, company, or community expectations 
8. Excessive use of alcohol or drugs 
9. Perceived inequities in the organization 
10. Resentment of superiors 
11. Frustration with the job 
12. Peer group pressures 
13. Greed or desire for self-enrichment and personal gain 
Company Situational Pressures 
1. Unfavorable economic conditions within the industry 
2. Heavy investments or losses 
3. Insufficient working capital 
4. Dependence on one or two products, customers, or transactions 
5. Excess capacity 
6. Severe obsolescence 
7. High debt 
8. Extremely rapid expansion through new business or product lines 
9. Reduced ability to acquire credit 
10. Profit squeeze (costs and expenses rising higher and faster than sales and 
revenues) 
11. Difficulty in collecting receivables 
12. Unusually heavy competition 
13. Restrictive loan agreements 
14. Progressive deterioration in quality of earnings 
15. Significant tax adjustments 
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16. Urgent need for favorable earnings (to support high price of stock, meat 
earnings forecast, etc.) 
17. Need to gloss over a temporarily bad situation (in order to maintain 
management position and prestige) 
18. Significant litigation (especially between stockholders and management) 
19. Unmarketable collateral 
20. Significant reduction in sales backlogs indicating future sales decline 
21. Long business cycle 
22. Existence of revocable and possible imperiled licenses (especially when 
necessary for the continuation of business) 
23. Suspension or delisting from a stock exchange 
24. Pressure to merge 
25. Sizable inventory increase without comparable sales increases 
Opportunity Red Flags 
Personal Opportunities 
1. Extensive familiarity with operations (including cover-up capabilities) and in 
a position of trust 
2. Close association with cohorts, suppliers, and other key people 
3. A firm which does not inform employees about rules and disciplinary 
actions of fraud perpetrators 
4. A firm in which there is rapid turnover (quit or fired) of key employees 
5. A firm in which there are no annual vacations or transfers 
6. A firm which does not use adequate personnel screening policies when 
hiring new employees to fill positions of trust 
7. A firm in which there is an absence of explicit and uniform personnel 
policies 
8. A firm which does not maintain accurate personnel records of dishonest 
acts or disciplinary actions for such things as alcoholism and/or drug abuse 
9. A firm which does not require executive disclosures and examinations 
10. A firm which has a dishonest management and/or environment 
11. A firm which has a dominant top management 
12. A firm which is always operating on a crisis basis 
13. A firm which pays no attention to details 
14. A firm in which there is too much trust in key employees 
15. A firm in which there are few interpersonal relationships 
16. A firm which has unrealistic productivity measurements 
17. A firm which has poor compensation practices 
18. A firm in which there are no vested employee interests 
19. A firm which has inadequate training programs 
Company Opportunities 
1. A firm which has related party transactions 
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2. A firm which has a very complex business structure 
3. A firm which does not have an effective internal auditing staff 
4. A highly computerized firm 
5. A firm in atypical or ' 'hot" industries 
6. A firm which uses several different auditing firms or changes auditors often 
7. A firm which has a reluctance to give auditors needed data 
8. A firm which uses a large number of banks none of which can see the entire 
picture 
9. A firm with inadequate internal controls 
10. A firm which uses unduly liberal accounting practices 
11. A firm which has poor accounting records 
12. A firm which has inadequate staffing in the accounting department 
13. A firm which inadequately discloses unusual accounting practices 
Personal Characteristic Red Flags 
1. A person with low moral character (possessing deceptive or dishonest 
tendencies, for example) 
2. A person who rationalizes his contradictory behavior 
3. A person without a strong code of personal ethics 
4. A person who is a "wheeler dealer'' (someone who has a desire for power, 
influence, or social status) 
5. A person who lacks stability (employment history, etc.) 
6. A person with a strong desire to beat the system 
7. A person with a criminal or questionable background 
8. A person with poor credit rating and financial status 
The "red flag'' list provided in Exhibit C is the one developed by the authors. It 
is more comprehensive than other available lists and does have the advantage of 
having been partially validated. To illustrate how relevant these red flags have 
been to past cases of fraud, we have selected 27 of the 72 cases studied and ex-
amined their relevance to these red flags. The 27 cases are listed in Exhibit D . 
Exhibit D 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
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Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Ultramares 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
A l l the publicly available literature on these cases was reviewed to see if any 
explicit mention of these factors could be found. While the results that follow (Ex-
hibit E—at end of paper) indicate that almost all of the red flags were mentioned in 
the writings about many of the 27 cases, the absence of a case from a given red 
flag does not mean the red flag was not a factor in the case. Certainly, the authors 
who wrote about the cases had a perspective much different than ours and thus 
the mention of the variables in the publicly available literature is a very demand-
ing criterion. 
It is quite obvious that these "red flags" can be associated with many of the 
major past cases of fraud. While this association doesn't guarantee that future 
frauds will also have these relationships, it does seem that auditors should pay 
some attention to these facts. While auditors have given heed to many of the op-
portunity factors (through internal control checks) and recently even examined 
some of the firm pressures, there are many of these factors that have not been ex-
plicitly considered. 
We realize that it would be difficult to investigate many of these variables. Cer-
tainly, most auditors will and probably should be reluctant to probe managers 
about their personal gambling and sex habits. However, we would argue that the 
decision of whether or not to use these factors is a cost-benefit question. We are 
convinced that more frauds could be detected earlier if these red flags were used. 
We also recognize the costs involved in doing so. Thus, only when the perceived 
benefits exceed the perceived costs should they be used. Also, the cost of using the 
various red flags is not equal. Some have relatively low costs while the costs of 
others may be almost prohibitive. In general, we would argue that auditors should 
look at each red flag from a cost-benefit perspective. 
We also realize that even if used, the presence of one or even all of these red 
flags doesn't necessarily guarantee the existence of fraud. We would argue that as 
the number of red flags increases, the probability of fraud increases. At best, 
however, the red flags can only be viewed as a risk-evaluation tool. Also, the 
relevance and fraud predictability of the red flags haven't yet been assessed. Cer-
tainly, some are "better" than others. We are presently working on a discrimi-
nant approach that should provide insight into which "red flags" are the best 
fraud predictors. 
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Concluding Comments 
Management fraud is a major problem that concerns auditors. The auditing 
literature, standards, and court cases expect auditors to assume more responsibil-
ity for its detection. Management fraud will continue to increase because society 
reinforces those factors which contribute to fraud. Fraud perpetrators generally 
have personal characteristics that are typical to those of college students, and most 
likely, the general population. They have personal characteristics much different 
than other property offenders. There are three factors that contribute to fraud: (1) 
situational pressures, (2) opportunities, and (3) personal honesty. Because of the 
combination of more responsibility for fraud detection, increasing reinforcement 
for fraud, and the absence of a "criminal type" profile, it is critical that auditors 
become better fraud detectives. Two ways to be better detectives are: (1) to better 
screen potential new clients, and (2) to look for situational pressure, opportunity, 
and personal characteristic red flags both in organizations and in managers' and 
executives' personal lives. 
Exhibit E 
Situational Pressure Red Flags 
Personal Situational Factors 
1. High Personal Debts or Financial 
Losses 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Four Seasons 
Hochfelder 
Stirling Homex 
Vesco 
2. Inadequate Incomes 
Vesco 
3. Living Beyond One's Means 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Black Watch Farms 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
4. Extensive Stock Market 
Speculation 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
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McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Vesco 
5. Excessive Gambling 
Four Seasons 
Penn Central 
Vesco 
6. Involvement with Members of 
Opposite Sex 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Equity Funding 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
7. Undue Family, Company, or 
Community Expectations 
Ampex 
Black Watch 
CIT Financial 
Equity Funding 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Yale Express 
8. Excessive Usage of Alcohol or 
Drugs 
Equity Funding 
9. Perceived Inequities in 
Organization 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Equity Funding 
McKesson & Robbins 
Vesco 
10. Resentment of Superiors 
Vesco 
11. Frustration with Job 
None of the 27 major cases 
12. Peer Group Pressures 
Equity Funding 
Stirling Homex 
13. Greed or Desire for Self 
Enrichment or Gain 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Company Situational Pressures 
1. Unfavorable Economic Conditions 
in Industry 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Westec 
Yale Express 
2. Heavy Investments or Losses 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
3. Insufficient Working Capital 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Yale Express 
4. Dependence on Single Products, 
Customers, or Transactions 
Allied Crude Vegetable 
BarChris 
Black Watch Farms 
CIT Financial 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
McKesson & Robbins 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
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Westgate 
5. Excess Capacity 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Yale Express 
6. Severe Obsolescence 
Ampex 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Stirling Homex 
7. High Debt 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
8. Extremely Rapid Expansion 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
9. Reduced Ability to Acquire Credit 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Black Watch Farms 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Westec 
Yale Express 
10. Profit Squeeze 
Ampex 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Yale Express 
11. Difficulty Collecting Receivables 
Ampex 
BarChris 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Yale Express 
12. Unusually Heavy Competition 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
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Yale Express 
13. Restrictive Loan Agreements 
Ampex 
McKesson & Robbins 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
14. Deterioration in Quality of 
Earnings 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
CIT Financial 
Equity Funding 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Westec 
15. Significant Tax Adjustments 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Continental Vending 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
16. Urgent Need for Favorable 
Earnings 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
17. Need to Gloss Over Temporarily 
Bad Situation 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Equity Funding 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
18. Significant Litigation 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Home-Stake 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Talley Industries 
19. Unmarketable Collateral 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Republic National Life 
20. Significant Reduction in Sales 
Backlog 
BarChris 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
21. Long Business Cycle 
Ampex 
BarChris 
CIT Financial 
Stirling Homex 
22. Existence of Imperiled Licenses 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Four Seasons 
Republic National Life 
23. Suspension From Stock Exchange 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
Continental Vending 
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Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
24. Pressure to Merge 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Talley Industries 
Westec 
25. Sizable Inventory Increase 
No major cases 
Opportunity Red Flags 
Personal Opportunities 
1. Familiarity With Operations 
(Cover Up Ability) 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
2. Close Association With Cohorts 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
3. Doesn't Inform About Rules For 
Fraud 
Equity Funding 
4. Rapid Turnover of Key People 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Stirling Homex 
Vesco 
5. No Mandatory Vacations or 
Transfers 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
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Cenco 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
6. No Adequate Screening Policies 
Equity Funding 
Giant Stores 
McKesson & Robbins 
7. Absence of Explicit Personnel 
Policies 
Equity Funding 
8. Doesn't Maintain Adequate 
Personnel Records 
Equity Funding 
McKesson & Robbins 
9. No Executive Disclosure 
Requirements 
Continental Vending 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
Hochfelder 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Westec 
Westgate 
10. Unethical Management 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
11. Dominant Top Management 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Black Watch Farms 
Cenco 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
12. Operates on a Crisis Basis 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
CIT Financial 
Equity Funding 
Giant Stores 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
13. Pays No Attention to Details 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Ultramares 
14. Too Much Trust in Key 
Employees 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Continental Vending 
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Equity Funding 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Hochfelder 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
15. Low Interpersonal Relationships 
Ampex 
Equity Funding 
Penn Central 
Yale Express 
16. Unrealistic Productivity 
Measurements 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
Four Seasons 
Talley Industries 
17. Poor Compensation Practices 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Home-Stake 
18. Lack of Internal Security 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
19. Inadequate Training Programs 
Equity Funding 
Giant Stores 
Yale Express 
Company Opportunities 
1. Related Party Transactions 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
Cenco 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
2. Complex Business Structure 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
Cenco 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
3. No Effective Internal Auditors 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
Cenco 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
4. Highly Computerized Firm 
Cenco 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
5. Atypical or "Hot'' Industries 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
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Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Stirling Homex 
6. Different Auditors or Change of 
Auditors Often 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Republic National Life 
Westgate 
7. Reluctance to Give Auditors 
Needed Data 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale 
8. Large Number of Banks 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
BarChris 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Ultramares 
Westec 
9. Inadequate Internal Controls 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
Black Watch Farms 
Equity Funding 
Hochfelder 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
10. Unduly Liberal Accounting 
Practices 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Fisco 
Four Seasons 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
11. Poor Accounting Records 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
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Four Seasons 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Photon 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Ultramares 
Yale Express 
12. Inadequate Staffing in Accounting 
Department 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Cenco 
National Student Marketing 
13. Inadequate Disclosure of Unusual 
Accounting Practices 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
CIT Financial 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
Giant Stores 
Home-Stake 
National Student Marketing 
Penn Central 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Ultramares 
Westec 
Westgate 
Personal Characteristics Red Flags 
1. Low Moral Character 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
BarChris 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Hochfelder 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Stirling Homex 
Ultramares 
Vesco 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
2. Rationalizer 
Equity Funding 
Westgate 
3. No Strong Code of Personal Ethics 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Equity Funding 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
Vesco 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
4. Wheeler-Dealer 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
Ampex 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
Continental Vending 
Equity Funding 
Four Seasons 
Georgia Pacific 
HomeStake 
McKesson & Robbins 
National Student Marketing 
Republic National Life 
Stirling Homex 
Talley Industries 
Vesco 
Westec 
Westgate 
Yale Express 
5. Lacks Stability 
Equity Funding 
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7. Criminal or Questionable 
6. Strong Desire to Beat System 
McKesson & Robbins 
Background 
Allied Crude Vegetable Oil 
U.S. vs. Benjamin 
Black Watch Farms 
McKesson & Robbins 
Stirling Homex 
Continental Vending 
Home-Stake 
McKesson & Robbins 
Penn Central 
Stirling Homex 
Westgate 
8. Poor Credit Rating or Financial 
Status 
McKesson & Robbins 
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Footnotes 
1. In addition to the authors of this paper, the research team consisted of David Cherrington 
(Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior—B.Y.U), Reed Payne (Professor Psychology— 
B.Y.U.), and Allan Roe (Criminal Psychologist—Utah State Prison). 
2. A complete bibliography can be found in Albrecht et. al. [1]. 
3. A separate case bibliography is included in Albrecht et. al. [1]. 
4. This checklist is included in Romney et. al. [8]. 
5. While the definition of fraud used in this paper includes only improper action resulting in a 
material misstatement of financial statements, the original research also included a study of major 
embezzlements and defalcations. 
6. Sample sizes were 49 fraud perpetrators, 677 property offenders, and 148 college students. 
7. A full description and analysis of these factors is included in Albrecht et. al. [5]. 
8. See Romney and Albrecht [10]. 
9. In addition to ours, fraud checklists have been prepared by the AICPA, Coopers and Lybrand, 
and Touche Ross & Co. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Auditing Implications Derived from a Review 
of Cases and Articles Related to Fraud 
Henry J. Murphy 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
I appreciate this opportunity to participate in the Fifth Annual Auditing Sym-
posium sponsored by The University of Kansas. Not only is it a personal honor 
but it will also be very helpful to me as a member of the A I C P A Standing Com-
mittee on Methods of Perpetration and Detection of Fraud. 
First of all, I want to compliment the authors on their study. I personally 
believe it was a study long overdue, and I can share their frustration in trying to 
"get to the facts and issues," so to speak, because our A I C P A Task Force has 
also been frustrated in trying to obtain similar information from various govern-
mental bodies, accounting firms, etc. The authors properly commented on this 
fact by stating that "many of the agencies and prisons responded they could not 
comply with our request" (for information) and went on to state that in their 
review of the 72 past cases of fraud, they attempted to determine the fraud-related 
variables which were present in each of the cases in order to establish a "red-flag'' 
checklist which could be helpful to auditors in detecting and deterring manage-
ment fraud. They further stated that in reviewing various articles, etc., it was 
most difficult to identify these variables because "certainly the authors who wrote 
about the cases probably had a perspective much different than ours.'' 
Problems Encountered 
I think the two aforementioned problems (or limiting factors, as the case may 
be) are extremely important for all of us who are interested in the subject to 
understand and be aware of in reaching any conclusions as to where we go from 
here, whether in terms of further research, using a "red-flag" approach in our 
auditing practice, or in the teaching environment. I will come back to these prob-
lems later but, in any event, I think the authors have done a good job of compiling 
some excellent research on a very complex issue. 
The authors comment on the fact that they used 72 past cases of fraud to 
validate the fraud-related variables and go on to compare the typical fraud 
perpetrator to incarcerated prisoners and to college students. However, I could 
not determine how the 72 cases were selected, nor did I understand why the com-
parison was made to college students as a control group. Further, I wasn't sure 
what college students were included; i.e., from a single university or a cross-
section of all universities. I think it would be helpful if these points could be ex-
panded. 
120 
Objectives 
The authors state that there are four objectives to their interdisciplinary study 
and these need not be repeated here. I find the concept of an interdisciplinary 
study quite interesting from a research and teaching perspective, but become a lit-
tle concerned if this concept were contemplated by the authors to establish a 
similar team approach for conducting audits in the normal ongoing business envi-
ronment. M y reservation does not relate to the current practice of using or relying 
on other experts, which is covered under the existing auditing literature; rather, it 
deals with the authors' concept of developing "an early warning system that 
could be used by auditors in detecting and deterring fraud" which is the fourth 
objective spelled out by the authors. 
I believe that the existing literature (and court cases) now makes it clear that 
the external auditor has the responsibility to search for fraud which has a material 
impact on the financial statements presented. However, the authors' stated objec-
tive of developing a method (early warning system) which can be used by external 
auditors to deter fraud (material?/immaterial?) concerns me because I firmly 
believe that the responsibility for the deterrence of fraud rests clearly with 
management and the board of directors through the company's system of internal 
control. It is not practicable or cost efficient for the external auditors to be charged 
with this responsibility. However, an interdisciplinary approach by management 
in establishing the appropriate control environment and internal control systems, 
in the broadest sense of the word, is very helpful and is used by many companies 
in assessing hiring policies, establishing job criteria, selecting key personnel, etc. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The authors go on to state that they want to present some conclusions and im-
plications from the study and that two assumptions will be made (by the authors). 
First, they assume that the reader is familiar with auditors' responsibilities under 
existing SAS's and, second, that readers agree with their definition of manage-
ment fraud; i.e., improper actions resulting in a material misstatement of financial 
statements. 
Accordingly, the authors then state that "the remainder of the paper will be 
divided into three parts: 
1. A description or profile of the typical fraud perpetrator; 
2. A n explanation of why fraud occurs; and 
3. Steps that can be taken by auditors to reduce their exposure to 
management fraud." (See definition above.) 
In dealing with " T h e Typical Fraud Perpetrator," the authors have provided 
us with an extremely valuable insight but the problem is one which I previously 
mentioned; i.e., that they had to include embezzlers and (I believe) immaterial 
fraud perpetrators, and, accordingly, the characteristics of those who commit 
management fraud (by the authors' definition) could actually produce a different 
profile. This "identity problem" (of which ones committed management fraud 
vs. an embezzlement) could not, in my opinion, have been avoided for reasons 
upon which both the authors and I agree, and my comments are not meant as a 
criticism; rather, I mention it only to reinforce the fact that the problem does ex-
ist, and that as the accounting profession goes forward, we should do everything 
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possible to correct the situation by making available the necessary information to 
researchers on actual management fraud cases. 
Observations Concerning Cited Cases 
A t this time, I would like to go back to the point I made previously about the 
72 cases reviewed by the authors and their comments as they relate to the 
perspective of other authors on whose material they relied. The biggest surprises I 
had in reviewing the material presented (including the more extensive material to 
be published in book form which was made available to me by Dr. Albrecht) were: 
(1) there was no direct mention of the problem of collusion between employees 
against the company or between employees on behalf of the company, and (2) 
there was no reference to the accounting principles or reporting disclosures in-
volved in the "fraud" which have since been strengthened by new accounting 
pronouncements (such as profit recognition guidelines involving the sale of real 
estate) or by disclosure requirements (such as those involving related party trans-
actions). 
In other words, in many of these cases there was more than one person in-
volved but there was no mention of the interaction, of how this interaction was ad-
dressed, or how it possibly impacted the "profile" of a specific case or individual 
involved. 
Further, if the case involved a related party transaction (or a series of such 
transactions) including, say, the apparent sale of real estate and yet there were no 
definitive accounting or disclosures required under G A A P at the time, were these 
factors considered by the authors in reaching their conclusions? In other words, if 
there were no specific accounting and disclosure requirements and management 
made a choice (which may have been the wrong one, for whatever reasons), does 
this constitute management fraud, or is it poor judgment based on hindsight? If, 
for example, I were to commission a study of a particular case or series of cases and 
asked for an evaluation of the cases in light of the "state of the art", so to speak, 
as it relates to "principles" and "disclosures," what might the answer be? I can 
assure you that I don't know what it would be but I suspect that it might influence 
my conclusions. Please don't misunderstand my point. I am fully aware of the 
concept of "fairness" as to principles and disclosures (notwithstanding the state 
of the art) and if an expanded study were to address the "fairness'' issue, then that 
is perfectly acceptable to me. But let us not assume that because accusations have 
been made that it is axiomatic that there is guilt, because many of these cases were 
not tried in court; rather, they were settled via consent decrees. 
M y recollection of many of the cases reviewed by the authors was that the 
above-mentioned factors were key elements in many of these cases, and I would 
suggest that the authors' research be expanded and interrelated to the points I 
have mentioned. 
I have spent 20 years in public accounting and believe that there is no more 
difficult problem for auditors to deal with than the problem of collusion. A l l one 
has to do is consider the magnitude of "sensitive payment disclosures'' (over 400 
companies), price-fixing cases, and the purchasing agent/kickback scandal of 
earlier decades. I would think it would be of significant benefit to the profession if 
the authors could expand on this point as well as the impact of changed account-
ing principles and disclosure requirements. 
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In addition, I would like to see additional objective research on which of the 
72 cases involving management fraud (by the authors' definition) involved 
human (audit) failure; that is, if a careful review indicated that 20 of the 72 cases 
involved audit failure, would the conclusions reached by the authors have been 
the same or might they have differed? 
Deterrence of Fraud 
In reviewing the paper as it relates to "An Explanation of Fraud," I found it 
quite helpful and observed that it reinforced my earlier comment regarding who 
has the responsibility to deter fraud to note that the authors point out the social 
factors that contribute to the incidence of fraud, stating: 
Certainly it would be difficult for auditors to change many of these societal 
factors. Maybe a strong lobbying effort or high-placed connections would 
help but, generally, auditors must live with those factors. 
T h e Authors' Conclusions 
In summary, based on their research, the authors reached two conclusions. 
First, that it is imperative that auditors make fraud prevention an explicit part of 
their audit and, second, that they should take two steps to "reduce their exposure 
to fraud.'' The two steps which they suggest for auditors to take to reduce their 
exposure are to: (1) make sure they accept only "clean" clients, and (2) consider 
adopting a "red-flag'' checklist as part of their audit program. 
As to their first suggestion, I believe existing literature (SAS No. 16) clearly 
states that it is the responsibility of the auditor to plan and execute the audit in a 
manner which will uncover material irregularities or errors and, accordingly, I 
concur with the authors' conclusion if they are talking about material fraud. I 
might add that I believe it has always been an explicit part of the audit process via 
the use of audit programs, physical observations, counts, confirmations, etc. 
As to their second suggestion, I don't know of anyone who knowingly ac-
cepted a "dirty'' client, and the professional literature has been expanded to cover 
this point (SAS No. 7). However, in a more serious vein, their point is valid and 
really relates to the individual firm's quality control program and the monitoring 
thereof which lays down specific guidelines on the acceptance of new clients, in-
cluding the assignment of personnel who have the necessary industry knowledge. 
Our firm has had such criteria for many years and I'm sure that other firms have 
similar programs. 
However, their second suggestion causes me real concern for a couple of 
reasons. First, there is the implication that by coming up with a master checklist, 
it will solve the problem. I, and other members of the A I C P A Task Force, am 
constantly being asked (in substance) at various speaking engagements, "When 
are you going to give us a program or checklist which we can incorporate in our 
workpapers that will uncover fraud?" (and I might add they mean all fraud). M y 
response is that there will be no such program or checklist because there is no pro-
gram or checklist that could ever be developed to cover all situations. For exam-
ple, how would you apply a checklist to a multinational conglomerate with, say, 
25 operating subsidiaries around the world and having 200 or more operating 
plants or offices versus a local gas station under audit? The point is that the scope 
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of an audit is based on the auditor's knowledge of the risk involved, the adequacy 
of internal control, his knowledge of the industry, and his prior involvement with 
the clients in terms of results of prior years' audits. 
Furthermore, what if you couldn't get (for whatever reasons) objective 
answers to the questions involving the personal character issues concerning key 
management personnel? How many unanswered questions do you need before 
you must have a scope exception in your opinion or cite them in a "no material 
inadequacies" letter to regulatory authorities? Or, conversely, let's take a situa-
tion where a check on one of the key employees uncovers the fact that he is lack-
ing in certain moral standards (of your choice). The auditor has no power to hire 
or fire. (As an aside, let me assure you that, in practice, when a serious problem 
does exist, we have a way of communicating this information to the appropriate 
level of management in the company and have been doing this for years.) Further-
more, the implications of an auditor collecting personal information on manage-
ment have serious legal considerations which would need to be examined carefully 
and which could create serious auditor/client relationship problems that could 
have a direct bearing on completion of the audit and, accordingly, the cost thereof. 
T h e Red-Flag Checklist 
In summary, the incorporation of a standard "red-flag'' checklist in the stand-
ard audit process, in my opinion, has a number of serious limitations which have 
to be reviewed carefully as to their long-term implications before any such 
checklist is adopted as a "standard'' audit procedure. 
Does this mean that the proposed checklist is without merit? No, it does not. 
Rather, I think it should be directed at the training effort of the individual firms 
and made part of either basic or advanced accounting curriculum at the university 
level. I think back to my early days with Arthur Andersen 6k Co. and the content 
of our training, both in a formal classroom sense and the informal "on-the-job" 
training. This training covered not only general audit principles but also included 
a great deal of emphasis on specific industries (i.e., banking, brokerage, real estate, 
etc.). The training was aimed at dealing with "risk'', not only "risk' ' as it relates 
to general audit problems but also in "people" auditing. The problem of "high-
flying" management, "personal situation pressures", and other pressures men-
tioned by the authors is something that I believe is currently being discussed but 
the importance of which needs to be reconfirmed constantly not only via increased 
training but also through additional research in the entire area of fraud and fraud 
detection and deterrence. 
In fact, the idea of a "red-flag" checklist was so attractive as a training tool 
that, as you are aware, the A I C P A Task Force, on which I serve, published such a 
list in 1979 because we believed it would be helpful to the accounting profession 
in the context discussed in the previous paragraph, so I am totally in support of the 
authors' approach. 
Another concept I would like to see addressed is the concept of "greed." 
Webster's definition follows: 
Excessive desire for getting or having, especially wealth; desire for more 
than one needs or deserves; avarice; cupidity. 
I believe that this concept should be incorporated into a research study dealing 
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with the many issues raised by the authors. "Greed'' is a dirty word, so to speak, 
but it also seems that it is an attribute applicable to a segment of our population. 
The authors' concept of what constitutes "management fraud" could be a very 
interesting study. Consider the possibilities. Let's assume M r . or Ms. X is highly 
motivated and ambitious and that he/she is in a position of power. Further, 
assume that our business person comes from an overachieving background, has 
access to competent professional advice of all kinds and wants to "get ahead" as 
fast as possible. Further, assume that this person is very persuasive with a positive 
outlook as to the outcome of current developments, contracts, the economy, etc. 
This description of an individual and the situation is quite common in our free 
enterprise system and rightfully so. The manager is trying to put his/her best foot 
forward but, if there is a certain change in circumstances, he/she could be accused 
of being "greedy" or committing "management fraud" because the decision 
path he/she followed was aggressive, positive, and to his/her best interest because 
of compensation agreements; or, on the other hand, was he/she just being an ag-
gressive manager? Conversely, another individual will sometimes construct the 
worst possible scenario in the worst possible situation and try to convert it into a 
"positive growth" situation. This to me creates the real difference as to what is 
reasonable versus what is unrealistic. This is what the auditor has to learn to con-
tend with and dissect and where he must use judgment and experience to reach 
his conclusions. 
Other Comments 
There are two other points which I feel should be made. The first deals with 
the number of audits which are done each year and the incidence of management 
fraud therein. The second is the composition of the audit team. 
I do not know how many audit reports are issued each year but the number 
has to be in the hundreds of thousands, and while even one case of management 
fraud would be a sad commentary, I think we have to accept the fact that there are 
people who, for the reasons suggested by the authors, will commit fraud (of all 
types). But it seems to me that the incidence of management fraud is relatively 
small and, in fact, could be infinitesimally small in relation to the number of audits 
involved. Obviously, the problem of irregularities, embezzlements, etc., is a much 
larger problem from the standpoint of incidence and must not be ignored. Ac-
cordingly, as the teaching profession and we in public practice constantly em-
phasize the importance of the adequacy of internal controls, I pray that we not 
develop a generation of professionals who conceive that "everyone is a crook until 
proven otherwise." Rather, we must develop a generation who will maintain an 
attitude of "professional skepticism." We must remember that the majority of 
clients we represent (both in the public and private sector) are seeking the same 
goals we are and operate totally within the existing legal and moral framework 
throughout their business careers. 
M y final point. In general, each audit team is made up of people at various ex-
perience levels, starting with the partner who has the most experience. Most audit 
partners whom I have talked to (and not just from my own firm) have the healthy 
skepticism I referred to. They may call it " a gut feeling" based on their experi-
ence and industry expertise, but the fact is that they maintain an alertness to the 
"red flags'' identified by the authors and they do not hesitate to expand the audit 
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scope as the situation requires. This, I recognize, is a very subjective area but 1 
think we must acknowledge that auditing is a combination of art and sciences. 
While there may be cases of human audit failure, I think it would be misleading to 
assume that management fraud hasn't been detected and stopped in its infancy on 
many occasions. The problem is that the "success stories" never make the 
newspapers or the courts, while the "bad news'' makes the headlines. 
To illustrate this point, I would like to relate a true story involving an audit I 
was involved in as a young staffman in the early '60s. As you will recall, there 
were at that time very few authoritative pronouncements on accounting principles 
and fewer on disclosure. In fact, it was considered unique if there were footnotes to 
the financials. In any event, the problem we faced was disclosure to owners and 
creditors of a number of significant changes in this situation which had occurred 
in the company during the year. The changes included (among other things) a 
change in top management, a change in marketing strategy and financing of 
customers, a change in production arrangements for their only product line which 
resulted in decreasing profit margins on production, a change in banking relation-
ships, a turnover of key personnel, a change of law firms, and a proposed change of 
manufacturing locations. In substance, the company had radically changed 
although they were still selling the same product, in the same market, with the 
same labor force, and in the same economy. 
It was our opinion that the facts had to be clearly spelled out in the proxy state-
ment, as well as in footnotes to the financial statements, including the fact that 
there were related party transactions involving the new management who had in-
troduced other related party transactions which, I might add, made some business 
sense. A l l of these changes resulted in a series of meetings which culminated in a 
heated discussion over the phone between a partner from our firm (who is long 
since retired) and counsel for the company. I was fortunate to be included in the 
discussion via a conference call as an observer, so to speak. After much bickering, 
I recall, as if it were yesterday, the partner asking counsel if they were aware of the 
implications of Rule 10 b.5 of the SEC and that he didn't care if there wasn't a 
specific requirement to disclose certain transactions or accounting practices; 
rather, he was interested in a fair presentation and fair disclosure. As a result, the 
accounting policies which we felt necessary were disclosed. 
You may ask what is the point of this story. M y response is that an auditor 
can't rely on a checklist approach because circumstances differ; rather, he must 
also exercise judgment which is a far more critical attribute in any audit. 
An Educational Plea 
I would also like to make a plea to the colleges and universities who are offer-
ing degrees in accounting. I recommend that material such as that developed by 
the authors, as well as other recently-published material, such as Management 
Fraud by Robert Elliott and John Willingham, be incorporated into existing or 
newly-created auditing courses. I believe the public accounting profession has 
become much more cognizant of the problem of management fraud and has made 
internal changes in various degrees to deal with the problem. Hopefully, your pro-
fession can say the same and lead all of us in doing the necessary research to help 
solve the problem. 
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7 
Unique Audit Problems of Small Businesses 
that Operate under Managerial Dominance 
Dan M. Guy* 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Many practitioners with small business clients believe that pronouncements of 
the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) are not responsive to their needs. Typically, 
the criticisms pertain to implementation problems stemming from existing 
statements on auditing standards. Commentators usually are not advocating that 
the profession should have two sets of generally accepted auditing standards 
(GAAS)—one set for public companies and another set for nonpublic companies. 
Rather, they ask questions like, how do you apply the guidance in SAS No. 12, 
Inquiry of a Client's Lawyer Concerning Litigation, Claims, and Assessments, if 
your client does not retain an attorney? 
The purpose of this paper is to: 
• Identify the characteristics of small businesses that generate unique 
audit problems. 
• Briefly describe how the ASB is responding to the problem. 
• Review existing A I C P A and international guidance that addresses 
unique audit problems of small businesses. 
• Review guidance contained in other published literature. 
• Identify some of the implementation problems and possible solutions. 
Characteristics of Small Business 
The term "small business'' as used in this paper is best described as an entity 
with some or all of the following characteristics: 
1. Concentration of ownership or operational control in the hands of one 
or a few individuals. 
2. Management personnel that have limited accounting experience and 
capability combined with an attitude that is not conducive to hiring 
employees having accounting expertise. 
3. Internal accounting control weaknesses resulting from: 
• limited segregation of functions within the accounting system 
because of the small number of employees. 
*The author wishes to express appreciation to Ellen C. Downey, Manager, and Martin J. Rosenblatt, 
Practice Fellow, Auditing Standards Division, AICPA, for their contributions to this paper. The 
views expressed by the author are personal and do not represent the views of the AICPA or any of its 
committees. 
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• easy access of clerical and administrative personnel to physical 
assets. 
• informally designed procedures (planning, budgeting, accounting, 
reporting) dependent upon managerial style. 
• high potential for management override. 
4. No independent policy-making board. 
These characteristics encompass both public and private businesses. Of particular 
interest is the characteristic of weaknesses in internal accounting control. Even in 
a small business having some of the above characteristics there may be selected 
areas where an auditor can place reliance on internal control. For example, con-
trols over disbursement and receipt of cash and physical inventory counts may be 
of sufficient quality to enable audit reliance to be placed thereon. Also, as dis-
cussed later, there are practitioners who believe that if management of the small 
business exercises proper "executive" control, other areas of internal control 
may be relied upon to limit substantive testing. 
Problem Background 
The Cohen Commission publicly stated that the Auditing Standards Ex-
ecutive Committee (predecessor to the ASB) pronouncements were not respon-
sive to small business clientele. The Commission said:1 
. . . variations in the size and nature of an entity will dictate variations in 
specific audit practices and procedures, as contrasted to auditing standards 
[emphasis added]. Present guidance on the application of auditing stand-
ards to audits of different size entities is inadequate. More attention should 
be accorded to the possible effect of variations in audit clients on the nature 
and extent of audit procedures; additional guidance specifically applicable 
to audits of smaller entities should be given. 
The commission considered the proposition that there are significant differences 
between audits of public and nonpublic entities and concluded that criticism of 
authoritative auditing pronouncements for a failure to differentiate standards 
based on whether the client is public or nonpublic is misdirected. According to 
the commission, the problem relates to small entities, whether public or private. 
In response to the Cohen Commission, the Review of Existing Auditing 
Standards Task Force was formed by the ASB in 1978. The task force was 
charged: 
To review existing auditing standards (a) to determine whether they are 
responsive to the needs of auditors of smaller companies, whether changes 
are needed because of changed conditions, and whether there are inconsis-
tencies in existing literature; and (b) to develop necessary guidance as a 
result of such review or to recommend how and by whom such guidance 
should be developed. 
In May 1978, the AICPA's Council adopted the recommendations of the 
Oliphant Committee on the structure of Aud SEC. 2 The committee stated that the 
ASB should provide " . . . auditors with all possible guidance in the implementa-
tion of its pronouncements, by means of interpretation of its statements, by is-
suance of guidelines, and by any other means available to i t . " 3 The Oliphant 
Committee also recommended that auditing standards and procedures should 
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" . . . make special provisions, where appropriate, to meet the needs of small 
enterprise."4 Consistent with this directive, the ASB, starting with the exposure 
of SAS No. 26, Association with Financial Statements, in May 1979, began to 
specifically request comment on the special needs of small business via the 
transmittal letter accompanying exposure drafts. 
The Review of Existing Auditing Standards Task Force devoted its initial ef-
forts to identifying inconsistencies in existing literature, which resulted in 
numerous editorial revisions, and to drafting a proposed SAS on "Adequacy of 
Disclosure in Financial Statements."5 Then, at its first meeting in 1980, the task 
force agreed, based on its study of the literature, that existing auditing standards 
are relevant for businesses of all sizes. However, the task force also agreed that 
there is a need for more explicit guidance for auditors on the appropriate imple-
mentation of standards in the audit of small businesses. The form of guidance 
(SAS, audit guide, etc.) has yet to be decided by the task force. 
A I C P A Guidance 
Four publications of the A I C P A present limited guidance on the unique ap-
plication of auditing standards in the small business audit. Two of these are 
statements on auditing standards and thus are authoritative; two are 
nonauthoritative technical practice aids (not governed by rule 202 of the In-
stitute's Code of Ethics). 
SAS No. 1, Section 320.35, which presents a conceptually logical approach to 
internal accounting control evaluation, contains the following: 
Reasonable assurance that the objectives of accounting control are 
achieved depends on the competence and integrity of personnel, the inde-
pendence of their assigned functions and their understanding of the 
prescribed procedures. Although these factors are important, their contri-
bution is to provide an environment conducive to accounting control 
rather than to provide assurance that it necessarily will be achieved. Ac-
counting control procedures may be performed by personnel in any appro-
priate organizational position. In smaller organizations, such procedures 
may be performed by the owner-manager. In these circumstances, how-
ever, some of the limitations discussed in paragraph 34 may be particu-
larly applicable. 
The reference back to paragraph 34, discussing inherent limitations, cautions the 
auditor that procedures designed to assure the execution and recording of transac-
tions in accordance with management's authorization may be ineffective against 
either errors or irregularities perpetrated by management. 
Paragraphs 34 and 35 considered together leave the auditor in a quandry. 
Paragraph 35 appears to implicitly permit reliance on owner/manager internal 
controls in a small business. However, paragraph 34 warns auditors about 
management override of controls. 
SAS No. 20, Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in Internal 
Accounting Control, issued in August 1977, specifically addresses material 
weaknesses in internal accounting control for which management believes correc-
tive action is not practicable. In these situations, the auditor, according to 
paragraph 9 of SAS No. 20, may summarize the weaknesses and describe the cir-
cumstances (e.g., inadequate control over cash transactions because of inadequate 
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segregation of duties due to limited personnel). The summary of material 
weaknesses may be presented in writing or communicated orally and is to be com-
municated to senior management and the board of directors. 
Interestingly, three members of the board assented with qualification and 
three members dissented (out of 20 total members) to SAS No. 20. Each dissenter 
included in his objections a statement expressing concern about the application of 
SAS No. 20 to smaller or closely held businesses. 
Turning next to nonauthoritative A I C P A guidance, section 8200 of 
Technical Practice Aids includes an inquiry on the study and evaluation of inter-
nal control. 
Inquiry—Several small audit clients have weak internal controls. If the 
auditor elects to not rely on the client's internal control, may he omit his 
study and evaluation of the internal control system? . . . 
Reply—An auditor may not omit his study and evaluation of the client's 
internal control. The auditor may not have to conduct tests of compliance 
if he is not relying on the internal control, but the auditor must still study 
and evaluate the client's system of internal control as required by the sec-
ond standard of field work. . . . 
Implicit in the above commentary is the need for a practitioner to include in his 
audit work papers a conclusion with respect to the study and evaluation of internal 
control even if he does not rely on internal control. Such a conclusion might 
state:6 
On 12/2/X1, I updated our memoranda concerning the company's ac-
counting and internal control systems, there was no significant change in 
these systems during the eleven months ended 11/30/X1. 
It is my opinion that the company's controls over the various accounting 
systems are such that: 
1. They cannot be relied upon due to a lack of segregation of duties, 
2. Various controls are not susceptible to testing, or 
3. It would not be cost/effective for us to test the controls. 
Therefore, it is my opinion that our work should consist entirely of 
substantive procedures. 
The above illustrative conclusion that the auditor would not restrict his audit pro-
cedures without performing compliance testing conforms with authoritative 
literature and also satisfies the requirement of SAS No. 1, Section 338.05 
("Working Papers"). 
Another nonauthoritative A I C P A publication is the recently published Audit 
and Accounting Manual.7 The manual is intended to be responsive to local practi-
tioner needs; therefore, one might assume that audit problems of small businesses 
would be extensively addressed. However, only two sections of the manual ad-
dress unique small business audit problems. A n illustrative internal control ques-
tionnaire ( A A M 4300) and a flowchart illustration ( A A M 4500) depict a small 
business. 
The Audit and Accounting Manual questionnaire presents a list of questions 
an auditor might raise concerning a small manufacturing operation owned by one 
person who also serves as the general manager and has only a few employees in-
volved in the accounting function. The questionnaire stresses the need for 
owner/manager ("executive'') controls. For example: 
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• Does the owner use operating budgets and cash projections? 
• Are journal entries understood and authorized by the owner? 
• Is the owner satisfied that all employees are competent and honest? 
• Are write-offs and other adjustments to customers' accounts authorized 
by the owner? 
• Does the owner verify that the trial balance of accounts payable agrees 
with the general ledger control account? 
• Are vendors' statements checked by the owner periodically for overdue 
items? 
• Are all checks signed by the owner? 
The section on flowcharting in the Audit and Accounting Manual illustrates 
the purchases, receipt of stock, and cash disbursements for purchases, of the 
Kilroy Wholesale Grocery. John Kilroy, according to the scenario, owns and 
operates the business with two employees. One employee serves as both the stock 
clerk and truck driver. The other employee is the bookkeeper. 
Absent guidance provided by the Audit and Accounting Manual, and 
especially considering the questionable usefulness of internal control flowcharts in 
the small business environment, one has to conclude that authoritative auditing 
literature and nonauthoritative practice aids promulgated by the A I C P A do not 
extensively address unique problems encountered in the small business audit. 
International Guidance 
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (English Institute), and the 
Auditing Practices Committee of the Consultative Committee of Accountancy 
Bodies (APC) 8 have published documents pertaining to small business audits. As 
discussed below, the CICA study refers to a negative assurance audit report which 
has not become an acceptable reporting practice. The English Institute pro-
nouncements also deal with audit reporting. The A P C discussion paper sets out 
arguments for and against audit requirements for certain small companies. 
Canadian Institute 
In 1967 the CICA published an audit technique study entitled Internal Con-
trol in the Small Business. The study dealt with the audit problem of reporting on 
a small business having limited internal control. The study group suggested the 
use of a negative assurance report in situations where the auditors have done an 
audit and have found nothing materially misstated, but the internal control is 
dominated by the owner/manager of the small business. The suggestions made in 
the study have not been accepted. 
According to the study group, the first paragraph of the negative assurance 
report would contain wording similar to that contained in the scope paragraph of 
the standard auditor's report in order to indicate that the auditor has done all that 
in his professional opinion could be done. However, the scope paragraph would 
end with an exception which sets out the reason why an expression of opinion is 
not possible; for example, " . . . except that, in common with many businesses of a 
similar size and organization, internal check on management is limited and there 
were no practicable audit procedures to determine the effect of this limitation.'' 
The second paragraph of the report would state that because of the limitation 
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referred to in the preceding paragraph, the auditor is not in a position to express 
an opinion on the financial statements. It would then go on to set out the negative 
assurance, that is, to the effect that nothing had come to the auditor's attention 
during the examination which would indicate that the financials do not present 
fairly. 
Although the study has been available since 1967, it was not, as mentioned, 
accepted in practice or included in the CICA Handbook. In fact, the study has 
been withdrawn. According to a January 1979 research proposal, the CICA has 
initiated a new audit technique study on internal control in the small business. In 
1977 the CICA also published a CPE course, "Audit Problems of Manager 
Dominance.'' 
English Institute 
In 1972, the English Institute published a statement for guidance entitled 
Audit Problems of the Smaller Company. The statement indicates that the duties 
and responsibilities of a small company auditor are the same as in a large company 
audit. The small company audit engagement requires the skillful adaptation and 
application of auditing procedures to the individual small client situation. 
Problems arise in the application of auditing procedures to a company employ-
ing a small number of administrative staff and controlled and managed by a single 
proprietor (or a small number of managers). According to the English Institute, 
these problems mainly derive from: 
1. Substantial domination of the accounting and financial management 
functions by one person, and 
2. Limitations in the effectiveness of the system of internal accounting 
control made inevitable by the small number of employees. 
The statement concludes that in the audits of many smaller companies it becomes 
necessary, despite an extension of audit procedures, to rely to a more significant 
extent than with larger companies on the representations of management. In such 
circumstances, the auditor is justified in rendering an unqualified opinion if the 
evidence available and auditor's knowledge of the company are consistent with 
and supported by the representations of management. In other words, the 
auditor's use of representations of management will not of itself require a qualified 
opinion provided such representations are compared critically against all other 
available evidence. 
The English Institute has expanded its position from Audit Problems of the 
Smaller Company as evidenced by publication (April 1, 1980) of Auditing Stand-
ards and Guidelines. The new United Kingdom standards present small business 
reports for a disclaimer (inability to substantiate cash transactions) and a qualified 
audit report (heavy reliance on management assurance). 
Audit ing Practices Committee 
The relevancy of audits for small companies in the United Kingdom, over re-
cent years, has been a hot topic for debate within the accounting profession. The 
United Kingdom has over 700,000 registered companies, the vast majority of 
them private companies, but all with the same audit obligation. That is, many 
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private companies have to be audited solely because they are registered under the 
Companies Act. 
In response to a European Economic Community directive, which would 
allow legislation to be drafted exempting certain small private companies from a 
statutory audit, the A P C in 1979 published a discussion paper, Small 
Companies—the Need for Audit? The Companies Act at present does not dif-
ferentiate in any way between the audit requirements of large and small com-
panies, of public and private companies, nor of limited and unlimited companies. 
One of the primary alternatives being considered in Small Companies—the Need 
for Audit? is a statutory review of financial statements instead of a mandated 
audit. The review, as presented in the discussion paper, is equivalent in many 
respects to the review of nonpublic unaudited financial statements in the United 
States as delineated in Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review Serv-
ices No. 1, Compilation and Review of Financial Statements. 
Other Published Literature 
Unique audit problems of small businesses have been addressed in published 
journal articles and occasionally in auditing textbooks and reference books (e.g., 
Montgomery's Auditing,9 Anderson's, External Audit10). Appendix A presents a 
selected bibliography of journal articles. 
The thesis of an article by Grollman and Colby is that many of the limitations 
of a system of internal control for the small business can be offset by 
owner/manager controls and that the auditor should be able to place greater 
reliance on the system of accounting controls if these controls are strong and well 
placed.11 According to Grollman and Colby, owner/manager controls are most ef-
fective when the executive:12 
Effectively uses accounting information in both budgeting/planning and 
day-to-day managing of the business. 
Seeks explanations for discrepancies between the accounting information 
with which he is provided and his expectations based on his knowl-
edge of the business. 
Is aware of the potential meaning of unusual items, customers' com-
plaints, etc., which come to his attention. 
Enlists non-accounting employees (e.g., receptionists, secretaries) to per-
form certain accounting control functions on a part-time basis where 
the segregation of duties is important. 
Required prior authorization of certain transactions or payments. 
The article, however, points out the problem of a concentration of power and 
notes that the auditor should be concerned about relying too strongly on 
owner/manager controls in a small business. Consequently, the auditor should 
recognize the need for applying other audit procedures to compensate for the 
dominance of the executive. 
Stelzer,13 in agreement with Grollman and Colby, advocates reliance on 
owner/manager internal controls. According to him, the scope of the examination 
should be broadened to cover not only the accounting functions but also ad-
ministrative functions (i.e., budgets, cash projections, standard cost estimates, 
periodic operating reports and quality control).14 Both articles also say that 
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auditors of small business need a special internal control questionnaire with ques-
tions emphasizing owner/manager controls. 
Cottle,15 in addressing special problems in auditing a small client, explains 
what additional audit procedures are used to compensate for internal control defi-
ciencies common to small organizations. He does not advocate reliance on 
owner/manager internal controls. However, he does believe that the basic audit 
procedures applied in a small business audit are the same regardless of client size. 
He stresses the need to increase the extent of testing in the small business audit. 
Some of his examples, however, suggest that the nature of testing should also be 
altered (e.g., compare details of deposit slips, remittance advice and accounts 
receivable postings; confirm accounts payable). 
Some of the published journal articles identify differences inherent in the 
auditor-client relationship when auditing a small company. For example, the rela-
tionship between the C P A firm and the client is more intimate, less formal and 
sometimes characterized by more frequent client contact; the auditor's report is 
frequently the initial source of hard information on which management bases its 
decisions and planning; and the auditor frequently is not only examining, but has 
often prepared from the trial balance, the financial statements on which he is ex-
pressing an opinion. 
Audit problems of smaller businesses are not extensively discussed in auditing 
textbooks or reference books. When the subject is discussed, the presentation 
rarely exceeds two pages. One exception to this is Anderson's External Audit 
which contains an entire chapter devoted to small partnerships and proprietor-
ships. Salient points made in textbook/reference sources are presented below: 
Alvin A . Arens and James K. Loebbecke, Auditing: An Integrated Ap-
proach, Prentice-Hall, 1976, pp. 178-179. 
Due to the frequent lack of sufficient segregation of duties and other 
important controls, the auditor must recognize that usually less 
reliance can be placed on controls in a small company. This generally 
results in more extensive direct tests of dollar balances and less em-
phasis on tests of the effectiveness of the system. Even though the lack 
of controls may dictate more testing for small companies than for large 
ones, certain other considerations often reduce the amount of testing 
needed. First, the auditor is likely to have a better understanding of the 
business and the individuals operating the business for a smaller client. 
Second, the overall level of assurance needed in the audit is usually less 
for a smaller client because non-involvement with the SEC and other 
variables significantly reduce the auditor's risk. Smaller population 
sizes also frequently reduce the testing needed. 
Philip L. Defliese, Kenneth P. Johnson, and Roderick K . Macleod, Mont-
gomery's Auditing, 9th edition The Ronald Press Company, 1975, pp. 
132-133. 
Small companies and some that have not been previously audited often 
have rudimentary controls. Auditors of those companies must con-
sider whether there is need for functional tests if they already know 
that controls are weak or nonexistent. 
. . . A t a minimum there must be accounts to audit. The underlying 
system has to be understood and the understanding confirmed. Thus, 
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a transaction review, at least, is called for in every company being 
audited. . . . 
Functional tests may or may not be needed, depending on the results 
of the transaction review. Even in a one bookkeeper operation, the ac-
counting system can be well organized, the attitudes toward order, 
discipline, and accuracy exemplary, and the competence of the book-
keeper outstanding. If so, functional tests may provide evidence that 
those conditions are present, and the auditor may be able to complete 
his examination with little extension of tests. Because internal check is 
lacking, particularly the discipline of segregation of duties, he is likely 
to decide to perform validation tests at year end instead of at an interim 
date. But he may not need more extensive validation procedures if the 
functional tests reveal no significant exceptions or problems. He may 
decide to rely more than otherwise on comparison and analyses of the 
interrelationships among accounts to identify misclassifications or 
unusual conditions—again because inability to segregate duties makes 
control over that type of error difficult. But, under the favorable condi-
tions cited, extensive verification of transactions or similar vouching is 
not required. 
Unique Implementation Problems 
Based on published materials and letters received from practitioners and state 
societies of CPAs, six implementation problems associated with existing SASs are 
discussed in this section. Although not pertaining to an existing SAS, a small 
business audit practice problem relating to engagement letters is also discussed. 
For some of the unique implementation problems presented, possible solutions are 
also discussed. 
Owner/Manager Internal Controls 
One of the most pervasive implementation problems in the small business 
audit area is the question: Can the independent auditor rely on owner/manager in-
ternal accounting controls to establish a basis for restricting audit procedures? In 
spite of suggestions in current literature suggesting otherwise, it is risky to rely on 
owner/manager controls to limit substantive testing. Where there are controls by 
management but not on management, the auditor should design audit procedures 
with this in mind and absent other factors, little reliance should be placed on inter-
nal control. Of course, the auditor may use a small business internal control ques-
tionnaire to enhance understanding of the accounting system so that an ap-
propriate substantive-oriented audit program can be designed. The questionnaire 
also is useful as a client service, e.g., to identify owner/manager controls that can 
help to reduce the risk of employee errors and irregularities. 
Special Audit Procedures 
Although SASs typically do not discuss detailed audit procedures, practi-
tioners auditing small businesses need and want guidance on special audit 
procedures—with "special audit procedures" defined as substantive procedures 
that are applied to offset internal accounting control weaknesses resulting from 
limited segregation of duties. Examples of these procedures are: proof of cash, ac-
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counts payable confirmations, and observation of property, plant and equipment. 
Comparisons of substantive audit programs with compliance/substantive audit 
programs should be helpful in identifying relevant special audit procedures. 
Letters to Management 
According to SAS No. 20, if the auditor is aware of a material weakness, it 
should be communicated to management, whether or not corrective action is 
practicable. Although SAS No. 20 does not require a written report (letter to 
management), many practitioners have firm policies that mandate written reports. 
Practitioners performing small business audits sometimes have difficulty in 
writing a letter to management (senior management and the board of directors) 
that is responsive to SAS No. 20. As previously discussed, SAS No. 20 specifi-
cally states that internal accounting control weaknesses for which management 
believes corrective action is not practicable may be presented in summarized form. 
However, SAS No. 20 does not discuss or illustrate how to present material 
weaknesses in summary form. 
Concerns about the application of SAS No. 20 to small businesses may be 
alleviated by publishing guidance illustrating letters to management used in small 
business audits. Appendix B presents one such example. 
Engagement Letters 
As Benis has noted, engagement letters are not required by G A A S . 1 6 
However, they are widely used today because of the auditor's increased awareness 
of litigation problems. 
Engagement letters are especially helpful in small business audits in explaining 
to the client that management has primary responsibility for the financial 
statements. Often the client believes that the auditor has primary responsibility 
because the auditor prepares the financial statements and drafts the related notes. 
In an attempt to clarify the auditor/client responsibility, a small business engage-
ment letter might include the following paragraph:17 
Although we may prepare or help prepare the financial statements of 
X Y Z Corporation, these financial statements are solely the representa-
tions of management. Although we may advise as to which accounting 
principles should be applied to financial statements and the method of ap-
plication, the selection and method of application is a determination made 
solely by management. 
The AICPA's Sample Engagement Letters for an Accounting Practice (1978) 
does not present engagement letters that include materials explaining client 
responsibility for financial statements. 
Lawyers' Letters 
SAS No. 12 assumes that the audit client has retained an outside attorney to 
advise on litigation, claims, and assessments. No guidance is provided in SAS No. 
12 to cover a situation encountered in a small business audit where an attorney 
has not been consulted. Logic would suggest that the client representation letter 
be modified to obtain written assurance that the client has not consulted an at-
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torney and there are no pending litigation or unasserted claims. In some cases, 
other corroborating information simply may not be available. 
Another problem practitioners have pertains to the illustrative audit inquiry 
letter to legal counsel presented in the appendix to SAS No. 12. The illustrative 
letter presumes the client will be able to detail each pending or threatened litiga-
tion as to: (1) the nature of the litigation, (2) the progress of the case, (3) how 
management is responding, and (4) an evaluation of the likelihood of an un-
favorable outcome and an estimate of the amount or range of potential loss. 
Similar details are also expected for unasserted claims that are probable of asser-
tion and have at least a reasonable possibility of an unfavorable outcome. 
A n alternative to the SAS No. 12 appended letter, which is sometimes pre-
ferred in small business audits, is a "short-form'' lawyer's letter that requests the 
responding attorney to provide the aforementioned details for asserted claims. A n 
example of a short-form lawyer's letter is presented in Appendix C of this paper. 
Client Representation Letters 
Some practitioners are critical of the illustrative representation letter presented 
in the appendix to SAS No. 19, Client Representations. The letter covers only the 
ordinary representations that are generally appropriate for a manufacturing client. 
The appendix to SAS No. 19 clearly states that the illustrative letter is only one 
example and thus should be adapted to client circumstances.18 
When the SAS No. 19 illustrative letter is considered from a small business 
audit perspective, two immediate problems surface. First, although the letter is 
not extremely technical, it does include several terms that may not be familiar to a 
small business client. Second, the letter probably should be tailored to fit the 
special circumstances of the small business client. 
Terms included in the SAS No. 19 letter that perhaps might be defined for the 
client include the following: irregularities, unasserted claims, and related party 
transactions. Since these terms have specific meaning in accounting and auditing, 
it may be beneficial to present definitions within the client representation letter. 
Other modifications may be beneficial to the small business client. For exam-
ple, it may be desirable to have management acknowledge the auditor's recom-
mended adjusting journal entries and indicate whether they have been posted to 
the accounts. Likewise, if internal accounting control weaknesses are orally 
reported to management, it may be desirable to ask management to acknowledge 
this communication. Representations as to the proper segregation of business and 
personal items and as to capital account transactions may also be needed, espe-
cially if the small business entity is a partnership, sole proprietorship, or other 
unincorporated business. 
Audit Reports 
A problem peculiar to reporting on a small unincorporated business arises 
when the owner has other business interests in addition to the entity being 
audited. In these situations, the audit report should clearly identify the business 
entity that is being examined. Consideration might be given to recommending 
that the scope paragraph be modified and a middle explanatory paragraph might be 
added to clearly identify the business examined. The middle paragraph might ap-
pear as follows: 
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As indicated in Note X to the financial statements, the financial 
statements referred to above do not include William J. Clip's personal 
assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses which are not included in the ac-
counting records of X Y Z Proprietorship. 
Conclusion 
Enough evidence exists to support the assertion that existing SASs are 
generating implementation problems in the audits of small businesses. The most 
significant problem pertains to the application of SAS No. 1, Section 320. Prac-
tice today appears to condone some reliance on owner/manager internal controls 
without giving adequate consideration to the risk of management override. Audit 
attempts to rely on owner/manager controls may result in either overauditing or 
underauditing, depending on the audit approach used in a given C P A firm. 
Additional guidance in auditing small businesses should be developed in the 
areas of special audit procedures, letters to management, engagement letters, 
lawyers' letters, client representations, and audit reports. Other areas, not dis-
cussed herein, also appear to represent areas where guidance may be needed. 
Some of these are: related party transactions, statistical sampling and EDP 
auditing. 
The Review of Existing Auditing Standards Task Force is currently working 
on identifying implementation problems associated with existing SASs. The Task 
Force has also arranged for a doctoral student to provide additional research input 
to help identify other unique audit problems, measure the impact of the unique 
problems on audit efficiency, and suggest solutions to the problems. 
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Appendix B 
Illustrative SAS No. 20 Letter for a Small Business 
To X Y Z Company 
As part of our examination of your financial statements for the year ended December 31, 19X1, as 
described in our engagement letter dated October 1, 19X1, we studied the Company's system of in-
ternal accounting control to the extent we considered necessary to evaluate the system as required by 
generally accepted auditing standards. 
Such a study and evaluation does not necessarily cover all aspects of internal accounting control and 
might not detect all weaknesses in the system. However, it disclosed certain conditions that we 
believe to be material weaknesses. A material weakness is a condition in which the internal control 
procedures, or the degree of compliance with them, do not reduce to a relatively low level the risk 
that material amounts of errors or irregularities may occur and not be detected within a timely period 
by your employees in the normal course of performing their assigned functions. 
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[Example of a Material Weakness:] 
The bookkeeper is assigned the responsibility of recording all disbursements. However, he/she could 
intentionally omit the recording of checks. Since he/she also reconciles the bank account a failure to 
record checks could be concealed through an improper reconciliation. 
This weakness could be corrected by having the bank reconciliations prepared by a person who has 
no other cash duties. 
We have discussed the above conditions with Mr. John Jones, who has indicated that due to the 
limited number of personnel, an adequate segregation of duties is not achievable and that the costs of 
correcting the weakness would exceed the benefits that would be derived. 
This letter should not be distributed outside the Company 
[CPA firm, signature and date] 
Appendix C 
Short Form Lawyer's Letter 
To Outside Attorney for X Y Z Company 
Foot, Tick, & Tie, CPAs, 100 East Broad Street, Lubbock, Texas 43215, are making their usual ex-
amination of our financial statements (and the financial statements of our subsidiaries; see attached 
list). Please furnish to our auditors the information requested below involving matters as to which 
you have been engaged and to which you have devoted substantive attention on behalf of the Com-
pany and/or any of its subsidiaries in the form of legal consultation or representation. Your response 
should include matters that existed at December 31, 19X1, and for the period from that date to the 
date of your response. 
Pending or Threatened Litigation (excluding Unasserted Claims and Assessments) 
Please prepare a description of all material litigation, claims and assessments (excluding unasserted 
claims and assessments). Materiality for purposes of this letter includes items involving amounts ex-
ceeding $25,000 individually or items involving lesser amounts that exceed $50,000 in the ag-
gregate. The description of each case should include: 
1 The nature of the litigation. 
2 The progress of the case to date. 
3. How management is responding or intends to respond to the litigation (e.g., to contest the 
case vigorously or to seek out-of-court settlement), and 
4. An evaluation of the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome and an estimate, if one can be 
made, of the amount or range of potential loss. 
Unasserted Claims and Assessments 
We understand that whenever, in the course of performing legal services for us with respect to a mat-
ter recognized to involve an unasserted claim or assessment that may call for financial statement 
disclosure, if you have formed a professional conclusion that we should disclose or consider disclosing 
such possible claim or assessment, as a matter of professional responsibility to us you will so advise us 
and will consult with us concerning the question of such disclosure and the applicable requirements 
of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5. Please specifically confirm to our auditors 
that our understanding is correct. 
We have assured our auditors that you have not advised us of any unasserted claims or assessments 
that are probable of assertion and must be disclosed in accordance with Statement of Financial Ac-
counting Standards No. 5. 
Other Matters 
Please identify the nature and reasons for any limitation on your response. Also, please indicate the 
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amount we (and our subsidiaries) were indebted to you for services and expenses on December 31, 
19X1. 
The scheduled completion date of the auditors' examination is such that you should send your letter 
to Foot, Tick, & Tie, CPAs on or about February 6, 19X2. 
[XYZ Company Signature and Date] 
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Discussant's Response to 
Unique Audit Problems of Small Businesses 
that Operate under Managerial Dominance 
Albert A. Armstrong, Jr. 
Baird, Kurtz, & Dobson 
Let me say at the outset that this is a comprehensive and useful piece of 
research on a subject that is most significant to firms such as my own. I was dis-
appointed that Dan offers no specific solutions to the problems precipitated by 
Sections 320.35 and 320.34 of SAS No. 1 and apparently endorses the recom-
mendations of the Cohen Commission calling for "additional guidance specifically 
applicable to audits of smaller entities . . . " by the AICPA. Since I have no quar-
rel with the basic facts presented in the paper, I shall attempt to address these two 
areas to which I have referred. Let it be understood that the following opinions are 
my own and do not necessarily reflect the position of my firm on these matters. 
Unique Problem 
In my opinion, the problem of management override or dominance is not 
"unique" to the small business. Any objective review of major audit failures will 
reveal that they are primarily the result of management fraud or misrepresenta-
tion. Thus the single greatest audit risk, regardless of the size of the entity under 
review, may well be the integrity of management or, as I prefer to call it, 
"Management Bias.'' 
The unique aspect of management override in the small business sector, as 
defined in the paper, is the relative ease with which management can manipulate 
the accounting records. It is seldom necessary to resort to "policy writing par-
ties," peer group pressure or other elaborate ruses commonly found to be the 
causative factors in major audit failures. Due to his "limited financial and ac-
counting experience and capability," the manager of the small enterprise is nor-
mally limited to simple misstatement of assets and liabilities. 
Since the normal bias of the financially healthy small business is toward 
minimization of income taxes, the most frequent result is understatement of assets 
and income. Although the auditor should be as concerned with understatement as 
overstatement, I think it is fair to state that fewer auditors come to grief for the 
former than the latter. 
Don Ziegler, in his paper presented earlier in this symposium, has offered a 
succinct and highly perceptive description of the audit attitudes necessary to deal 
with the risk of management override or fraud: 
1. Watch out for overstated assets and understated liabilities. 
2. Be wary of related party transactions. 
3. Pay particular attention to large, complex transactions. 
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4. Get to know your client, his business and his industry before you 
report on his financial statements. 
With the exception of Item 3, his formula is as applicable to the small entity as 
the largest. It should be noted that Don has not attempted to specify which 
auditing procedures are most effective in achieving his stated objectives. 
Management bias must be evaluated on each engagement before meaningful 
final audit planning can take place. The forces tending to encourage "overstate-
ment" have been discussed many times. A t the risk of redundancy, the auditor 
should be alert to: 
1. Significant contemplated borrowing or refinancing. 
2. Merger and sale negotiations. 
3. Management motivational devices such as: 
a. Budgets and quotas 
b. Incentive compensation 
c. Stock option plans 
4. General financial health of entity. 
There is an old saying in financial circles; "If a statement is good, it's proba-
bly better, and if it's bad, it's probably worse.'' 
The interest of the A I C P A in the problem of "management bias" as evi-
denced by official pronouncements is of relatively recent origin. The following 
statements on auditing standards pertain to one aspect or another of the problem: 
SAS 6 (July, 1975) Related Party Transactions 
SAS 12 (January, 1976) Inquiry of a Client's Lawyer Concerning 
Litigation, Claims and Assessments 
SAS 16 (January, 1977) The Independent Auditor's Responsibility 
for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities 
SAS 17 (January, 1977) Illegal Acts by Clients 
SAS 19 (June, 1977) Client Representations 
SAS 20 (August, 1977) Required Communications of Weaknesses 
in Internal Accounting Control 
Reliance on Internal Controls in the Small Business Environment 
Dan has correctly identified a major problem faced by the auditor of the small 
enterprise having limited controls, all of which are readily subject to management 
override. I am sure that we all accept the premise that audits are socially and 
economically useful. If we accept the capitalist notion that costs and benefits must 
be kept in a proper relationship, we must constantly challenge any audit pro-
cedural requirement that does not contribute in a meaningful way to the process 
of reaching an informed opinion as to the fairness of presentation of the financial 
statements under review. 
The reliance on internal controls is, in my opinion, the most talked about and 
least understood of the audit concepts. Prior to 1972, authoritative literature and 
pronouncements referred to internal controls and internal check. Internal check 
was defined as, "Procedures designed to safeguard assets against defalcation or 
other irregularities.'' 
SAP 54 (1972) represented a major effort to re-define the auditor's evaluation 
of internal control. Among other things, it: 
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1. Revised and expanded the definition of internal control and introduced 
four new terms. 
a. Accounting controls—"The plan of organization and all methods 
and procedures that are concerned mainly with, and relate directly 
to, the safeguarding of assets and the reliability of the financial 
records. They generally include such controls as the systems of 
authorization and approval, separation of duties concerned with 
record keeping and accounting reports from those concerned with 
operations or asset custody, physical controls over assets, and in-
ternal auditing.'' 
b. Administrative controls—"The plan of organization and all 
methods and procedures that are concerned mainly with opera-
tional efficiency and adherence to managerial policies and usually 
relate only indirectly to the financial records. They generally in-
clude such controls as statistical analyses, time and motion studies, 
performance reports, employee training programs and quality con-
trols." 
c. Tests of compliance—Tests designed to provide reasonable 
assurance that the accounting control procedures are being applied 
as prescribed. 
d. Substantive tests—Tests of details of transactions and balances and 
analytical review of significant ratios and trends and resulting in-
vestigation of unusual fluctuations and questionable items. 
2. Dropped the concept of separate internal check. 
3. Described an inverse relationship between reliance on substantive tests 
and internal accounting controls. 
4. Described management override as one of several limitations on the 
effectiveness of internal accounting controls. 
The second standard of field work states that, "There is to be a proper study 
and evaluation of the existing internal control as a basis for reliance thereon and 
for the determination of the resultant extent of the tests to which auditing pro-
cedures are to be restricted.'' 
Frankly, I do not feel that the second standard comprehended the expanded 
definition of internal accounting controls enunciated in SAP 54. I feel that the 
auditor is required to acquire an understanding of the client's accounting system. 
A "proper study" of internal accounting controls (as defined in SAP 54) in cir-
cumstances in which the auditor realizes intuitively that such controls do not exist 
is an absurdity. 
There is support for this position in authoritative literature. To paraphrase 
Montgomery's Auditing, 9th edition (The Ronald Press Company, 1975), pages 
132 and 133: 
The underlying system has to be understood and the understanding con-
firmed. Thus a transaction review (walk through) at least is called for in 
every company being audited . . . the conclusion reached may be . . . to 
proceed directly to substantive tests because there is not sufficient reason 
to rely on controls . . . It may be unnecessary to complete an internal con-
trol questionnaire, or a special "small business questionnaire" may be 
useful. Clearly if he already knows he cannot rely on some or all controls, 
functional tests of those controls serve no purpose. 
Our own firm distinguishes between procedures (the accounting system itself 
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including the activities of the owner/manager) and controls (that which we can 
rely upon to reduce substantive testing). 
In most small business audits substantive tests are performed at the balance 
sheet date and close attention is paid to cutoff procedures. Engagement partners 
are chosen for their knowledge of the industry and extensive use is made of 
analytic procedures. We feel that it is our responsibility to assure that the 
owner/manager is utilizing procedures to protect his company's assets from 
employee defalcation and irregularities. 
I feel that it would be beneficial to the entire profession if the A I C P A would 
clarify the meaning of "Proper Study and Evaluation of Existing Internal Con-
trol." 
The Need for Additional Guidance in Auditing Small Business 
When the C P A assumed his rightful place among the professionals, he ac-
cepted certain responsibilities as well as privileges. Traditionally, responsibility 
begets authority and with them goes the accountability which no professional per-
son can hope to escape. In the observance of generally accepted auditing stand-
ards, the independent auditor must exercise his judgment in determining which 
auditing procedures are necessary in the circumstances to afford a reasonable basis 
for his opinion. His judgment is required to be the informed judgment of a 
qualified professional person. 
In my opinion, the standard-setting authorities for any profession should limit 
themselves, wherever possible, to the enunciation of objective type standards 
similar in nature to what architects refer to as "performance specifications" as 
opposed to specific procedural type pronouncements. Official pronouncements 
were never intended to comprehend a step by step "cook book'' approach. 
Pressure for the "cook book" approach is brought about by several factors. 
We live in a litigious society. The class action suit coupled with the adoption of 
" n o fault" insurance laws by most states have unleashed upon the accounting 
and other professions a great deal of unwanted legal attention. Further, govern-
mental agencies are adopting an aggressive consumer-oriented stance in their 
dealing with the professionals. In such a climate, it is understandable why profes-
sionals of all disciplines should be seeking asylum from these forces. 
These pressures, however, must be resisted by professionals in policy-making 
positions. I have attempted, herein, to enumerate a few reasons for this conclu-
sion: 
• Many firms, including my own, tend to accept pronouncements like 
the "Tablets of Moses." 
• Specific procedural pronouncements tend to set a ceiling as well as a 
floor on standards. Innovation is stifled. 
• Specific pronouncements tend to be interpreted legalistically and 
present problems in interpretation. The three statements on auditing 
standards cited by Dan Guy as causing concern to auditors of small 
businesses (SAS 12, 19 and 20) are all of a procedural nature. 
If one can equate, in his thinking, the collision of two ships at sea with an audit 
failure, we might learn something from the experience of the maritime profession 
in rule making. Rule 2b, " T h e General Prudential Rule" of the International 
Navigation Rules, reads as follows: 
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"In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had to 
all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, in-
cluding the limitations of the vessels involved, which may make a depar-
ture from these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger.'' 
Guidance in the application of specific audit procedures to particular situations 
is essentially a function of education and experience and should appropriately 
come from the schools of accountancy, the writings of learned men of the profes-
sion, and symposiums such as that which we are attending. The ad hoc adoption 
of standards such as SAS 20 in response to pressure from regulatory bodies or 
congressional committees must be resisted whenever and wherever possible if the 
profession is to retain its integrity. 
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The Accounting Profession in the 1980's— 
Some SEC Perspectives 
George C. Mead 
Securities and Exchange Commission* 
I am very pleased to respond to Howard Stettler's invitation to speak on the 
topic, as Howard put it, "the SEC's position regarding the accounting profession 
in 1985." Of course, the response cannot be direct. The Commission has no 
such "master plan," nor does it desire one, nor would such preconception be 
wise in these fast-evolving times. 
However, there are some themes in the actions of the Commission and in the 
words of Chairman Williams and other SEC spokesmen which are indicative of the 
Commission's general expectations of and concerns about the profession in the 
1980's. There are in my view two underlying themes. The Commission is 
sincerely committed to the policy of self-regulation by the profession; it is also 
committed to "active oversight" of the profession. These seemingly contradic-
tory statements will come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the Commis-
sion's activities and annual reports to Congress, or who follows its relationships 
with the ASB, FASB, and the SECPS and its Public Oversight Board. 
Unfortunately, to base very specific predictions about the profession in the 
80's on these two features of the present climate would be questionable, even if 
the prevailing economic and social winds hold steady. Nevertheless, I believe we 
can take these two themes—that the profession is and should be and will remain a 
profession and that the SEC will continue its oversight role in helping interpret 
that which is reasonable in various public expectations for accounting and for 
business in general—second, add some observations about the climate in which 
we all operate, and then add some comments on certain areas where change is 
now occurring or is perceived as necessary—and from all this gain some feeling for 
the Commission's hopes for the accounting profession in this new decade. 
The Environment—Economic, Social, Legal, Professional 
Let me turn now to some comments about the environment in which we find 
ourselves. First, economic: the combination of inflation, recession, and ques-
tionable energy supplies have made the public much more conscious of economic 
* The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any 
private publications by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues on the staff of the 
Commission. 
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matters—and of economic measurements. The amounts, sources, and uses of cor-
porate profits (and losses) are often front-page news, and debate as to the proper 
measurement thereof is, appropriately, no longer left solely to accountants. Some 
major unexpected failures, of both corporations and municipalities, have also 
underscored the importance of accounting and in some cases have led to question-
ing of the auditors' responsibilities. 
Second, the social environment: questions of "to whom and for what ends is 
the corporation accountable'' are heard regularly. Widespread disclosures of ques-
tionable payments and illegal acts, and some glaring instances of fraud, have con-
tributed to this, as have increasing concerns for the physical environment and 
relations with employees, customers, and so forth. Changing views on corporate 
accountability do—and should—affect the role of the auditor. 
Third, the legal environment: this litigious era makes both business and the 
profession understandably cautious in responding to economic and social changes. 
Thus, where voluntary efforts such as disclosure of (and the C P A ' s review of) soft 
data may seem appropriately responsive, there is timidity—which only augments 
normal human inertia. Where standards or regulations have been promulgated, 
too frequently it is their letter rather than their spirit which is heeded. The in-
terest of Congress in accounting, as shown in the oil and gas legislation, the 
F C P A , and the Metcalf-Moss-Eagleton Committees' scrutiny of the profession, 
may be flattering in some ways but also invites legalistically defensive attitudes. 
Thus the profession, and with it the Commission, finds itself in a climate of 
conflicting and changing views on corporate accountability and the related roles of 
accounting data and the audit function. It is also a time of impatience with 
consensus-building. "Leadership"—usually and often necessarily translated, 
"rule-writing"—is expected of the profession and/or the Commission. Surely the 
"pronouncement explosion" of the 1970's will continue in this decade, given 
the economic, social and legal factors at hand. 
One other factor should be noted. Accountants seem to be changing. It is 
becoming easier for many practitioners to speak of the "accounting industry'' or 
"business" rather than "the profession." Consulting services are often viewed 
as not only an audit client service but as the major area of real growth opportu-
nity, in a profession obsessed by growth. Clearly, there is business justification— 
the profession must remain economically and intellectually attractive to retain its 
talent. Nevertheless, Professor Briloff is not the only party concerned with 
whether the growth of the aggressive consultant mentality may be affecting the 
"typical auditor." 
So this is the environment and the profession which is our concern tonight. 
T o reiterate my themes, one, the SEC hopes and expects the profession to be just 
that—a profession—in the 80s and beyond. That is: 
• to respond first to the public interest, however that is reasonably 
interpreted. 
• to practice, as firms and as individuals, in the spirit as well as the letter 
of articulations of the public interest. 
• to maintain, as the organized profession, public confidence through 
credible self-regulation. 
A t the same time, (theme two) the Commission will continue to play an active 
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and visible oversight role to ensure that the private sector exercises initiative in a 
timely and effective manner. 
Some Developing Areas 
I would like to turn now to a few developing areas, which I believe serve to il-
lustrate the profession's changing environment and the present course of private 
and public standard-setting. These are: 
1) "supplementary data'' and limited reviews thereof; 
2) corporate accountability, including governance structure and the 
specific case of internal accounting control reports; 
3) a corollary to items one and two, the "auditor of record" or 
continuous audit concept; and, 
4) professional self-regulation. 
Supplementary Data/Limited Reviews 
The era of "soft information" is rather rapidly evolving upon us. Inflation-
adjusted numbers, forward-looking data, management's analyses and policy 
statements—these are ideas whose time, perhaps with a push from our infla-
tionary economy, has come. The profession is facing the additional challenge of 
increasing expectations regarding its role in the broader area of financial report-
ing. A significant response has been the AICPA's designation of the FASB as the 
authoritative source of standards for disclosure of information outside the confines 
of the financial statements. The Board's Statement of Financial Accounting Con-
cepts No. 1 specifies this broader view; Statement No. 33, "Financial Reporting 
and Changing Prices," requires supplementary, non-statement disclosures. 
The SEC's contributions have included the ASR No. 190 "replacement 
cost'' disclosures (now rescinded), R R A (the reporting of valuations of proved oil 
and gas reserves), and various inducements to disclose forward-looking informa-
tion. Currently outstanding is a set of proposals—the so-called "integration proj-
ect.'' While this project has many facets, a very significant aspect is one portion of 
the proposed 10-K amendment. This would change the focus of "management's 
discussion and analysis'' and certain five-year summary data items to elicit mean-
ingful information on three financial aspects: liquidity, capital resources and 
results of operations. Narrative discussion of the effects of inflation on the business 
entity would also be called for—even if the company is not required to present the 
supplementary information required by FASB Statement No. 33. Not coinciden-
tally, the proposals would provide management with the opportunity to present 
more forward-looking information. 
In general, the primacy of the basic annual financial statements as the focus of 
reporting activity and thus of auditor attention is being eroded. Disclosures of 
breakdowns of historical data, such as quarterly and business segment informa-
tion, have also caused rethinking of the costs and benefits of various levels of audit 
assurance. 
Happily, the Commission has demonstrated faith in the ability of auditors to 
add credibility to management's disclosures, even if the degree is less than that 
presumed in the standard audit of historical cost financial statements. It seems 
beyond question that means will be devised for explicit reporting by auditors on 
supplementary, nonfinancial statement, disclosures. 
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There are, of course, many problems (or more positively, challenging matters) 
to resolve. Many of the disclosure standards are new, some seem vague, many re-
main to be articulated. The same is true of developing limited review standards. 
There are obvious costs, unmeasurable benefits, and client opposition. And there 
are uncharted responsibilities, that is, liabilities. 
SAS No. 27 is a positive step (and not the first one). However (to quote Chair-
man Williams): 
I am concerned that present standards do not require that auditors report 
on the nature and results of their reviews of supplementary information. 
Reporting the nature of the auditor's procedures and how they differ from 
an audit would provide an important communicating channel between the 
profession and the users of financial statements.1 
The Auditing Standards Board is understandably quite sensitive to the liability 
implications of explicit limited assurances. It is probably fair to concede that 
definitive answers will come only from testing before the courts. Nevertheless, the 
Commission is aware of the complex issue of auditor liability. It has acted, and is 
contemplating further action, to defuse some of the more serious liability obstacles 
(though it does not wish to remove all auditor responsibility). 
In June 1979, the Commission adopted a safe harbor rule offering certain pro-
tection from liability where forward-looking information, along with related 
assumptions, is disclosed or reaffirmed in SEC filings (under both the 1933 and 
1934 Acts) or annual reports to shareholders. This includes projections of finan-
cial items, statements of management plans and objectives, and management 
discussion and analysis items which concern future economic performance. In ad-
dition, the Commission has proposed to extend safe harbor to certain supplemen-
tary information dealing with the effects of changing prices and with oil and gas 
reserve information. 
The Commission has also taken action relating specifically to the liability of 
auditors under Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act for their reports on supplementary 
information as to changing prices and oil and gas reserves, if such reports are re-
quired. As you may be aware, Section 11(a) imposes liability on an accountant for 
misstatements or omissions of material facts in a registration statement which in-
cludes his report, unless he had, after "reasonable investigation," grounds to 
believe that the information was true. The problem raised by this standard, of 
course, is that limited reviews contemplated by the Auditing Standards Board do 
not afford the auditor a sufficient basis to judge the " t ruth" of the supplemental 
data reviewed. The proposed rule amendments are similar to the Commission's 
recent action in ASR No. 274, the effect of which is to exclude reports by auditors 
on unaudited interim information (which under SAS No. 24 are based on review 
procedures less than an audit) from potential liability under Sections 7 and 11 of 
the Securities Act. 
However appropriate these precedents may be, they still a) represent an item 
by item approach rather than a general position on soft data and b) do not fully 
clarify the auditor-reviewer's legal responsibility under the securities acts. To 
again quote Chairman Williams: 
There are some who assert—and I might add, fairly persuasively—that ac-
countants should not be given a blanket exemption of this sort from liabil-
150 
ity under Section 11(a). Thus, I anticipate that the Commission may, in 
the near future, request comments on alternative approaches to the issue. 
The result of that process could be liability for failure to comply with the 
applicable professional standards. 
In any case, I fully expect that the liability question soon will be clarified 
and that requirements for accountants' reports expressing limited 
assurances on the basis of reviews of supplementary information will be 
resolved. This process reflects the Commission's belief—similar to that 
suggested by the Hochfelder decision—that there must be a fair and 
reasonable balance between, on one side, the need to ensure responsible 
auditing services, and, on the other, the burdens and liabilities placed on 
the accounting profession.2 
The growing importance of non-financial statement disclosures, both "soft" 
and analytical, and auditor association therewith, provides a clear example of the 
twin themes of this address—the SEC and the profession in tension—a creative 
tension. The Commission has provided much of the impetus for interims, 
forward-looking data, and inflation adjusted data, and is continuing to do so with 
the proposed expansion of management's discussion and analysis. The profes-
sion's standard-setting bodies have contributed significantly in guiding the im-
plementation of these initiatives. 
Supplemental data also provides an example of the frustrating problem of com-
pliance with the letter rather than the spirit of standards. The proposed manage-
ment discussion is a good illustration. The existing guidelines have become laden 
with all manner of interpretations and materiality policies; too frequently, the 
discussion is a bare recounting of the most obvious. The proposal attempts to 
elicit more meaningful disclosure by being purposefully indefinite; at one point it 
says, in effect, "tell investors about your liquidity and capital structure." 
However, many commentators have complained about this lack of specificity. For 
reasons both mean and defensive (legally), there is great reluctance to exercise pro-
fessional judgment in interpreting and enforcing the spirit or intent of standards 
and regulations. 
This pervasive professional problem is also illustrated by the current recon-
sideration of the term "fairly presents" in the standard audit report. The 
Auditing Standards Board is presently considering some significant changes in 
that report, one of which would substitute " i n accordance with G A A P appropri-
ate in the circumstances" for "fair . " The Office of the Chief Accountant is not 
especially supportive of this, despite the Cohen Commission recommendation, 
though it would feel more comfortable if more discussion of "appropriateness'' or 
"preferability of measurement and disclosure choices" were provided (either by 
the ASB or FASB). In any event, "fairness"—the judgment of management and 
the auditor as to overall impressions conveyed—cannot be avoided. The Securities 
Acts and the courts demand disclosure which is "not misleading." 
This "fairness-preferability-spirit of the standard" area is admittedly difficult. 
A n d as we move further from the anchor of the financial statements and experi-
ence a proliferation of "bottom lines," "fairness" is becoming even more 
amorphous. Still, the public expects disclosure of substance rather than mere com-
pliance with rules, and one way or another this demand will be served. 
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Corporate Accountability 
Any discussion of the profession in the coming years should pay some heed to 
changing popular expectations about business corporations and their manage-
ment. Auditors certainly are affected by what a company "is for" and how it is 
governed. Clearly, more is being expected of the auditor's role than a blessing of 
profit measures. That evolving role, only one of several in the broader context of 
corporate accountability, is not, and cannot, be entirely self-defined by the profes-
sion. 
There are two related areas here—for what should corporations be accounta-
ble and by means of what formal structure (that is, the corporate governance 
issue). 
Corporate Objectives 
As to basic corporate objectives beyond creation of value (or cash) for in-
vestors, we are all aware of the "social responsibility" school of thought. Where 
environmental and social concerns have been enacted into law, there are generally 
avenues of information and enforcement that do not involve the SEC or at present 
involve auditors. Yet, it is not inconceivable that the independent auditor could 
become involved in some of these matters, for example, as a result of calls for ex-
panded "social disclosures" for the benefit of those investors who are not totally 
economically motivated. Even assuming that formal reporting will retain a 
primarily financial orientation, FAS No. 5 may be more broadly interpreted in 
disclosures of "social costs." A related example is the Commission's presently 
required disclosure of contingent future environmental costs including costs of 
litigation, and its policy, recently clarified in the interpretative release issued con-
currently with the settlement of proceedings involving U.S. Steel, which states 
that disclosure may be necessary " . . . to prevent . . . financial statements [etc.] 
. . . from being misleading . . . if a corporation has a policy or approach toward 
compliance with environmental regulations which is reasonably likely to result in 
substantial fines [or] penalties. . . " 3 
Another "accountable for what'' area is that of illegal acts by or on behalf of 
the corporation. The general, though simplistic, assumption is that companies 
should operate within the law, and that the corporate governance structure should 
deter illegal acts. However, many matters of definition and implementation re-
main unsettled. These include questions of whom should be informed of such 
acts—top management, the board of directors, the public—and on what basis of 
evidence and concept of materiality. 
Turning to "irregularities," the Cohen Commission Report contained certain 
"recommendations . . . intended to add to the substance of the standard of care 
for fraud detection."4 Some of these recommendations already have been acted 
upon (note SAS No. 22—"Planning and Supervision," SAS No. 23— 
"Analytical Review Procedures," and Statement on Quality Control Standards 
No. 1). The continuing and considerable private sector initiatives (as evidenced by 
three of the papers at this Conference), along with increased involvement by direc-
tors, may yet provide realistic and responsive answers to these very difficult ques-
tions of disclosure and auditor responsibility regarding irregularities and illegal 
acts. In any event, neither the Commission nor the profession acts in a vacuum 
regarding these issues of business philosophy and law. 
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There is, of course, agreement that management has certain stewardship 
responsibilities. A n d the current "big issue'' in this area is the report by manage-
ment on the state of its internal accounting control. As you know, the Commis-
sion's proposed rule would have required such a report, accompanied by the 
auditor's comment thereon. The proposal was recently withdrawn, although 
"tabled" more accurately describes the Commission's action for it retains a very 
active interest in the matter. 
Such a report is not mandated by the FCPA, nor was the Commission's pur-
pose in its proposal a direct result of the accounting provisions of the Act. Rather, 
the Commission believes that reports on control systems provide information 
useful to investors in general but more specifically to the company's present 
shareholders—information for its own sake as a partial indicator of their manage-
ment's performance of stewardship responsibilities as well as having implications 
for the quality of unaudited public information. In addition, it is my personal belief 
that IAC reports may be related to the same perceptions of public concern for 
American corporate conduct that underlay the F C P A legislation. 
There are, obviously, some very substantive and unresolved questions of 
definition and liability. It should be emphasized though, that the Commission has 
not dismissed internal control reports. Chairman Williams' words nicely sum-
marize its position in withdrawing the proposal: 
I am receptive to arguments that private sector initiatives, such as that 
proposed by the Financial Executives Institute and by various public ac-
counting firms, should be given the opportunity to work. The Commis-
sion, of course, is watching developments on this subject with interest, 
and, where these initiatives conform to the objectives of the new Act, will 
take them into account in determining its course of action.5 
It seems obvious that the accounting provisions of the Act have significant im-
plications and that management statements on internal control are becoming a 
reality, whether in the long run they are molded by individual firms' initiatives, 
guided by private sector standards, SEC-mandated, or some combination thereof. 
Accountability Mechanisms 
Let us move now from the "for what" to the " h o w " of corporate 
accountability—mechanisms for corporate governance and possible effects on the 
auditor's role therein. 
The modern corporation is an extraordinarily complex system in which, 
among others, managers, directors, lawyers and auditors (both internal and in-
dependent) play important roles. In combination, their often subtle interrelation-
ships determine the quality of corporate accountability. In this system, the audit 
function, both directly, and indirectly by monitoring other controls, advances the 
corporate accountability process and influences the corporation's financial 
discipline. 
Both formal corporate structure and shareholder participation are involved 
here. As to developments in the area of structure: 
• Corporate boards which are more independent of management and 
more involved in the company's affairs. 
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The SEC supports this movement through moral suasion, through ordered set-
tlements of enforcement actions, and implicitly by inclusion of relevant 
disclosures in proxy information. As this trend develops, the profession has a 
significant opportunity in helping to meet corporate directors' information needs. 
I recommend " T h e Strategic Audi t , " a recent Journal of Accountancy article, 
for some interesting observations in this regard.6 
• Audit committees 
There is no need to recount the perceived importance of functional audit commit-
tees for auditors, internal and external, and for corporate accountability structure 
in general. A large majority of public companies have them; they are a New York 
Stock Exchange listing requirement. Also, certain companies have consented to 
audit committees, with defined membership and duties, as a feature of their set-
tlements of SEC enforcement proceedings. 
• Corporate legal counsel 
The American Bar Association is reconsidering the matter of whether "the cor-
poration," its board, its shareholders, or the management is the attorney's client. 
There is a theory that an attorney, who knows of actions (actual or contemplated) 
of management which because of their questionable legality could be detrimental 
to the company, has a duty to demand that management apprise the board, if not 
"the public" as well. If this view prevails, there could be implications for 
auditors—for example, attorney-CPA communication may be facilitated. 
• Formal Codes of Management Ethics 
The Cohen Commission, among others, has advocated that management disclose 
the existence and monitoring of such a code and that the auditor opine on that 
assertion. The implementation and publicizing of such reform measures could 
well improve the public's image of business. The private sector—the profession, 
but more fundamentally the business community—has an opportunity for in-
itiative. 
Turning briefly to shareholder democracy, here the activities range from the 
fundamental to the more evolutionary. The "Corporate Democracy Act of 
1980," recently introduced in the House of Representatives, would require 
among other things "constituency boards of directors," expanded disclosures, 
and "community impact analyses" in connection with plant closings. If this, or 
some of the other more radical of the legislative proposals were to pass, there 
would surely be major and unpredictable effects on business in general, and on the 
profession and perhaps the structure of accounting theory, as well. More pro-
cedural is the "corporate accountability project" of the SEC's Division of Cor-
poration Finance. While this study could result in proposed proxy rule amend-
ments, it seems doubtful that such proposals will involve extension of the respon-
sibilities of independent auditors. 
In summary, the corporate governance area is perhaps a better example of the 
profession's opportunity for constructive response than for initiative. Account-
ants are rather ill-positioned to initiate changes, but can, must, and are, adapting 
to whatever evolves. 
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Auditors—both outside auditors and internal auditors—are major con-
tributors to the effective corporate accountability process which is an alter-
native to further governmental intrusions into the private sector's 
decision-making process.7 
"Auditor-of-Record" Concept 
The audit should be considered a function to be performed during a period 
of time, rather than an audit of a particular set of financial statements . . . 
(It) should expand to include all important elements of the financial report-
ing process.8 
Thus did the Cohen Commission advocate the continuous auditing or auditor-of-
record concept. This was in a context which included regular association with in-
terim reports and evaluation of the full period's internal accounting control. As 
financial reporting expands and the corporate governance structure evolves—also, 
as basic audit approaches and techniques become less seasonal—it seems to be a 
natural development. 
This is, it seems to me, the expectation of the Commission. The SEC is in-
terested in and favors the concept. There were, of course, the actions of a few 
years ago which involved auditors in quarterly data. I believe it is fair to say that at 
present the staff posture is to encourage continued private sector initiatives re-
garding quarterly reviews and, by implication, further formalization of the 
auditor-of-record status. 
Professional Self-Regulation 
The new SEC Practice Section-Public Oversight Board structure provides the 
most vivid example of the clash and cooperation between the profession and the 
public sector in responding to the impetus of public expectations. The structure, 
still very much in the development and testing stage, is complex and subtle. The 
chain runs from the firm's own quality control mechanisms, to peer reviews of the 
firm by the SECPS, to POB monitoring of those reviews, to the SEC—whose over-
sight activity will be heavily influenced by the Commission's evaluation of the ef-
fectiveness of the POB as an overseer of the profession's self-regulatory program. 
The peer review program is the centerpiece. If carried out meaningfully and if 
coupled with effective disciplinary procedures, the profession will have im-
plemented a significant, though expensive and difficult, change. The effectiveness 
of this new program is understandably not yet resolved. The Commission hopes 
ultimately to be able to rely heavily on the POB's monitoring. However, it is still 
felt necessary for the SEC staff to have sufficient access to peer review workpapers 
to permit an overall evaluation of the reviews themselves and of the Board's 
supervision, both for the Commission's own satisfaction and so that it may report 
credibly to Congress. 
The difficulty in arriving at a mutually acceptable arrangement here is only in 
part due to technical or jurisdictional problems. More fundamentally, it reflects 
the profession's fears on the one hand (for example, that the Commission would 
use access to detailed documents to institute proceedings against firms) and on the 
other hand the SEC's need to assure integrity of the process (while not wanting its 
involvement to include a "blanket pardon''). There is probably no better example 
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of the need for regulator and professional statesmanship than the continuing "ac-
cess" negotiations. 
The major issue of disciplinary "clout" also is progressing. Last November, 
the SECPS established a "Special Investigations Committee'' and set forth Rules 
of Procedures for the Imposition of Sanctions. It remains to be seen whether the 
Section can complement and perhaps even obviate some of the SEC's enforcement 
work by invoking discipline which is both constructive and credible—or whether 
this function de facto will remain primarily with the Commission. Obviously, it is 
a "sticky" matter. 
The Public Oversight Board, composed of distinguished members of the 
public, occupies a unique position as the "go between" in the regulatory-
professional nexus. 
The POB must be sufficiently detached from the accounting profession to 
guide the effort objectively and to ensure that the profession does not lose 
sight of the goals which it must achieve. While the Board's authority is ad-
visory only, it can and should—by virtue of its stature—serve as a con-
science, critic and leader. But it is not yet clear whether the POB is 
prepared to assume this responsibility.9 
One matter underlying this less than ringing endorsement is the Commis-
sion's position on the "scope of services" issue, which differs at least in emphasis 
from that of the POB, and indeed it seems from much of the profession. Audit in-
dependence vs. consulting is, of course, an especially vexing matter, for it is intrin-
sically a question primarily of attitudes rather than hard evidence. ASR Nos. 250 
and 264 have been severely criticized as being too threatening and vague in at-
tacking an allegedly non-existent problem. The Commission, as you know, felt 
the POB and the profession to be "not adequately sensitized" to public percep-
tions. But it is reluctant to go beyond mandating disclosure of fees and directors' 
approvals at this point—instead, it much prefers that the profession grapple with 
the "scope" issue. 
One major feature of ASR No. 264 is the so-called "global test"—that is, an 
expression of the Commission's general concern that auditing firms be primarily 
in the practice of auditing. The philosophy of ASR No. 264 is that while there is 
generally no current problem, the profession should be alert to the potential, given 
the increasing importance and scope of consulting services. 
ASR No. 264 is indeed vague, but would more detailed rules be more 
realistic? Let us consider three example situations, the latter two hypothetical: 
• the 10% audit, 90% tax-writeup-consulting firm 
• a management consulting firm, which forms or acquires an auditing 
subsidiary 
• a C P A firm, where a majority of its billings and executive partners are 
non-accounting-related 
In any of these is actual audit quality necessarily impaired? Is even the probability 
of impairment higher? How will such firms—and indirectly the whole auditing 
profession—be perceived? How would the Commission view firms two or three 
(especially if either has been given a "clean'' peer review)? It is frustrating that 
none of these questions have clear answers. However, resort to detailed rules and 
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proscriptions would surely be more form than substance, i.e., give comfort (to 
firms, to the public, even to the SEC) that could be illusory. 
Hopefully, the "veiled threats" of ASR No. 264 (as some characterize them) 
and "sensitivity" on the part of firms and the SECPS will be sufficient to avoid 
cases of actual impairment of audit quality, the bottom line, as well as of a firm's 
professional image. 
Conclusion 
What generalizations can be made about the SEC's "perspectives" for the 
'80s, for the profession and itself? What are its hopes and expectations? 
As to the profession, the 1980's would appear to be a time of digesting the 
truly significant developments of the 1970's—soft data, limited reviews, audit 
committees, peer reviews, internal accounting control, the Cohen Commission 
Report, as major examples. A great deal of experimentation and definition remain, 
but the profession has broken ground in several ways to enhance its role in cor-
porate accountability. It must, and I believe it will, now 
. . . guard against the tendency to become complacent, or to develop an at-
titude that enough, or too much, has already been done—or that much of 
what is being done is not substantively necessary or cost justifiable, but 
rather a mandatory tithe to keep powerful but misguided external forces at 
bay.10 
The Commission is certainly not eager to formally regulate the profession or 
to set accounting and auditing standards. Dealing with practical impediments to 
broader societal purposes, which cannot be brushed aside as mere nuisances, is a 
clear role for the profession. The private sector will continue to be relied on to 
develop new ideas regarding disclosure, audit technique, and even audit purpose, 
and to aid the implementation of those initiatives which the Commission may feel 
to be necessary—and to take some of the grief that comes with new standards. 
Further, in Clarence Sampson's words: "It is inherent that professionals are more 
likely to respond in a professional manner when enforcing their own standards 
than when complying with rules imposed by government."11 
Turning to the Commission, it too needs to be sensitive and practicable—and I 
believe is generally demonstrating these qualities. It will surely continue to oc-
cupy a dominant role in interpreting public expectations. This seems inevitable 
because of the SEC's mandate under the securities laws, its "broader-than- ac-
counting" function in corporate accountability, and, relative to private sector 
standards bodies, its capacity to act. There is no desire to preempt the FASB, 
ASB, POB, etc., but rather, as an overseer, to assure that standards adopted fall 
with a range of acceptable solutions. 
The profession has understandable limits on its ability to undertake major in-
itiatives. However, it is in a quasi-public role—not conscripted into involuntary 
service in a dangerous mission, but it has nevertheless enlisted in a public service, 
under a franchise based on the securities laws of 1933 and 1934. As such, the 
profession with the Commission must heed and interpret reasonable public expec-
tations. 
If only we could predict those expectations (or even agree on what is reasona-
ble today), we could perhaps venture more definitive predictions for the profes-
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sion. But that is difficult. A l l anyone can say about "the Commission's plan for 
the '80s" is an expectation that in tandem—in constructive tension—the profes-
sion and the SEC will enhance the usefulness, and the concomitant responsibilities 
and prestige, of the accounting and auditing functions. 
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